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ABSTRACT
Removed from its historical setting, the concept of
"Indochi nese Federation" has assumed an unintended connota-
tion. Ambiguity and incomplete documentation surrounding the
origins of the concept compounds this dilemma. Consequently,
the usage of "Indochi nese Federation" to exDlain recent
developments in Southeast Asia infers biases which merit care-
ful consideration. When these deficiencies of context and
ambiguity are ignored, the consequence emerges that Viet-
namese actions in Indochina are potentially being interpreted
within a limited spectrum of possible Vietnamese intentions.
This analysis proceeds along two planes; it examines the
historical trend toward regional integration in Indochina,
and it examines the specific concept of an Indochi nese
Federation. While a trend toward greater regional associa-
tions has been observed - both historically and during the
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I. FEDERATION: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
However long it takes, Hanoi is determined to
head an Indo-China federation. That was Ho Chi
Minh's dream in 1930, when he founded the Commu-
nist Party of Indo-China, now the Worker's Party
of Vietnam. That is Hanoi's goal today.
A. INTRODUCTION
Vietnam's December 1978 invasion of Kampuchea rekindled
concern about Hanoi's potential threat to and intentions re-
garding Southeast Asia. As a consequence of recent Vietnam-
ese actions, the validity of the much criticized Domino Theory
has been reassessed. In the context of the Vi etnamese-Kam-
puchean conflict the notion that Vietnam is attempting to
establish an "Indochinese federation" has once again gained
prominence.
Countless volumes have been written on the conflict(s) in
Indochina. The numerous aspects of warfare; its execution,
effects, and lessons have been explored and evaluated. No
doubt that with the perspective only time can impart (and
with the declassification of additional documents) more
volumes will be written. For this there exists a need.
But this analysis is not an account of the wars in Indo-
china per se. Instead, this study has been designed to
explore the themes of expansion and regional integration --
themes deemed fundamental to both historic and present-day
Indochina. In pursuit of this design the following analysis
has chosen to focus on the "federation factor".
8

The federation factor receives its name from the concept
of the "Indochinese federation". As this study will demon-
strate, the notion of a federation in Indochina has implied
different things at different times: It was a notion in the
grand schemes of the Comintern-directed Indochinese Party
during the decade of the 1930s. Federation was a formula
agreed upon between Ho Chi Minn and the French Republic in
1946. In addition, it has emerged as an accusation lodged
against Hanoi by Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea -- an
accusation sustained and parroted by the Peoples Republic of
China, Thailand, and various elements of American society;
government, academia, and the press, etc. It is from this
last element, the U.S. press, that the introductory quote was
excerpted.
This analysis proceeds along two planes. First, it
examines the historical trend toward regional integration in
Indochina. In this trend federation is but one option. And
in this dimension factors are examined which tend toward or
away from a federal formula for association between the Indo-
Chinese federation is deeply rooted in this historical trend.
Second, this analysis specifically looks at the origins
of the notion of an Indochinese federation. This dimension
seeks to answer such questions as:
1) What is the notion of an Indochina federation?
2) Was Ho Chi Minh's "will", his "age-old dream", in
fact the establishment of an Indochinese federation?

3) Why did Vietnam, devastated by years of war, economic
chaos, and presumably bent on efforts to effect re-
construction and national solidarity, invade Kampuchea
in 1978? Was the invasion an effort to establish
such a federation?
4) Do Vietnam's present relations with Laos and Kampuchea
spell federation?
As was stated above, the notion of federation has changed
with time. Wrestling with this fundamental issue has, in
effect, defined the methodological framework employed by this
study. It is the thesis of this analysis that problems of
context, ambiquity, and perspective have rendered the present-
day accusation that Vietnam is attempting to establish an
"Indochina federation" largely irrelevant.
This belief does not contradict the perceived trend toward
regional integration; instead it focuses on it. This belief
does, however, implicitly reject the common notion that
Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea was an attempt to establish a
federation. Consequently, this writer views with some
caution the corrolary implication generally held by those who
support the federation idea -- i.e., that Vietnam poses an
imminent military threat to the remaining non-communist
nations of Southeast Asia.
B. FRAMEWORK AMD METHODOLOGY
The body of this study has been sectioned into four main
areas. This first section introduces the basic concept of
federation in international relations theory. It defines the
relevance of this concept to the domain of this study , I ndochi na
10

This introductory section also constructs an operational
definition of federation and identifies attributes which will
be alluded to throughout the remainder of this analysis. The
second section of this analysis develops a historical
perspective of Indochina in which the trend toward federation
is examined. This section also specifically explores the
origins of the concept of an "Indochinese federation". The
third section examines recent developments in Indochina.
This examination is conducted in two parts. In the regional
setting, it surveys Vietnam's bilateral relations with Laos
and Kampuchea. It addresses the present trend toward
regional integration and identifies factors which augment or
militate against this trend. Specifically, it surveys the
role China and the Soviet Union play in Vietnam's Indochina
policy. The fourth and final section of this study provides
a qualitative summary of the trend analysis and provides
conclusions regarding the specific nature of "Indochina
federation". Such conclusions may prove valuable in
consideration of U.S. policy regard inq Southeast Asia.
Before proceeding with the definition of federation, a
word is necessary regarding the methodology selected to pur-
sue this study.
One of the first problems encountered in the course of
this study was the selection of a methodological framework.
A common framework used to assess events in Indochina since
the Second World War has been to divide the period into three
11

sections; namely, the First Indochina War, the Second Indo-
china War (also known as the Vietnam War), and the Third
Indochina Conflict. Yet, such a framework proved deficient
in addressing the demands of this study, for it had a tendency
to neatly compartmentalize what from the Vietnamese perspec-
tive must be seen as a continuous event, i.e., the constant
challenge to Vietnamese national security and integrity
from external powers since World War II.
What was desired in this analysis of the trend toward
sregional integration with its specific focus on the notion
of federation in Indochina, was a conceptual framework that
facilitated an examination of change over time. And yet, an
open-ended framework that permitted one to look toward the
future was also sought. Thanks to the valuable suggestion
proferred by Douglas Pike, the methodologies of Herman Kahn
were examined. It is the spirit of his trend analysis model,
(i.e., the Basic, Long-Term Multi-Fold Trend Model) -- not
its specific methodology -- in which this examination of the
trend toward regional integration is grounded.
The following final section of this introductory chapter
will address the theory and problems regarding federation's
definition. It will complete the linkage of federation in




Federation has many connotations, and often these have
been used casually. Federation is also mul ti -dimensional . It
serves as a theoretical framework, and has practical appli-
cation. Being both a process and an end result, federation
is a concept which has proven to be difficult to define,
troublesome to operational ize, and painstaking to implement.
The intent with which this chapter was written (and con-
sequently, the spirit with which it should be read) was to
spend the minimum amount of time necessary to examine the
concept of federation. The intent is not to resolve the
difficulties mentioned above; the purpose is to provide an
acceptable, not exhaustive, definition.
While a definition of federation is necessary and rele-
vant to all chapters, it is also but of minor overall impor-
tance. One step in answering the question: "What is the
Indochina Federation?" is to address the nature of federation
itself. The problems of comprising the web in which Indo-
china is entangled, which the purpose of this thesis to to
explore, far transcend the definition of federation.
The following paragraphs will survey some of the diffi-
culties associated with definition. A general definition
will be proposed, and elements characteristic of federation
will be be examined. It is these factors/elements which will
serve as the foundation for future analyses concerning the
trend toward federation in Indochina. Possible alternatives
to federation will also be addressed. Finally, objectives of
federation will be presented.
13

The succeeding discussion will provide an understanding
of the basics of federation to serve as a benchmark for
comparison and contrast. The basics presented here will
provide the reader with the tools necessary to analyze criti-
cally events transpiring in Indochina - and evaluate the
nature of the trend. Is the trend toward federation, or is
it not?
1 . Federation - Working Definition
The process of definition involves a number of steps:
the first is stating what something is, the second is identi-
fying the significant characteristic elements, and the third
is indicating how it can be measured or detected, i.e., the
operational definition. All three elements prevent rather
sticky problems.
As stated earlier, federation is mul ti -dimensi onal . The
definition must address its dual nature of "f ederati on-as-pro
cess" and "f ederati on-as-condi ti on" (or end result). Viewed
as a process, federation in a broad sense, can be conceived
of as movement and/or motivated by free consent, coercion, or
use of (military) force. The end result of the process may
be either a loose of tightly structured association of commu-
nities. With respect to f ederation-a s-condi ti on it is useful
to think in terms of a broad spectrum of alternatives of asso-
ciated states with varying degrees of tightness.
Regarding the operational definition; when viewed as a
process, elements identified as being characteristic of
14

federation should be considered "factors". This will facili-
tate later analysis of Indochina Federation which will be ex-
amined with an eye toward how a factor advances or retards
the process, or how a factor tends toward federation or to-
ward other alternatives. When considering federation-as-con-
dition characteristic elements are to be considered as "pre-
conditions". Current events in Indochina will be evaluated
in terms of how they fulfill, or fail to fulfill, the reaui-
site standards of federation.
Federation as a process demands a few qualifying comments.
Combining territorial communities can result from free choice,
coercion, or forcible aggregation. The process is usually
the result of all elements. Forcible aggregation of terri-
torial communities against their will also goes by the name
of imperialism. Certainly the process of federation
involves a struggle for power; a juggling of the status quo.
Defined in this manner, imperialism in no way compromises
the broad definition of federation; it is not a matter of
either-or. Imperial federation, be it process or condition,
is no stranger in the annals of history. Indeed, it is
this process of imperial federation to which much attention
will be devoted in subsequent chapters.
Finally, fundamental to the definition of federation as a
process is recognition of the problem of analyzing change
over time.
Numerous definitions are available which serve to focus
the concept of federation as a condition. The purpose here,
15

however, is to establish a broad functional definition.
All definitions appear to contain two basic points:
First, in a federation the political authority is
territorially divided between two autonomous sets
of separate jurisdictions, one national and the
other provincial, which both operate directly on
the peopl e.
Second, the existence of a single, indivisible
yet composite federal nation is simultaneously
asserted. °
A federal system entails a consi tuti onal division of power
between one general government (that is to have authority over
the entire national territory) and a series of subnational
governments (that individually have their own independent
authority over their own territories). In summary, a fed-
eration is a system of government in which power to make and
administer laws is divided between a central authority and a
q
number of unit authorities. Federations are entered into
Q
when a number of regions desire union but not unity.
Federation then is a sharing of power, ideally an equi-
table distribution of power. In theory, this is easily stated,
but it is difficult to actually achieve in practice. No
member to a federation can rule out the possibility that one
state may emerge dominant. Federation demands sacrifice of
power and many compromises; quite probably this is federation's
Achilles' heel.
Can federalism, which was conceived in an era of free
economy, maximum private initiative and local responsibility,
and minimal role of government in the economic and social
fields, 10 exist within a communist system? Some experts
16

assert that it can. Duchacek in his work on comparative
federalisms examines the Soviet Federal Union. He maintains
that the polyethnic, multi-level Soviet federalism gives re-
cognition to the cultural and linguistic heterogeneity of the
USSR, but at the same time, ensures that linguistic and cul-
tural autonomy does not interface with the monolithic unity
of the party and the state, both dominated with Russians. 11
While the use of analogy is likely to be misleading, the rel-
evance of Duchacek's comments to Indochina becomes clear if
Vietnam is substituted for the Soviet Union. This scheme,
along with the hazards of comparing federal systems, will be
developed further later.
In countries where the means of production have been
largely collectivized, proposals for "federalization" of the
collective ownership of the means of production are sometimes
1 9
encountered. c Duchacek warns, however, that the term
federalization of collectivized economy should be understood
as meaning: "first, that the ownership and control of the
means of production have been transferred from private hands
to public authorities and, second, that the ownership and
management are not in the hands of one single central author-
ity but have been decentralized". 13 Territorial units such
as provinces, or functional groups such as agricultural or
industrial cooperatives own and run these means of production.
Federation, then, is not necessarily incompatible with
communist systems, not is it unreasonable to speak of federa-
tions in communist systems.
17

Federal relationships in which one member has emerged
dominant are known as asymmetrical federations. The fear of
the weaker units is that the dominant member may transform
the federation into an imperial structure, into a master-
servant or patron-client relationship. This historical pro-
clivity (but certainly not inevitability) of federation has
been pessimistically, yet succinctly, summarized by one
scholar of politics as: "Who says Federation, says domina-
tion of one over the others." 14 This problem translated
into Indochina context would simply result in a Vietnam writ
1 arge.
In a pattern similar to the discussion of federation-as-
process above, the absence of consent distinguishes a forcible
territorial association, usually called empire, from a volun-
tary association whose forms and degrees of cohesion vary. The
following paragraphs will describe variations of federation
as a function of cohesion. An examination of these variations
of federation will serve to further refine our definition.
Is it a prerequisite to answering the question: Is the trend
toward federation, or is it not?
2 . Alternatives to Federation
Since no single definition of federation has proved
satisfactory to all, it is not surprising that it is
difficult to get even the most general agreement as to whether
a federation means something generally different from a treaty
1 c
of alliance or association. While the following para-
graphs will not resolve such problems, they will offer some
generally acceptable points of contrast.
18

a. The Unitary System
The spectrum of alternatives on the subject of
power distribution presents extreme opposites, from a totali-
tarian system on one hand to a loose confederation on the
other. For the purposes of this general discussion, the
"tightest" association to be examined is the unitary system.
In a unitary form of government, all power resides in a
central "parliament" which normally delegates authority. In
this system the central authority is sovereign. This differs
from a federal system where there is no sovereignty except
that which resides in the constitution. In a federation,
sovereign powers are then divided between central and regional
uthorities. Unitary systems have been adopted by demo-
cratic, authoritarian, imperial, and fully totaliarian
1 ft
systems. The central authority, in the unitary system,
determines how much of its power may be delegated. The bottom
line, in the discussion of unitary systems - be they commu-
nist or otherwise - is that the (theoretical) total elimina-
tion of provincial autonomy distinguishes the unitary
system.
b. Confederation
Proceeding in the direction of looser associations
(and by -passing federation proper, which has already been dis-
cussed) leads us to a consideration of confederation. Confed-
eration may be the first step or the end result in formalized
cooperation among territorial communities. The power to
19

conclude treaties with foreign states on the part of lesser
units is identified to be one characteristic of a confederal
1
9
system. The right of succession is a second character-
istic of confederation which further distinguishes it from
federation proper. CVJ A confederation is also character-
ized by a central authority which is either politically or
financially dependent on its component units to the point
where its acts are constrained,
c. Alliances
Alliances are looser associations yet. The defi-
nition of alliance, while also very broad, usually describes
a voluntary association of territorial communities primarily
for the purpose of military defense of their common interests
What constitutes defense, however, is often controversial.
Germane to this debate is the problem of distinguishing "off-
ensive defense" from "defensive defense". * This dilemma,
which is only introduced here, has important consequences for
the countries of Southeast Asia.
Modern alliances are not constrained to military affairs
or defense. The provisions of alliances have expanded to
cover such non-traditional concerns as social and cultural
affairs. Such complex alliances unite territorial units to
form "communities" or "blocs", or confederations. Other usual
features of modern alliances are:




2. The right of "succession" is guaranteed.
3. The principle of unanimity (by negotiated compromise
as opposed to formal vote).
4. Alliances are directed against a common enemy. 22
3. Federation and Alternatives - a Summa ry
Where has this discussion of federation and its alter
natives led us? First, it rejected the argument that imper-
ialism contradicts federation. Second, it sustained the
argument that federations and communist systems are not
mutually exclusive. Third, it provided some criteria by
which to assess the events and trends to be examined in
following chapters. It has provided some aid in answering
the question: "Is the trend toward Federation, or is it
not?" All three elements demanded examination before the
problem of an Indochina Federation could be addressed.
Federation and its alternatives fall into the broad cate-
gory of regional integration. Integration is a subset of
International Relations Theory. Regions, regional integra-
tion, like the concept of federation, is an elusive target in
theory and practice.
Before proceeding with the Mnal step of the definition
process, the operational definition, some possible objectives
of federation merit consideration.
4. Federation - Possible Objectives of :
Although the reasons why states enter into federation
are many, only a few will be discussed. Federation itself
21

may be a means to an end, it may be a pragmatic solution to
problems of trade, population movement, defense, or foreign
policy. Anthony Birch in his study of federation provided
the following objectives:
1. Protection against external pressures, especially
military dangers, can be achieved. We have already
noted the aggregative effect of an external threat.
Subversion by the imperialist tactics of "divide
and rule" may often be neutralized by a defensive
federal compact.
2. Benefits to all may be derived from bringing the
diplomatic and military assets of member units
into a common pool - benefits that may be trans-
lated into qreater internal security and progress
or, possibly, external expansion.
3. Economic advantages may accrue to all from planning,
working, and exchanging products in a larger mar-
ket and production area.
5. Federation - the Operational Definition
The function of the operational definition is to pre-
sent factors which will facilitate later analysis of Indochina
Federation. Empirical data are collected for each of these
factors and evaluated either as tending toward federation, or
tending away. The trend toward federation is a function of
these characteristic elements. The objective is to develop
an qualitative equation for federation in Indochina, evaluate
the variables and determine if their sum equates to federation
Philip Jacob and Henry Teune, in their study of the
integrative process, lumped preconditions and factors together
? 5
In practice they are nearly impossible to segregate.
Each of these factors is essentially a collection of possibly
22

relevant characteristics, and the list provided is by no
means comprehensive. Nevertheless, it does have the virtue
of providing a "check-list" with which to attack the problem.
Their list of ten "factors" that may exert integrative
influence contains:
1. Geographical proximity.
2. Social homogeneity of the peoples involved.
3. Transactions, or interactions, among the peoples
involved.
4. Mutual knowledge of each other among the peoples
involved.
5. Shared functional interests.
6. The communal character of a people - is it disposed
toward integration?
7. The structural frame or system of power and decision-
making in the emerging community - democratic or
authoritarian, decentralized or centralized.
8. Degree of sovereignty-dependency of the community.
9. Governmental effectiveness.
10. Previous integrative experience of the peoples and
government involved.
Other scholars have also attempted to operati onal i ze fed-
eration. Franck, in his analysis of why federations fail,
sought the common factors which brought each federation to its
doom. In doing so, however, he realized that these same fac-
tors offered some clues as to the necessary preconditions of
success. It led Franck to the tentative conclusion that the
sharing of such things as culture, language and standard of
? 7living,, are helpful to the cause of federation. The
23

below matrix lists Franck's factors; it provides factors
making for federation and goals sought to be achieved by
federation-building.


















































The prerequisite needed to ensure
against eventual failure
These factors may bring federalism
into being and thereafter engender
the primary factors. The factors of
cannon challenge and cannon enemies
appear to stand the best chance of
affecting the transition to primary
factors. If so, the federation is
likely to succeed; but is is by no
means certain that this seouence
will occur. If it does not, the
federation is susceptible to fail-
ure despite the favorable motiva-
tion based on secondary factors and
goals.
The motivation based on these factors
and goals may brinq about a feder-
ation but, unless rapidly replaced
by secondary and primary goal -factor
motivation, these tertiary qoals can
be said to contain the seeds of
their own defeat. In themselves,
these factors rarely engender the
development of secondary and primary
factors.
Franck's definitions of primary, secondary, and tertiary
are not immediately relevant to this study. 23
24

These factors, identified by Jacob and Teune, and Franck,
translated into the environment of Indochina, will provide
the basic building blocks out of which the trend toward
federation in Indochina will be assessed. Ultimately it will
be a subjective evaluation.
In summary, this chapter has stressed the "shades of gray'
in the nature of federation. Its purpose has been to serve
as the fullest possible introduction to the problem of feder-
ation in Indochina. There is no complete definition of
federation, nor are there black and white distinctions between
federation and its alternatives. Franck stated that: "What
this definitorial problem suggests is not that a single,
highly structured definition is needed. Rather, it is that
there be greater understanding of the nearly infinite number
of variations that can be played on the federal theme. ..[and]
that the concept of federalism is flexible enough to bend
with the realities." 29 This notion of flexibility, to
which Franck refers, is the test of subsequent chapters.
While this research generates reliable date which allows
us to make qualitative judgements regarding the components of
the federation process, they do not as easily allow us to
integrate them and state with certainty whether a system is
federal or some other political system. u It is a task
"3 1
which doesn't lend itself easily to quantification. x
This preliminary chapter lays the groundwork for examining
the problem of federation as it applies to Indochina. It
serves as the foundation for that which follows -- examin-
ation of the Indochina Federation.
25

II. VIET NAM: THE T REND TOWARD FEDERATION
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
History is much more the product of chaos than of conspiracy.
Zbiqniew Brzezi nski JC
This chapter serves to provide a historical background
for the forthcoming analysis of Indochina Federation. Of the
many reasons for developing such a backdrop, three stand out:
Primarily, such a background contributes the added dimension
that can only be gained by familiarity with relevant histor-
ical events, i.e., the historical perspective. Benefits
gained from such a perspective are a sense of pattern (if one
exists) and foundation for comparison. Historical pattern
might possibly be the window to the future.
Secondly, a historical background is necessary for a pro-
per understanding of causal relationships; of cause and effect
A review of past events serves to remind us of what is known
at the time -- so that present discussions are not invalidated
by the third eye of hindsight.
Finally, a review of historical events might yield their
"lessons". In this context, the rationale for providing a
historical survey is the desire to avoid past mistakes and to
manage future circumstances more wisely.
In pursuit of the first objective, the following section
will summarize the continuity of events in Indochina. Milton
26

Osborne, a respected scholar of the Asian scene, acknowledged
this need in April 1978:
For a student of Indochinese history there is an
almost irresistible temptation to see in the major
armed clashes that have taken place between the
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and Democratic Kam-
puchea (Cambodia) a confirmation of past historical
patterns and a reflection of deep-seated ethnic en-
mity. The fightinq that burst into priminence at
the end of 1977 and has continued into 1978 fits
readily into a historical context that has seen
Cambodia and Viet Nam as rivals at best and enemies
at worst, for three hundred years. Such a histor-
ical pattern cannot be easily dismissed in any dis-
cussion of the immediately contemporary situation. 3
Appendix A contains a chronological listing of some
major events. It extends back beyond the past three hundred
years to which Osborne refers, to Viet Nam's early ethnic
origins. The reader is urged to review the chronology, as
its purpose is to supplement the followina discussion.
A. EXPANSION AND INTEGRATION: RECURRING PATTERNS
What patterns emerge from two thousand-plus years of
Vietnamese history? 34 All sorts of patterns emerge.
This analysis chooses to focus on but five. It is believed
that these themes prvide a useful perspective, and foundation
for comparison. Their secrets contain valuable lessons.
Endemic to Indochina is the first pattern, conflict.
Life -- the very act of survival itself -- has been a strug-
gle in Indochina. Specific societal patterns have developed
and have been adapted to ensure its continuity. Yet, what




consequence is death. Conflict, in a borderline sub-
sistence society where instability means famine for millions,
has an enhanced cutting edge.
Coupled to conflict is the second pattern of reversal. A
popular Chinese proverb validates this generalization: "No-
body stays rich for three generations, nobody stays poor for
three generations." 36 Victors soon become the vanquished.
Has such a pattern inspired a feeling of compassion
towards one's less fortunate neighbor? Perhaps - but the
evidence is inconclusive. Tending to contradict it is the
ferocity of the recent ethnic clashes, but at the other ex-
treme peace in Indochina has not been of Carthaginian-style
either. 37
Since the latter 13th century, Laos and Cambodia have
been pawns in the alternating advances of Siam and Viet Nam.
Kampuchea, the present-day descendant of the once glorious
Angkor, is presently on the horns of a terrible dilemma. It
is the story of ebb and flow.
A third pattern is that of "march to the south" - "nam-tien"
in the Vietnamese language. The original population of
Man-yueh had migrated from the north, from what are now the
southern provinces of China. And under the guise of a dynas-
tic quarrel, Chenla's conquest of Funan was the first episode
38
of this southern drive in Cambodia.
Yet it is the push to the south of the Yuen of Tonking
which sets the precedent for the present pattern of Vietnam-
ese migration. The nature of this expansion has been neither
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homogeneous nor fluid. The impulse for this drive has resul-
ted from a variety of causes: Demographic pressures have
triggered periods of growth. 39 State-directed expansion
has been another causal factor. In addition, territorial
aggrandizement has been the booty of war, and the bridesprice
of romance. u
A corollary of nam-tien is the fourth pattern of the
retreat of Indianized states before the Sinic culture. Indo-
china has been a crucible for the clash of these two
cultures. Since its mostly easterly advance in the 12th
century, touching the shores of the South China Sea, Hindu
culture in Indochina has been in a near continual state of
retrenchment.
Yet Georges Coedes maintains that the cultural influence
of China has been "insignificant" compared to that of India
in their respective neighborina areas. * Why? Differences
in method, type, and administration of colonization offer some
expl anations.
Regarding the method of colonization, it can generally be
maintained that India advances her influence through peaceful
means. China, by contrast, resorted to conquest.
Chinese civilization did not spread beyond the area of her
military conquests .
Indian influence demanded no political dependence on the
mother country. The Hinduized "type" of colonization was
based on equality. Suzerainty and tribute, on the other hand,
were the prices of China's imperialism.
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History as a Foundation for Comparison
Thus Viet Nam's December 1978 invasion of Kanpuchea
seems to confirm the patterns of conflict, nam-tien, and the
retreat of Hindu culture before Sinic advance. The low
frequency pattern of reversal has a long period indeed; it
seems likely that Cambodia and Laos are destined to remain
expendable pawns in the regional struggle for power for the
forseeable future.
Where will the buffer zone reappear next, if at all? The
future resolution of this questions will to a large degree
determine the regional balance of power.
2 Historical Origins of Causal Factors
This summary of historical trends and patterns in
Indochina, and the appendix that supplements it, has identi-
fied five broad categories of causal factors relating to Viet-
namese expansionism. All these factors will be developed
further in Part II of this study. It is the intent only to
introduce them here.
Vietnamese expansion has been influenced by geostrategic
factors such as mountains, deltas, and rivers (particularly
Mekong), and geopolitical factors such as borders. Security
considerations, particularly their political, economic and
military dimensions, are a second category of causal
factors. Primordial factors, such as ethnic conflicts, also
have a causal function; as does the fourth category of
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demographic factors. The final category alluded to in con-
junction with "spheres of influence" is the "proxy"
relationship as a causal factor in Vietnamese imperialism.
An assessment of the lessons of history will be deferred
until Part III where they will be incorporated with the trend
identified in that section into recommendations for U.S.
pol icy f ormul ati on.
While the above paragraphs have generally examined Indo-
china as a region, the unique characteristics of Vietnamese
society remain to be explored. This will be examined in the
following final section developing the historical perspective.
B. THE VIETNAMESE POLITICAL TRADITION
An appreciation of the Vietnamese political tradition can
provide clues for an analysis of Vietnamese political behavior
and Vietnam's foreign policy decision-making process. The
purpose of this section is to survey briefly the character-
istics of the Vietnamese political tradition.
Historically, the political tradition of Viet Nam has
been an expression of Confucian political thought. Confucian
political thought is rigidly authoritarian; the governing
patterns it created established a distance between the ruler
and his subjects. Nevertheless, the Confucian political
system reserved the right to intervene directly in village
affairs.
Yet, the Confucian state bureaucracy was a coordinator
and not an executive. By means of bureaucratic
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coordination, balance was established between the ritualistic
state and the autarchic village.
Traditional concepts of individual responsibility demanded
two orders of duty. Responsibility to one's family and
village was a man's first obligation. A peasant's second
obligation was the ritualistic observation of traditional
rights that ensured the favor of heaven and harmony with
AC
nature.
Contrasting the Vietnamese and Chinese Confucian models of
administration, Alexander Woodside has identified two tradi-
tions as being characteristic of the Vietnamese monarchy. 46
One Vietnamese school of thought, which was derived from the
Chinese model, stressed that political harmony could only be
assured through the vertical accomodation of social differ-
ences, through the Confucian principle of hierarchy. This
was the filial piety relationship extended to the socio-poli-
tical system.
The second traditional school of thought idealized the
Vietnamese monarch. According to Woodside, "The ideal Viet-
namese ruler... should be able to resist the political domi-
nation of the Chinese court. He should be able to preserve
the people's livelihood and well-being. And he should be able
to introduce and domesticate Chinese culture. He should be
part rebel, part guardian of agricultural fertility, and part
cultural innovation". 7
The principal problems of Vietnamese society with which
the Vietnamese political tradition had to cope must be viewed
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from the perspective of the village. Central to this view is
Paul Mus' belief that there is a rhythm to the life of the
peasants synchronized around the cycle of growing rice in the
fields. The fields have provided the basis for a stable
social structure, a discipline for work, and a pulse for com-
munal ritual. In such a society Western concepts of time be-
come largely irrelevant, moreover, the seeds of instability
were sown when these concepts were introduced.
Traditionally, the Vietnamese have looked to the past as
a model for the future -- the ideal to be achieved lay in the
past. Social ills were a consequence of neglect of the
Confucian model; their rectification lay not so much in indi-
vidual achievement or innovation, but rather in con form ism and
refined application of the model. 4 ^ In such an
environment Western future-oriented concepts of technological
improvement, and Western concepts of individual achievement,
further threatened the balance of society.
Concerning Vietnamese expansion and integration, Mus makes
references to most of the pattern summarized earlier, stating:
The harmony between the Vietnamese - who entered
history in 208 B.C. somewhere around the southern
edge of China--and their environmental conditions
has proved to be so deep that no race has been able
to resist their advance, nor has any force subse-
quently managed to wrench them from the land. The
historic southward advance of the Vietnamese from
the Red River Delta was facilitated by military
operations. But it was consolidated by the peasantry
who extended their network of villages and destroyed
all the vestiges of the defeated Kingdom of Champa,
which lay in the path of the southern movement. In
the eighteenth century a large part of Cochin China
had been similarly taken away from the Cambodians,
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who were driven farther and farther back toward the
west. Had the French not arrived, the remaining
portion of Cambodia would have been the reward to a
victor in a war between Viet Nam and Thailand. Viet-
namese history thus poured down through Indochina
like a flood sweeping away the other peoples where-
ever they inhabited flat land on which there were
rice fields or which was favorable to the develop-
ment of rice fields. 9
Mus also acknowledges the geostrategic constraints of
nam-tien, stating that Vietnamese expansion has stopped at
the foothills of the highlands. 50
Concerning the 20th century Vietnamese revolution two
factors are particularly relevant to this discussion of the
Vietnamese political tradition and its implications for
regional integration. First is the belief that the struggle
to change the values by which the people live was the central
issue on which the revolution was based, i.e., revolution in
Vietnam was a crisis of values.' Second, is that Viet-
52
namese political tradition maintains that only revolutions
which effect a complete change are authentic and legitimate.
Only a complete change signals to the people the passage of
the T h i e n m i n
h
,
the Mandate of Heaven.
Thus the Vietnamese political tradition was an authori-
tarian system whose legitimacy rested in a reactionary identi-
fication with the Confucian ideal. It was an administrative
system in which governmental policy, both domestic and exter-
nal, was viewed in terms of a series of concentric circles
eminating from the center of the imperial court— each defined
in step-like fashion as an extension of the filial piety rela-
tionship. It was a system in which expansion and integration
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were sanctioned, subject to the above norms. It was a system
that for centuries had been in harmony with its envi ronment--
yet, the environment had changed, a change which signaled the
start of the Vietnamese revolution.
1
.
The Vietnamese Political Tradition in Transition
The advent of the West in Indochina, primarily in the
form of Christian missionaries and French colonialism, upset
this Confucian balance and eroded its framework. Western
concepts of time and the introduction of a currency -based
economy were principal actors in this struggle between East
and West. It was in this weakened state --when the legitimacy
of the Confucian system was being quest ioned--that notions of
communist ideology first begin to appear in Indochina.
2 Vietnamese Confucianism and Hanoi's Communist
Political Culture
The purpose of this section is to survey briefly the
issue of Confucianism and Marxism in Viet Mam--the link
between Viet Mam's political tradition and Hanoi's Communist
political culture.
There exists no simple equation relating the variables of
Confucianism and Marxism in Hanoi's political culture. Various
scholars have assigned them alternative coefficients and have
combined them in different fashions.
Scholars who have attempted to explain Viet Nam's politi-
cal behavior--be it domestic or external --have chosen to focus
on these or other factors. The decision to focus on the
communist nature of Vietnamese expansionism was the funda-
mental tenant of the Domino Theory.
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The issue of Conf iciani sm and Marxism in Viet Nam has
been addressed in some detail by both Vietnamese and Western
writers. 53 Dr. Nguyen Khoc Vien (editor of the multi-volume
Vietnamese Studies
,
and responsible for all DRV foreign
language publications in the early 1970's) offers a Vietnamese
view sympathetic to communist ideals. As such, Dr. Vien tends
to emphasize the commonality of Confucianism and Marxism.
Vien prefers to root the conversion from Confucianism to
Marxism in the village culture— as opposed to portraying it
as an elite-imposed change— thereby establishing its prole-
tarian legitimacy. He maintains that Marxism in Viet Nam
offered the people a political and social doctrine that
enabled them to solve their problems. This doctrine-- by
its very (comprehensive) nature—was similar to Confucianism.
But Vien also asserts that Marxism was more than a doctrine,
it was an instrument of liberation.
Marxism, like Confucianism, addressed itself to the problems
of here-and-now, and not to the the hereafter. Vien further
illustrates their complementary nature by citing Marxist texts in
which: "The passages would not be out of place in an anthology
of Confucian writings, and in them one can clearly perceive the
I 5 5political morality of Confucianism.
Because Confucian teachings stressed social discipline as a
virtuous element of one's personality, Vien maintains that the
Confucian man could make the transition from a traditional
society to a socialist one. A society schooled in Confucian
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discipline was not hostile to the principle of collective
discipline. While Vien believes that Confucianism has now
passed permanently from the scene, he fully acknowledges the
effects of its legacy on the Vietnamese national heritage:
Today Marxism has replaced Confucianism as a doctrine
of political and social action, and a new revolution-
ary ethic has replaced Confucianism in Vietnam. Any
attempt to revive Confucianism is useless. But, con-
trary to what pseudo-revolutionaries believe, Viet-
namese Marxists consider Confucianism and the work of
the scholars part of their national heritage, to be
assimilated by the new society.
A recent analysis has attempted to distinguish the views of
Paul Mus and Dr. Nguyen Khoc Vien on this subject by alleging
that Mus derives Vietnamese affinity for Marxism directly from
the Confucian mandarin elite. ° While this may be so, Mus
nevertheless addressed its relationship to the peasant society.
Mus firmly believed that whatever form of leadership ultimately
prevailed, subsequent to the Vietnamese revolution, it would have
to adopt their administrative policies to the traditional expec-
tations of the Vietnamese peasants. 59 Mus maintained that
Among the many reasons for Communist success the
most essential one is the relevancy of their values to
the lives villagers must lead. This relevancy springs
from a conception of society as a communal as distinct
from a secular organization— a conception which offers
a comprehensive explanation for a new sense of commun-
ity in which rural people can participate.
In this sense the views of Paul Mus and Or. Nguyen Khac Vien
run Daral 1 el
.
Stephen B. Young, in an ambitious assessment, 1 believes
that Marxism is but a transition in elite ideology, and is
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antagonistic to the Vietnamese peasant population. In his
view Communism has succeeded not so much because of its simi-
larities to Confucianism, but because the Vietnamese commu-
nists, as mandarins, knew best how to manipulate a power
structure to play on the dependency needs of the Vietnamese
people.. He sees Vietnamese Communists as Viet Nam's new
mandarins .
The present writer views with caution this proposal that
the Marxist elite in Hanoi are but new mandarins, even though
this assessment would make easy the attempt to link Viet
Nam's present expansionism with its historic pattern. Yet at
the other extreme, there are hazards in assuming that Viet
Mam and the Soviet Union are of one mind concerning the appli-
cation of Marxist international ideology.
Vietnamese decision making reflects the influences of its
national heritage and communist ideoloay. In a sense, commu-
nism in Viet Nam is a veneer that Hanoi is trying to unite
with the fabric of Vietnamese society. Because of communism's
similarities to traditional Confucianism, its prospects for
success are perhaps good. Yet, there are inherent contradic-
tions. Marxism itself is a Western ideology. In this respect
Viet Nam has adopted but another colonial mantle. Time will
be the test of how and to what degree these social doctrines
will be assimi 1 a ted.
For the present, the distinction between Hanoi's communist
culture and Viet Nam's political tradition is important to
recognize. As of yet, it remains an imperfect assimilation,
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despite their areas of confluence. Analysts examining Viet
Nam's decision making process should bear in mind Viet Nam's
national heritage and the recurring patterns of its long tra-
dition. The trend toward reqional integration in the present
period is a consequence of the ill-defined mix between Viet
Nam's political tradition and its communist culture.
C. VIETNAMESE CONCEPTS OF INTEGRATION: ORIGINS AND THE ICP
Generally speaking, the external relations of the Demo-
cratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) have found expression in
two principal forms: political action and military conflict.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the former. The
military dimensions of Hanoi's policies, while important,
have been discussed in detail elsewhere; and, although refer-
ences will be made to military campaigns in conjunction with
this discussion of political policies (or for reasons of
balance and completeness), it will not be the focus of this
chapter.
Almost exclusively, the political dimension of the ORVN's
regional relations has been guided by the manifesto of the
Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). In addition, the core
cadres of the Viet Minh had come from the ranks of the ICP.
The present-day Viet Nam Communist Party, and its predecessor
--the Viet Nam Workers Party--have been alternate forms of
the Indochinese Communist Party. The ICP has been the pulse
of communist activity in the region since its founding in 1930
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The very name, Indochinese Communist Party, suggests the
intention to establish a single communist regime throughout
Indochina. This desire is well documented. The degree to
which this intention was an expression of Vietnamese desires,
and the degree to which this intention found fulfillment, are
the objects of this chapter's analysis. The search for an
answer demands a careful examination of the origins of the
ICP, and an assessment of its political statements. These two
areas form the major sections of this chapter.
The extent to which Vietnamese concepts of federation
were, in fact, a product of the ICP's political platform, and
consequently subject to pressures bearing on the ICP, provides
the rationale for the forthcoming detailed analysis of the
development of the Indochinese Communist Party.
1. The ICP and Origins of Communist Concepts of Integration
Vietnam has not abandoned its idea of an Indo-
china Federation. It has been implementing this
idea systematically through continuous planning




The Communist Party of Indo-China is founded. It
is the Party of the working class. It will help
the proletarian class to lead the revolution in
order to struggle for all the oppressed and ex-
ploited people.
Nquyen Ai Quoc° 4 , 1930
Conflict, once again, plagues Indochina. Democratic Kam-
puchea maintains that conflict in Indochina is a consequence
of Hanoi's attempt to establish an Indochina Federation. The
PRC echoes this claim. Viet Mam denies it.
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The purpose of this chapter is to examine the historical
origins of the concept of an Indochina Federation. It will
survey Vietnamese concepts of federation. It is the thesis of
this analysis that problems of ambiguity and context render
present-day allegations of Federation irrelevant,
a. Ho Chi Minh and the ICP
The roots of Vietnamese concepts of federation
rest, in part, in the origins of the Indochinese Communist
Party. That the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea believe this
to be true is suggested by the introductory quotations above.
Events themselves do not tell the full story of the foun-
ding of the ICP. This added dimension can only be provided
by a sense of the spirit of the times in which they unfold.
The discussion of the ICP and external factors will strive to
present such a blend between events and historical background
There is a tendency to view the origins and development
of the Indochinese Communist Party as having occurred under
the protective direction of Ho Chi Minh, then known as Mguyen
Ai Quoc. While this is to a large extent true, it is a simp-
lification that demands qualification. The course of the ICP
and the career of Nguyen Ai Quoc are certainly bound up with
one another. Yet, it is a history that is marked by diver-
gence and confluence; and its course has been neither fully
loqical nor inevitable.
One path, that of the Indochinese Communist Party itself,
has been punctuated by bends and breaks. Founded in Honq Kona
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in 1930 as the Vietnam Communist Party, the party shortly
thereafter changed its name to the Indochinese Communist
Party. The ICP was not permitted to function legally and
openly in Indochina until 1936. Forced to go underground
once again in 1939, the Party suffered continued harassment
until its dissolution in November, 194 5. Its core cadres,
members of the Indochina Association of Marxist Studies, re-
emerged as the Lao Dong, or Vietnam Workers Party, in 1951.
After national reunification, the VWP changed its name to the
Vietnam Communist Party in December, 1976.
The second path is that of Ho Chi Minh. As an agent of
the Comintern, and a fervent nationalist, it is reasonable to
believe that conflicting interests, on occasion, arose. Yet
it is apparent that Ho handled these difficulties with the
same dexterity that would later mark his close association
with the feuding Soviets and Chinese.
Bernard Fall maintains that throughout his whole life, Ho
never quite reconciled within himself the conflicting demands
of overall Communist strategy and his own love for his
country. Yet Fall believes that Ho Chi Minh's patriotism
65
overrode his allegiance to international Communism.
The need for this distinction between the development of
the Indochinese Communist Party, and the career of Ho will
become apparent as the following paragraphs examine the
notion of federation in its Vietnamese context.
43

b. The ICP and External Influences
Unfolding events in China during the 1920's
spelled high opportunity for the revolutionary cau'se through-
out Asia. Nationalist fervor and social revolution, domin-
ated the social atmosphere of the elites in Indochina. Amidst
this backdrop of anticolonial unrest Vietnamese communism was
born in Canton in 1925. 66
Communism in Vietnam during the late 1920's was racked by
factionalism. Debate centered primarily on the issue of the
formation of a true communist party; prior to this time revo-
lutionary leagues were a common organizational unit.
Conservative elements believed that Marxism in Vietnam
was not yet sufficiently mature to warrant the transformation
from a revolutionary league to a communist party, and that the
multitude of members were but patriots with ideas of national-
ism and little commitment to Marxism and social revolution.
Douglas Pike, a noted Indochina scholar, maintains that Ho
reportedly "argued in Moscow in the summer of 1927 against
formation of a communist party in Vietnam on the grounds that
no one in Vietnam understood the word 'communism'" 67
Conversely, proponents in the debate argued for compliance
with the Comintern's Sixth Congress which "had given clear
indication that revolutionaries in Asia should prepare to
transform themselves into formal communist parties as soon as
conditions were met".
Communist disunity and contention in Indochina, which
smacked of personality conflicts and petty rivalries, was
44

a source of serious concern for Moscow; and an irritation for
the Comintern. In response to the formation of an Indochi-
nese Communist Party (ICP) by one faction, others followed
suit forming the Annam Communist Party (ACP) and the Indo-
Chinese Communist League (ICL). Each petitioned the Comin-
tern for recognition. The response to these requests was a
caustic Comintern directive that ordered formation of a
single unified party:
Divisions among various Communist groups... cannot
be tol erated. .
.
the most urgent important task of
all Communists in Indochina is to form a revolu-
tionary party with a proletarian class base, that
is, a popular Communist Party of Indochina. It
should be the only Communist organization in Indo-
china. ..The Indochina Communist Party should bring
together all Communist groups.
Recent Soviet "analysts confirm the Comintern's direction
of events:
The Comintern gave them its recommendations which
proved very valuable. The Comintern wanted Indo-
china to have one strong and united Communist Party,
and in its letter, 'On the Establ i
s
hmentof a Commu-
nist Party in Indo-China' (October 27, 1929), it
said: "Divisions and controversy among these qroups
can have a very bad effect on revolutionary agita-
tion in Indo-China. The key problem facing all Indo^
Chinese Communists, a problem which brooks no delay,
is to estblish a revolutionary proletarian party,
that is, a massive Communist Party --a sinale Commu-
nist organization for the whole of Indo-China.
The Comintern subsequently directed Nquyen Ai Ouoc to
effect a unification between the factions. Proceedina from
Siam, where he had been working secretly to organize 30,000
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Vietnamese living there into a nationalist association, he
arrived in Hong Kong in January 1 930
.
71
Under Nguyen Ai Quoc's direction a solution was rapidly
achieved, and the Vietnamese Communist Party was formed on
February 3, 1930. It was to be considered a new organization,
not just a continuation of previous parties.
The Vietnamese communist movement subsequently became in-
tegrated into the regional and world wide communist system.
At the lowest (or national) level, the Party was equal to the
Siam and Malay Communist parties. These parties were subord-
inated to the Southern Bureau of the Comintern Far Eastern
Bureau which was directed from Moscow.
The Comintern, however, was not yet satisfied. According
to Pike, "Being oriented toward pan-Asian rather than toward
national -1 evel communism, it was particularly displeased with
the parochial choice of name: The Vietnamese Communist Party.
An official party history describes the concern as follows:
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After studying the documents of the Unification
Meeting, the communist international immediately sent
a letter with instructions to the Viet Mam Commu-
nist Party amending a number of points in the line
and tasks of the Vietnamese revolution and with
suggestions about the question of changinq the
Party's name to Indochinese Communist Party.
"Apparently over the demure of Ho Chi Minh", the Party
Central Committee changed the name to the Indochinese Commu-
nist Party in October, 1930. It was awarded national
section status by the Comintern in April, 1931. 75
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Central to the purpose of this analysis is the relation-
ship between Vietnamese Communists and those of Laos and
Cambodia. While most of the organizational relationships
remain a mystery, some facts are known. For example, the ICP
directed party activity in Laos and Cambodia. It founded the
Laos Regional Party Committee in 1930 and chapters in Vien-
tiane, Savannakhet, Thakhet, and Pakse had emerged in 1933.
The Cochin Chinese Regional Party Central Committee apparently
administered Party activity in Cambodia during the 1930' s. 76
The preceding paragraphs serve to illustrate the degree
to which the ICP was initially molded to conform to Comintern
interests. The incident regarding the name change is not
offered as proof that Ho Chi Minn did or did not seek to con-
trol the communist parties of Laos and Cambodia. By itself
it contains insufficient evidence to be argued for either
case. What is valuable to note is the positive control
assumed by the Comintern in directing this name change--and
that it was the Comintern and not Ho that demanded the
formation of a unified Indochinese Communist Party.
Communist activities during the early to mid-1930's were
guided by a Vietnamese-drafted "Program of Action". It was
adopted in 1932 with Moscow's approval. The Program included
a section on "Basic Tasks of the Indochinese Revolution".
While similar to Nguyen Ai Ouoc's Ten Point Manifesto of 1930,
the Program went well beyond it. Self-determination for the
Laotians, Cambodians, and other nationalities in French Indo-




Comintern control of the ICP quickly reemerged. The
appearance in 1934 of the "right to separate" campai gn- -which
proposed self-determination for the minority peoples in Indo-
china—incurred the Comintern's wrath. Instead of seeking a
close union of Annamites with the Cambodian's, Laotians, and
other nationalities, 78 which would have paralleled Moscow's
rapprochement with France pursuant to Hitler's anti-Soviet
policy, the right to separate challenged it. The desire of
some Vietnamese Communists to link the "right to separate" to
the "right of Cambodian, Laotion, and other nationalities to
self-determination" was not tolerated by the Comintern. 9
During this period of strict Comintern control the Indo-
Chinese Communist Party held a meeting in March, 1935. The
Party's resolution on policy regarding nationalities as quoted
in The Kampuchea Dossier, published in Hanoi, 1978, stipulated
After drivina the French imperialists out of Indo-
china, every nation will have the right to self-
determination; it may join the Indochinese Feder-
ation or set up a separate state; it is free to join
or leave the Federation; it may follow whichever
system it likes. The fraternal alliance must be
based on the principles of revolutionary sincerity,
freedom and equality.
The Comintern's demand for unconditional adherence to
Moscow's line, its demand for iron discipline, and the stress
placed on the "monolithic leadership" within the Indochinese
Communist Party, was itself a result of this new shift in
Moscow's diplomacy. It was dictated by the need to ensure
Indochinese allegiance to the Comintern as Moscow began a
policy of rapprochement with France, i.e., a united-front
Q 1
policy in response to the ant i -Soviet policy of Hitler. 01
48

2. Summary and Assessment^
During the decade of the 1930's external factors
heavily influenced the policies of the Indochinese Communist
Party. It was an infant organization that depended on the
guidance and support of the Comintern.
The Comintern adopted policies which did not always run
parallel to Indochina's interests. The instances of Comintern
influence in selection of the party name, and Comintern
throttling of the "right to separate" movement illustrate but
two examples of Moscow's overlordship. Consequently, this
constraint on the independence of the Laotian and Cambodian
communist parties can be viewed as a result of external fac-
tors—and not necessarily part of a desire on the part of the
Vietnamese dominated ICP to absorb the Laotian and Cambodian
commi ttees.
Moscow's eurocentric united front policy was the last
o 2
major issue in which the Comintern was involved in Vietnam. 0<1
By the late 1930's, Comintern interest in Asia began to de-
cline. The Stalin purge trials and the threat of war in Europe
were principal factors. William J. Duiker identifies a Soviet
source as conceeding that Comintern influence in Asia had
"practically ended" by the late 1930 ' s--several years before
83
the Comintern's dissolution.
In 1940 Nguyen Ai Quoc returned to South China and took
control of the Party. He returned to Vietnam in 1943, the
same year the Comintern was dissolved. During this early
period Ho Chi Minh directed the activities of his party while
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under the watchful eye of the Comintern. Yet it is not
direct relationship between "leaders" and "the lead". During
this time Moscow's direction was neither consistent nor
uniform. Complicating the relationship is the ambiguous
degree to which Ho Chi Minh acted as an agent of the
Comintern or as an independent agent bent on pursuing what he
percieved to be the Vietnamese national interest.
An agreement in support of the belief that it was Ho Chi
H i n h '
s
desire to dominate all of Indochina overemphasizes the
role and influence of "the man" at a time when Ho lacked the
power and political stability to act. While an Indochinese
federation may have been a pipe dream, there is clear
evidence to support the belief that Ho objected to its
colon i'al implications. How Ho Chi Minh acted when he later
had more power and stability will be examined in later
chapters .
Before addressing Vietnamese concepts of regional
integration, this point in Vietnam's historical development
provides a convenient place to shift tracks and examine
French concepts of integration in Indochina. The following
section will examine the notion of federation in the context
of French rule in Indochina.
This section, while germane to a complete discussion of
federation in Indochina, should not be equated on par with
indigenous Vietnamese efforts toward greater association.
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D. FRENCH CONCEPTS OF FEDERATION IN INDOCHINA
Peninsular Southeast Asia was a strategic area in the
Franco-British competition for the prizes of empire.
France's early interest in the region was largely a function
of the scramble for access to the expected riches of China's
interior. In this context, the Mekong River was seen as a
possible back door free from British interference.
Viewed from the perspective of the river there is a
proclivity to regard the territories which form its banks as
a single unit. Yet, as was illustrated earlier, the cultures
that inhabit the banks of the Mekong are vastly different.
As a result of these cross-cutting factors, the political
creation of French Indochina was highly artificial.
The French administrative structure in Indochina was com-
plex. Cochin China was the only territory which was a colony
in the narrow constitutional sense. Arrangements concluded
in 1884 created a protectorate over Tonkin and Annam. After
1887 all five regions (the above three plus Laos and Cambodia)
were brought together under the cognizance of a single gover-
nor-general to form the Union Indochi noise. The trend
of French administration was toward centralized control. Paul
Doumer, the energetic Governor -General from 1897 to 1902,
8 5
was a key figure in this centralization process. 3
The relevance of this trend toward centralization to the
discussion of the concept of federation in Indochina emerges
in the period of the Second World War.
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When France yielded to German occupation in June, 1940,
the repercussions from the fall of the Republic were quickly
felt throughout Southeast Asia. The arrival of Japanese
troops in northern Indochina in September, 1940 spelled the
end of an era for French colonialism in Indochina.
During the Japanese occupancy of Indochina, the French and
Japanese engaged in a political struggle in which the Indo-
Chinese people were reduced to the role of pawns. Admiral
Jean Decoux, who had replaced Governor-General Georges Catroux
in July, 1940, promoted the development of the five Indochinese
states (Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchina, Laos, and Cambodia) within
a federal framework. Initially, the Japanese were content
p c
with the framework of French control in Indochina. This
concept of an Indochina Federation - "a mutually beneficial
organization of different peoples, each with their separate
traditions, held together and directed by France", was put
forward to counter the appeal of a Japanese "Greater East
Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere".
While the Japanese were the actual masters of Indochina,
French admini strati ors still governed the countryside and
villages until 1945. The Japanese rarely, if ever, stepped
qpfoot into the rural areas.
However, the events of the Spring of 1945 ushered in a
dramatic change. On March 9, the Japanese dissolved the
French government, thereby immobilizing both political and
military forces. Announcing that "the colonial status of
French Indochina had ended", the Japanese declared Vietnam to
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be independent. On March 11, Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai
announced the French-Vietnamese Treaty of 1884 abrogated and
reaffirmed Vietnam's independence. He proclaimed Tonkin and
Annam to be united. King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia
announced his nation's independence on March 13, as did King
Sisavang Vong of Laos in April. 9
Free French designs on the future of Indochina had been
first made public in December, 1943. The De Gaullists issued
a statement advocating federalism which proclaimed that the
regions of Indochina were to be autonomous states within the
French association. While it promised political and economic
reforms, it envisioned "nothing more than an autonomous status
for Indochina within a larger association of France and her
overseas territories".
Anticipating the allied victory over Germany and eventual
defeat, the French Provisional Government issued another
declaration on Indochina on March 24, 1945. (This statement
pre-dated the existence of Ho Chi Minn's provisional govern-
ment.) Providing for a federal Indochina within the French
Union, the nationals of the federation were to have double
citizenship and access to all federal posts and positions in
Indochina and throughout the Union. While the Federation
would have its own armed forces, foreign affairs and defense
were to be French controlled. The text of the declaration is
reprinted in Appendix B.
A number of hurdles impeded the reestabl i shmen t of French
control over Indochina. The death of Franklin Roosevelt in
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April, 1945 ended U.S. resistance to the reestabl i shment of
French colonial control over Indochina and eliminated one
such hurdle. The Truman administration, directed by a Euro-
pean-oriented State Department - which argued that France's
colonial possessions were necessary for her post-war recovery-
supported France's return to Indochina.
Decisions reached at Potsdam in July, 1945, had determined
that Chinese troops would accept the surrender of the Japanese
troops north of the 16th parallel, while the British would do
the same south of it. The ultimate status of French Indo-
china had not been determined. At the time of the Japanese
surrender in August, 1945 problems of transport delayed the
return of French forces to Indochina. During this time per-
iod Ho Chi Minh negotiated with the Chinese for control of
Tonkin. Although desirous of influence in Indochina, the
Chinese viewed Vietnam more as a bargaining chip in their
dealings with France. Tonkin was ceded to France in exchange
for the relinquishment of French claims in Southern China.
In February, 1946, a Franco-Si no Treaty was signed which pro-
vided for the withdrawal of all Chinese troops from Viet Mam
by the end of March, 1946. The French agreed to renounce all
extraterritorial and related rights in China. In essence,
the Chinese decided to sacrifice Vietnamese independence for
French economic and political concessions.
The British-French Civil Affairs Agreement of October
1945 gave the French full authority to administer Indochina
south of the 16th parallel.
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Of course, the biggest hurdle blocking France's effective
return to control was the resistance offered by the Vietminh,
a nationalist-communist dominated revolutionary league formed
in 1941 to promote Vietnam's independence. Vietnamese desires
for independence had been developing apace and apart from
French intentions regarding the future of Indochina. Two days
after Japan's surrender, at a meeting of the People's National
Congress at Tan Trao, Ho Chi Minh was elected president of
the provisional government. Admist a "genuine popular revolu-
tion" that exceeded the expectations of the Vietminh, the
Vietminh swept into Hanoi, occupied governmental buildings
and took control of the local stores of arms. The Japanese
Q 1looked on passively.
Deferring to student demands, Emperor Bao Dai decided
against calling upon the Vietminh to form a new government -
which he had been prepared to do on August 2 2, 1945. Instead
he abdicated, granting power to the provisional government
formed by the Vietminh. According to I. Milton Sacks, this
act "effectively signified to the tradition-minded Vietnamese
people that a great historical shift of power had taken place,
and that the new Democratic Republic of Vietnam now had the
mandate of heaven." 92
With Vietnam having declared its independence on
September 2, 1945, Ho Chi Minh was now in a position to engage
the French. The result of the first series of negotiations
was the signing of the March 6, 1946 French-Vietnamese Aaree-
ment. The provisions of this agreement, which vaguely
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described Vietnam's relationship to France, stated that:
The French government recoqnizes the Republic of
Vietnam as a free state, having its own government,
parliament, army and treasury, belonging to the
Indo-Chinese Federation and to the French Union.
Concerning the unification of the three (Tonkin,
Annam, and Cochin-China), the French government
binds itself to carry out the decisions taken by
the population through a referendum. 3
Negotiations regarding the diplomatic relations of Vietnam
with foreian states, and the future status of Indo-China,
were postponed indefinitely.
Efforts to address unresolved issues were enjoined at
Dalat on April 18 1946. Two principal areas of concern at
the First Dalat Conference were the undefined nature of the
diplomatic relations of Vietnam with foreign states, and the
future status of Indo-China and the north.
In terms of tangible accomplishments, the Dalat Conference
yielded little. However, in terms of what France's ideas of
a federation were, the conference provides valuable insight.
The French High Commissioner was to remain the prominent
figure of the Federation. He was to be both president of the
Indochinese Federation and representative of the French Union.
His responsibilities included direction of federal services,
enforcement of federal laws, and selection of federal comm-
issioners and advisors who would report only to himself.
The Federation would also have an assembly of states.
Fifty of the sixty seats would be granted to the five divisions
of Indochina (ten each to Tonkin, Annam, Cochin China, Laos,
and Cambodia). The remaining ten would be held by French
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interests. By this arrangement French control was assured;
Tonkin and Annam could have been outvoted by French and French-
dominated regimes in Cochin China, Cambodia and Laos. 94
At Dalat the Vietnamese would only agree with the French
that some sort of federal assembly should exist.
By the time of the Dalat Conference, however, tangible
evidence of French ideas of federation had appeared in
Cambodia (and Laos). France effected a modus vivendi with
the kingdom of Cambodia on January 7, 1946. The Commissioner
of the French Republic was empowered to maintain order and
issue and enforce regulations. He also directed the various
French services in the country.
Additionally, the French Commissioner was to be personal
advisor to the King, having access to both him and Cabinet'
meetings. He nominated the French advisors and experts who
dominated the bureaucratic structure at all levels.
The Franco-Cambodian Agreement determined a large number
of federal services: federal justice, treasury, higher and
secondary education, customs, mines, railroads, foreign immi-
gration, and large-scale public works.
Ellen Hammer, basing her evaluation on facts obtained
from Journal Officiel de la Federation Indochi noise
,
assessed
the French concept of Federation stating:
The lesson of French policy in Cambodia was that the
Vietnamese were not the only people in Indochina to
talk federation without practicing it. The intricate
administrative structure envisaged by France for Indo-
china was as remote from Federation as the loose eco-
nomic understanding favored by the Vietnamese. Feder-
ation, implying a division of power between the
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various constituent units, on the one hand, and
the federal government, on the other, did not exist
in pre-war Indochina, where supreme power was di-
vided between the French Governor General and the
French Government in Paris. Whatever powers were
enjoyed by subdivisions of the federation did not
belong to them by right, but were delegated from
above by the French central government and were ex-
ercised directly or indirectly by French officials.
Despite a somewhat wider participation in the ad-
ministration of the country after 1945, the situation
in Cambodia remained much the same as before the
war. It was not easy to differentiate between what
the French described as a federal structure and what
was in fact the machinery of French rule.
A qualitative feel for Vietnamese notions of federation
can be gleaned from Ho Chi Minh's statement regarding the
conclusion of the conference:
Both our delegations have recognized the need to
form an Indochinese Federation. In this Federation
all the states concerned will be linked not with
hampering bonds, but with unifying and strengthening
bonds. We agree on the principle of the creation
of a federal organism providing it allows the members
of the federation to prosper freely while remaining
i ndependent. . . We must still determine the methods by
which this federation is to be realized. 7
As the dress-rehearsal, Oalat presaged an inauspicious
start for the Fontainbleau Conference held during the summer
of 1946. As at Dalat, Fontainbleau underscored the extreme
differences between French and Vietnamese concepts of feder-
ation. The French delegation viewed the French Union as a
federation of nations led by France. They insisted on unity
of diplomacy, and control of armed forces, finances, and
courts .
The Vietnamese advocated a Union in which status would be
accorded based on state population. They proposed that the
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federation's powers should be limited to making recommenda-
tions to the member states.
Chances for what little progress might have been made
between the French and Vietnamese were undercut by an ad hoc
second Dalat Conference. Ordered by the High Commissioner of
France for Indochina, Admiral d' Argenlieu, delegates from
Laos, Cambodia, and "southern Annam" were invited to attend.
The second Dalat Conference successfully upstaged Fontain-
bleau and destroyed the Vietnamese negotiating strength.
Refusing to return to Vietnam empty-handed, Ho Chi Minn
accepted a modus vivendi . The agreement skirts the issue of
Cochin China's relations with the north and once again post-
pones decision on the nature of Vietnam's relations with
foreign countries. The document is contained in Appendix B.
It was the last effective negotiation between France and
Vietnam until Geneva, 1954.
Having reviewed French plans for federation during the
period of French rule in Indochina, this analysis now returns
to Vietnamese concepts of federation. The following section
picks up with the declaration of independence of the Democra-
tic Republic of Vietnam.
As was stated in the introductory paragraph to this
section, it is indigenous Vietnamese concepts of greater
association that are the focus of this analysis.
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E. THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM: VIETNAMESE CONCEPTS
OF INTEGRATION AND STEPS TOWARD FEDERATION
Having thus far examined the origins of the Indochinese
Communist Party, the external factors which influenced it,
and consequences for the communists of Vietnam, Cambodia, and
Laos, the following sections will focus on the Ho Chi
Mi nh-di rected policies of the Democratic Republic of Viet
Nam.
1 . The First Official Statement
Having declared independence on September 2, 1945, the
Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
issued its first official foreign policy statement on October
25. The document clearly emphasized the need for the cooper-
ation of Laos and Cambodia in Vietnam's developing struggle
with the French:
Our desire to cultivate friendship with Cam-
bodia and Laos on the basis of self-determination
of peoples is more earnest as, in the past, in the
present juncture and in the future, there have been,
are, and will be common features in the respective
fates of the three nations. Having been under
French domination, we must make common efforts to
overthrow the French yoke and avoid taking any
separate step which might be prejudicial to the
independence of others. Mutual help is necessary
to the recovery and maintenance of independence.
Furthermore, as Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam will
have many economic bounds (sic), the three nations
will assist one another to reconstruct their respec-
tive countries and advance, side by side, on the
path of progress.
Tersely stated, this initial foreign policy statement
lays the foundation upon which the Vietnamese desire their
relationship with Laos and Cambodia to develop. Of note,
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in the above statement is the reference to the fates of the
three nations, implying some sense of common destiny. At this
early stage Hanoi has explicitly stated that cooperation be-
tween the three nations is not to be solely a function of ex-
ternal threat. It acknowledges that Vietnam also recognizes
the national self-determination and independence of Laos and
Cambodia.
2. Dissolution of the ICP and Implications for Viet-Lao-
Khmer Rel ati ons
The autumn months of 1945 were frantic ones for the new
regime in Hanoi. Amidst the general confusion of November,
the Ho Chi Minh government made a startling announcement. At
the end of its three-day conference, the Indochinese Commu-




Whereas, inconsi deration of the given historical
situation, both internationally and internally, the
present moment is precisely an exceptional occasion
for Viet Nam to reconquer her unitary independence;
2. Whereas, in order to complete the Party's task in
this immense movement of the Vietnamese people's
emancipation, a national union conceived without
distinction of class and parties is an indispens-
able factor;
3. Wishing to prove that the Communists, in so far as
they are advance guard militants of the Vietnamese
people, are always ready to make the greatest sacri-
fices for national liberation, are always disoosed
to put the interest of the country above that of
classes, and to give up the interests of the Party
to serve those of the Vietnamese people;
4. In order to destroy all misunderstandings, domestic
and foreign, the Central Executive Committee of the
Indochina Communist Party in meeting assembled on
November 11, 1945, has decided to voluntarily dis-
solve the Indochina Communist Party.
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CENTRAL COMMITTEE INDOCHINA COMMUNIST PARTY
November
Those followers of Communism desirous of continuing
their theoretical studies will affiliate with the
Indo-china association of Marxist Studies.
Ml
11, I94599
This statement officially dissolving the Indochinese Comm-
unist Party is relevant to the discussion of Vietnamese, Lao-
tian and Cambodian relations for three principal reasons.
First, it implies the termination of Vietnamese coordination
of the Laotian and Khmer revolutionary communist movements.
Second, it makes quite clear that liberation and "unitary in-
dependence" are Vietnam's primary objectives. Third, Laos and
Cambodia are not even mentioned in the text. This implies that
in comparison to Vietnam'1 s domestic concerns of liberation
and unification, the revolutionary movements in Laos and Cam-
bodia are clearly seconda ry.
Concern over the implications of this move in the context
of Vietnamese support for Laos and Cambodia was apparently
well grounded. That such a statement had an impact on party
members - particularly those concerned about Vietnam's
influence in Laos and Cambodia- is beyond doubt. Evidently at
this stage the misgivings were manageable, perhaps because as
Ho Chi Minh himself later said: "...in reality it [the
Party] went underground and, although underground, the Party
continued to lead the administration and the people". 100
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Nevertheless, by 1951 on the occasion of the reemergence of
the party, and in conjunction with its name change, resent-
ment was clearly manifest among some of the more disgruntled
Party members. This incident will be discussed in some detail
1 ater.
Observers have long speculated over the motives for this
decision to dissolve the Party. * The common denomina-
tor of the various assessments is that the Indochinese Commu-
nist Party was sacrificed as a tactical expedient in the neut-
ralization of anti -Communi st inspired Viet Minh opposition -
and not as a consequence of the "rational susceptibilities"
of the Lao or Khmer communists. Apparently in 1945 ethno-
centric factors of national identity were not a consideration
in the decision to disband the Party.
3 . Additional Concepts: Statements and Interviews
(1946-1950)
Returninq once again to the immediate question of Viet-
namese relations regarding Laos and Cambodia, Ho Chi Minh,
prior to going to France in the summer of 1946, offered words
of support and encouragement to the southern Vietnamese
peoples. In doing so, he made a loosely veiled plea for
cooperation:
I advise you to unite closely and broadly. The
five fingers are of equal length but they are united
in the hand. The millions of our countrymen are not




This appeal, ironically, came one day before the French
announced the formation of an independent state of Cochin-
china within the Indochinese Federation and the French
103Union. Uw> Ho Chi Minh granted a number of press confer-
ences during the summer of 1950. Despite the years of war,
the establishment of the People's Republic of China, and the
growing U.S. support for the state of Vietnam to the south,
the deference to the national independence of Cambodia and
Laos initially stated in foreign policy statement of the
Provisional Government of the DRVN, was maintained. When
asked what he thought of future relations between Viet Nam,
Cambodia, and Laos, Ho replied:
These relations will be established on the babis of
complete equality and mutual respect for the national
independence of the three countries.
Responding to questions regarding U.S. intervention in
Indochina, Ho Chi Minh indicated a desire for greater
cooperation between the three Indochinese states:
...The Indochinese people. ..we must oppose the U.S.
i nterventi oni s ts . . .c 1 ose solidarity between the
peoples of Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos constitutes
a force capable of defeating the French colonialists
and U.S. interventionists.




R e 1 a t i o n s
In early 1951 the underground remnants of the Indochinese
Communist Party publicly reemerged. At the second national
Nations Congress of the Party held in February, the
Party adopted a new name, the Viet Nams Worker's Party (VWP).
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External factors are believed to have had a large influ-
ence on the decision of the ICP to reemerge. One such factor
was the success of the communist revolution, and the emergence
of the People's Republic of China in October 1949. A second
factor concerned international recognition of the Hanoi regime.
The PRc officially recognized the DRVN on January 18, 1950,
and the Soviet Union followed suit on January 30. Thirdly, on
February 4, the United States extended recognition to Bao
Dai's Republic of Viet Nam. Increased U.S. support of the
south (in the form of $10 million for military assistance
approved by President Truman in May, and the establishment of
the USMAAG of thirty-five Americans in Saigon that August)
emphasized the expanding American involvement in the conflict
on the side of the French.
Thus, by 1951, the primary reasons for the DRVN to neut-
ralize its communist appearance (which was assessed to be a
primary factor in the dissolution of the ICP earlier in this
analysis) had become largely obsolete. Additionally, an open
declaration of Communist leadership over the Vietnamese
national liberation struggle and public commitment to
Marxism-Leninism would appeal to both Stalin and Mao- who were
at that time the principal source of Hanoi's support.
The selection of the name, Vietnamese Worker's Party,
had great significance. The nature of its significance is per-
haps best understood in the context of Paul Mus' belief that in
Southeast Asia, words are facts. 108 I n essence, the name
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change itself was a compromise, the new Party hoping to avoid
alienating moderates unnecessarily. The change, which was
met with doubts (contention had arisen over the abandonment
of both the words: "Indochi nese" and "Communist"), was
explained by Truong Chinh - secretary general of both the ICP
(1941-1951) and VNP (1951-1956):
Where does the Viet-nam Workers' Party come from? It
comes from the Indochinese Communist Party. According
to the above proposal, the Vietnamese section of the
Indochinese Communist Party would be detached to be-
come a party sepcifically in Viet-nam taking the name
Viet-nam Workers' Party.





Viet-nam Workers' Party? The
Central Committee of July 1950 ex-
Here I only present the main r e a -
Establishing the Viet-nam Workers' Party is aimed pri-
marily at strengthening the leading role of the
working class, consolidating the worker-peasant al-
liance, linking the working class with other popular
laboring strata, unifying the national democratic
forces under the Party's leadership, defeating the
imperialists and their lackies, completing the
national liberation, developing the people's demo-
cratic regime, protecting world peace and democracy,
and preparing to advance to socialism.
Taking the name Viet-nam Workers' Party is not only
advantageous to the unification of the entire people
to defeat the invading army, but also advantageous
to the anti- imperialist united front of Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos against French-U.S. imperialism,
and the winning of complete national independence.
...our Party is not convinced that we must take the name
communist party, but believe we can take another name,
provided that our Party still follows Marx ism -Leninism,
that the final objective of the Party is still commu-
nism, and that the change of name is advantageous for
the revolutionary movement, for the development of the
Party, into a powerful mass party, the consolidation of
the Party's leading role, and the strengthening of re-
lations between the Party and the masses.
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Evident in Truong Chinh's comments is the reference to
the "united front" of Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos. As to
what was ultimately meant by this "united front" is not al-
together certain - but subsequent statements by Ho Chi Minh,
and other documentary evidence would help define the nature
of the proposed united front.
Relating to this matter of the name change, P.J. Honey, a
noted scholar of Vietnam, provides a relevant and illuminating
extract from a "Top Secret" document. (This document and its
origins will be discussed in more detail later.) It provides
not only further justification for the name but also ties it
in to Party objectives in Southeast Asia.
If we were
Party", a
g r e s s i v e i
woul d be u
The name "
n i s t Party
different







bod i an rev
movements

















nwi 1 1 i ng to
Workers ' Pa








s it our d
u













in keeping the name "Communist
roperty owners, landlords, pro-
s, and members of religious sects
f ol 1 ow us.
rty" is more useful than "Commu-
ng ground and spreading among the
the people, particularly among
























It is making its official

















1 so the r
Asian c o u
These m
from the




n i n i s t Pa























The name change, therefore, clearly did not imply a loosen-
ing of Hanoi's aid to Laos and Cambodia.
The Second National Congress of the Viet Nam Workers'
Party afforded Ho Chi Minn the first opportunity officially
to address the issue of Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian
relations since its successor, the ICP, had been "dissolved"
in November 1945. Proceeding one step - albeit a carefully
planned step - beyond his earlier call for "close solidar-
ity", Ho suggests the establishment of a front.
We are waging our war of resistance, the brother Cam-
bodian and Lao nations are also wagina theirs. The
French colonialists and the American interventionists
are the common enemy of our three nations. Consequent-
ly, we must strive to help our Cambodian and Lao
brothers and their wars of resistance, and proceed to
set up a Viet Nam -Cambodian -Lao Front. 1
In this statement Ho tactfully distinguished between the
Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian wars of resistance; and
acknowledges the struggle being waged by the "brother"
countries. Having paid deference to the "independence" of
their resistance efforts, he then proposes the establishment
of a united front. With one wave of the wand he is stroking
their national pride - with the other he is proposing that
they compromise it. It is subtle orchestration.
The platform adopted by the Lao Dong Party at the Second
National Conference adds an interesting twist to an assess-
ment of the degree of association actually proposed by the
Vietnamese. No Vietnamese text of the platform is available
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and the segments below are excerpts from the only known
D.R.V. English translation. 112
The document mentions Vietnamese relations with Laos and
Cambodia in two distinct contexts. Regarding their relations
in the context of the anti -French/anti-American resistance
the platform proposes that:
All political, economic, and cultural works must aim
to insure military victories and the military struggle
must be coordinated with the political, economic, and
cultural struggle. Frontal fighting against the enemy
must be closely coordinated with guerrilla fighting
and sabotage work in the enemy's rear. The liberation
war of the Vietnam people must be closely coordinated
with the armed resistance of the people of Laos and
Cambodia and with the world-wide struggle for peace
and democracy. 11 -^
The call for associated struggle, is in fact, quite tame.
Later in the document, in the context of foreign
relations, the degree of association desired becomes more
specific:
Our policy toward Laos and Cambodia - the Vietnam
people must unite closely with the peoples of Laos
and Cambodia and give them an (sic) all-out assist
ance in the common struggle against imperialist
aggression for the complete liberation of Indochina
and for the preservation of world peace. On the basis
of serving the common interests of the three peoples,
the Vietnam people are willing to cooperate on long
(sic) terms with the peoples of Laos and Cambodia and
will strive to bring about si ngl e-mi ndednes s between
the three peoples. 1 ^- 4
In effect, the Lao Dong platform calls for a long term co-
operation between the three nations; the objective is to
achieve a unified outlook on foreign policy.
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The twist comes from a Chinese translation of the docu-
ment found in a supplement to People's China. While the
statements referring to coordinated anti-resistance struggle
are essentially the same as quoted above, in the foreign
relations context the document refers to the establishment of
a federation; if the people of Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos
so desire:
OUR POLICY TOWARDS LAOS AND CAMBODIA
The people of Viet-Nam must unite closely with the
people of Laos and Cambodia and give them eyery
assistance in the common struggle against imperial-
ist aggression, for the complete liberation of Indo-
china and for the defence of world peace.
In the common interests of the three peoples, the
people of Viet-Nam are willing to enter into long-
term co-operation with the peoples of Laos and Cam-
bodia, with a view to bringing about an independent,
free, strong and prosperous federation of the states
of Viet-Nam. Laos and Cambodia, if the three peoples
so desire. US
This is believed to be the first Vietnamese sponsored call
for "federation". 116
5. Unification of Viet Minn/Lien Viet Congress: Impli-
cations for Indochinese Relations
At the Congress for the Unification of the Viet Minn and
Lien Viet, held on March 3, Ho Chi Minn alludes to yet
greater cooperation between the three states. Having already
proposed his desire to see the three nations strive toward
singlemindedness, Ho now proclaims they are of one heart and
mind. "Surely" a union between the states will be formed.
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What makes me even happier is that not only the entire
people of Viet-Nam are united, but the entire people of
the two brotherly nations, Cambodia and Laos, have also
achieved broad unity (Long Applause). The good news of
this unity has been personnaly brought to us by Cambodian
and Laotian delegates.
Thus the Vietnamese people have achieved broad union;
so have the Cambodian people and so have the Lao
people. We shall surely arrive at a broad Vietnamese-
Cambodian-Lao union (Long Applause).
Because our three fraternal nations are of one heart
and one mind...
Long live the Vietnamese-Cambodian-Laotian great unity. 117
As if it were to confirm his predictions on March 3, a joint
conference of Vietnamese, Laotian and Camabodian United Front
delegates was held on March 11. The Manifesto of the confer-
ence adopted the below "steps toward implementation of (the)
Indochinese 'federation'". 11 ^
Manifesto of the Joint United Front of Viet-Nam,
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peoples in Southeast Asia, and for plunging the
wo rid in a new war.
2. In the face of the common enemies, the Joint Con-
ference of Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia has set up
an alliance between the peoples of Viet-Nam, Laos
and Cambodia on the basis of free choice, equality,
mutual assistance, and mutual respect of national
sovereignty, with the aim of wiping out the French
colonialists, defeating the American interventionists
and punishing the traitorous puppets, and gaining
genuine independence for the three peoples and con-
tributing to the maintenance of world peace.
The Conference has elected a Joint Committee of Viet-
Nam, Cambodia, and Laos, with a view to strengthen
friendly relations and realize mutual assistance
between the three peoples.
3. The Conference calls on the people of Viet-Nam to
unite ever more closely in the Lien Viet Front, on the
people of Cambodia to unite more closely in the Khmer
Issarak Front, and the people of Laos to unite more
closely in the Lao Issara Front, so as to strengthen
the alliance between Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia, to
bring early vi cto ry to the resistance of these three
peoples, to consolidate and develop the national and
people's power in the three countries.
The Conference calls on peoples of the world and the
oppressed peoples to support the alliance between
Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia, so that it can fulfill
the task of defending justice and gaining freedom. The
Conference firmly believes that world peace will
certainly be victorious and that the three peoples of
Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos will surely achieve genu-
ine independence. 1*9
In addition, the conference adopted a resolution calling
1 on
for the formation of the Joint United Front. u This
conference can be viewed as a major stepping stone in the
percieved progression toward federation.
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6 . The Secret Document
Despite Truong Chnih's reassurances at the Second
Party Congress, it soon became apparent that a number of the
Party members retained misgivings over the change of name.
This group feared that the change from "Indochi nese" to "Viet-
namese" implied that Viet-Nam was proposing to abandon her
influence in Laos and Cambodia. Consequently, in order to
shore up their support, the Lao Dong issued a secret direc-
tive in November, 1951 to supplement the public manifesto it
had issued the previous Februa ry.
This document was captured by the French Expeditionary
Corps in North Viet-Nam during the spring of 1952. Having
been unable to locate a copy of the original, "* this
writer relies heavily on the assessment of P.J. Honey who has
reviewed the document. Honey's interest in the document,
namely its implications regarding the long-term objectives of
the Vietnamese communists, exactly parallels the ultimate
concern of this study.
Honey asserts:
The captured directive states that the Laotian
and Cambodian Communist Parties continued to receive
their orders from the former Indochinese Communist
Party, but they did so secretly, and the overt leader-
ship of the two parties was in the hands of Laotians
and Cambodians. The captured directive continues:
"But later on, when conditions permit this to be
carried out, the three revolutionary parties of Viet-




His assessment is that:
Thus theultimate aim of the Vietnamese Communist
leadership is to install Communist regimes in the
whole of Vietnam, in Laos, and in Cambodia, after
which they will then rule the three countries. The
captured directive does not state, but strongly
implies, that the single party will be controlled by
Vietnamese Communists in the same way the Indochinese
Communist Party was. ^3
Honey believes that Hanoi's actions to effect the
"federation" were motivated by economic concerns. The North's
lack of self-sufficiency, particularly in the agricultural
sector is a primary causal factor - not only for the
liberation of the south, but for all actions toward the
stated objectives regarding all of Indochina.
These (Hanoi's) activities are directed toward the
achievement of the objectives stated in the cap-
tured document, and there are strong indications that
the objectives lhave been neither changed nor modified.
This can be said despite shifts in the tactics used to
gain these objectives. For example, the northern half
of Vietnam was not economically self-sufficient in
1954 when the Communist regime assumed control, and
has still not achieved self-sufficiency today despite
the aid supplied by other members of the Communist
bloc. Hence North Vietnamese actions and tactics for
achieving the stated objectives of the Lao Dong Party
have been influenced by the state's economic needs,
Darticularly by her insufficient aaricultural pro-
duction. 124
Mention must be made of the appearance of this document
in the context of the course of the Franco-Vietnamese War. In
December, 1950 General Jean De Lattre de Tassigney was aopoin
ted Hi ah Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief of the French
Expeditionary Forces in Indochina. He was the first and only
man to wield the power of both positions.
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De Lattre, one of France's "ablest World War II generals,"
arrived in Indochina to find the French community in a state of
panic, and an army "demoralized, defeated, and decimated". 1- 25
He set about to reverse this tide of events. The General saw
his mission not in terms of reestablishing the French colonial
presence in Indochina (which he was critical of), but in the
context of an anti -communi st crusade. 126 He revitalized
the French forces and formed them into spirited fighting units,
and the founding of a Vietnamese national army was initiated
under his direction.
The "electrified" fighting corps, under de Lattre's com-
mand, handed Giap and the Vietminh their first series of
1 p 7devastating defeats. c forcing Giap to abandon large
unit maneuvers and retreat back to guerilla tactics. General
de Lattre spoiled the promise made by Giap to Ho Chi Minh
that they would be out of their jungle retreat and in Hanoi
for the Tet, February, 1951. 128
The untimely death of de Lattre - at the hands of cancer
on January 11, 1952 - marked the end of hopes for a French
counterof f ensi ve. The consequence of this event, in conjun-
1 O Q
tion with the unpopularity of the Indochina War in France,
did not escape the attention of the Vietminh military leader-
ship. Thus it was at a crucial period of renewed optimism
following a year of set-backs, that the secret document sur-
faces. Viewed in this context, the document can be read as a
call for enhanced coordination and solidarity in the acceler-
ating resistance struggle. 130
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Concluding on a pessimistic note, Honey informs the reader of
the implications contained in this document for the whole of
Southeast Asia
Before passing from this section on the long-term
objectives, it is worth citing one more short extract
from the captured directive. Part C, Section 5,
reads: "Not only is it our duty to aid the revolu-
tionaries in Cambodia and Laos, but we must also aid
the revolutionary movements in the other countries of
South East Asia, countries such as Malaya, Indonesia,
Burma, etc^l
Quoting from a mimeograph copy of Honey^s work, 132
Frank N. Trager reveals additional insight into the degree of
control exercised by the Vietnamese communists.
Sections of the Communist Party now esist in Cambodia
and Laos (as well as in Viet-Nam as a whole) and are
developing; Cambodia and Laos already possess unified
Liberation Fronts. At the center of the organizations
are groups of faithful « Communists who constitute dele-
gations of the Indochinese Communist Party, from which
they receive their orders. The Vietnamese Party re-
tains a permanent right of supervision over the acti-
vities of the fraternal Cambodian and Laotian Parties.
Later, when conditions permit, the three revolutionary
parties of Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos will unite to
form a single party. "3
Finally, Honey indicates that the secret directive
strongly implies, though does not say so in so many words,
that the intention of the Vietnamese Communist leaders is to
unify the territories of the former French Indochina. *34
This, of course, would be a tangible step toward federation.
The operative words, however, are "implies" and
"intentions". Such non-specific words should be read with
caution lest they influence one regarding their author's
biases rather than Vietnamese desires.
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Assessments as to the reasons why the secret directive
to form three separate parties for Viet Nam, Laos and
Cambodia at the time of the Workers' Conference in 1951
generally vary only in degree. Quoting from an inter-Party
memorandum, William Duiker maintains that the decision "was
based on the need to observe- 'national susceptibilities'
(suggesting that Party members of Lao and Khmer extraction
were growing restive under direct Vietnamese control)". 13 ^
This evaluation strongly echoes that of P.J. Honey, who
alleges that the change was made to avoid causing offense to
Laotian and Cambodian nationalists, who were all too aware
that the Vietnamese dominated the senior positions in the
ICP.136 The Laotian and Cambodian movements were under
the ICP's direction, and "lest they resent Vietnamese
direction of their movements", the split was ordered.
Gareth Porter believes that by this time, the revolu-
tionary movements in Laos and Cambodia had matured to the
point where they needed their own Communist Parties. *"
7. Ho Chi Minn: What Shall We Do From Now On?
Concluding what in many respects was a landmark year
in coordinating its resistance against the French, Ho Chi
Minh, in December made an appeal for closer solidarity be-
tween the three peoples.
What shall we do from now on to win complete victory?
...Our people will strengthen their solidarity; solidarity
among us, solidarity with the Cambodian and Laotian people,
solidarity with our brothers: China, the Soviet Union and
the new democracies. ^38
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8. Summary and Assessment
The purpose of this preliminary summary and assessment
is to underscore a few discernable trends and highlight some
perhaps less obvious patterns.
A reading of the collection of Ho Chi Minh's writings,
Party documents, and unofficial statements has left this
writer with two qualitative impressions. The first is the
relative infrequency with which statements regarding Laos or
Cambodia were made by Vietnamese officials. This is important
to note because in a study such as this, which focuses on
Vietnam's relations with its neighbors in Indochina, there is
a tendency toward tunnel vision. In the great majority of
cases, references to Laos and Cambodia - when they were made
at all - were made in the context of Vietnam's ant
i
-colonial
resistance. During this time period the primary objectives
were liberation and unification. While relationships rarely
exist solely on one plane, and rarely are geared toward a
single objective, it is a tentative conclusion that Vietnamese
efforts to enhance its association with Laos and Cambodia
were under the influence of the dominant objectives of liber-
ation and unification.
The second impression follows from the excerpts quoted in
the previous paragraphs. During the period between 1946 and
1951 there is a discernable trend of calls for closer associa-
tion on the part of the DRVN. From the desire to "cultivate
friendship" expressed in the initial policy statement of
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October, 1946, the calls for increased association develop in
a step-like fashion. What were calls for friendship in 1946
had adopted a Marxist tone and appeared as pleas for "close
solidarity" in 1950. The calls for association quickly
accelerated in 1951 as the "brother" countries were urqed to
form a front, an alliance, and possibly a federation. The
possibility of territorial integration is implied.
Yet despite the calls for greater integration, the con-
cepts of equality, mutual respect, self-determination, and
national independence were never compromised. Are these con-
cepts contradictory? Perhaps, but it is also entirely poss-
ible that these notions of equality and independence
reflected the true desires of Ho Chi Minh - a man who had
spent his life combating the consequences of racial inequality
The nature of this apparent paradox will be addressed further
throughout the remainder of this study.
Also left unresolved by the survey of statements thus far
is the question of who the burden of the calls for integra-
tion was falling on, i.e., who was the audience? In this re-
gard there are three distinct possibilities: the people, the
nation, and the Party.
On the majority of occasions, it was the people who were
called on for greater unity; on rare occasions it was the
nation. Under the ideals of international communism, it can
be assumed that the parties of the three Indochinese states
were always expected to seek greater solidarity.
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This question, and its implications, will be addressed in
further detail later.
Finally, based on the asessment to this point, what can
be concluded about the "steps toward federation"? This writer
proposes the following ladder:
1) recognition of a common threat
2) establishment of an "alliance" with the aim of
combating the threat
3) establishment of a joint committee to coordinate
the three distinct communist parties
4) call for the people to unite and support the
resistance
5) call for international recognition
Havinq examined in some detail official statements pro-
posing cooperation, the reader should by this point have
developed a sense of both continuity and context.
The remaining section in Part I will review in a more
cursory fashion the events followina 1951 up until unifica-
tion in July, 1976.
9. Additional Concepts: 1952 - Geneva 1954
The ensuinq period of time up until the Geneva Confer-
ence of 1954 was marked by frequent Vietnamese praise and ack-
nowledgements of greater unity between Indochinese DeoDles.
It was a period of coordinated struggle. And it was a period
that climaxed at Dien Bien Phen. Marking the new year, Ho
Chi Mi nh had occasion to review past successes:
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In 1951, the Vietnamese people made a big stride
forward. In the political field, the founding of the
Viet Nam Worker's Party, the amalgamation of the Viet
Minh and Lien Viet, the setting up of the Committee
of Action for Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos, greatly
consolidated the unity and enhanced the confidence of
the Vietnamese people; they strengthened the alliance
between the three brother countries in their struggle
against the common enemies - the French colonialists
and U.S. interventionists - in order to realize their
common goals, i.e., national independence. 1 *^
On the occasion of the Tet festival of 1952, Ho Chi Minh
posed the answer to his own rhetorical question of what the
three nations must do in order to achieve further success.
Only that task directly relevant to Lao and Khmer relations
is quoted below:
What have we to do to make further progress and
achieve greater successes?
To this end, it is necessary for us to perform the
following tasks:
1. We shall unite more closely, frankly and
'broadly. Unity of the entire peoples. Solidarity
with the Cambodian and Lao peoples. Solidarity with
our brother countries. Solidarity with the peoples




Solidarity with the Lao and Khmer people was also Draised
on the occasion of Vietnam's most important national holiday,
the anniversary of the August Revolution and National Day,
September 2, stating:
the bonds of solidarity between our peoples and
the Cambodian and Laotian peoples have been streng-
thened. 141
Anniversaries during the year of 1953 followed much the
same pattern. The March 3 celebration witnessed Ho calling




Now I am speaking of the work of the Viet Mam
Workers' Party. ...It must unite with the friendly
parties and unite the organization within the Front
...we must unite with the Cambodian, Laotian and
Chinese peoples, and other friendly countries. * 4 2
On August Revolution Day and National Day, 1953 Ho Chi
Minh praised the many successes of the resistance. He ack-
nowledged that the solidarity between the brother countries
had become "stronger and stronger" . l 4 ^
And in his report to the third session of the First
National Assembly - his last official statement regardina
Laos and Cambodia prior to the Geneva Conference - Ho acclai-
med: "The alliance between Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos has
grown cl oser. "144
10. The Geneva Conference: Implications for Vietnamese -
Laotian-Cambodian Relations
The Geneva Conference of 1954 provides occasion for
additional insight into Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian
relations. Of the complex issues considered at the confer-
ence, those dealing with Laos and Cambodia were significant -
but of a secondary nature. The overriding issue was to pro-
duce a settlement to the conflict between France and the Viet
Minh. The DRVN's primary interest was to obtain as favorable
a solution as possible in Vietnam - the decisions about Laos
were important in the context of its security. ^ 4 ^ Cam-
bodia was somewhat less so.
Before Pham Van Dong, head of the DRVN delegation, was
willing to present his proposals for peace in Indochina, he
asked for discussion on a proposal that acknowledged the
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necessity for inviting representatives of the resistance
"governments" of the Pathet Lao and Khmer Issarak to the con-
ference. The Soviet representative, Molotov, and the PRC's
delegate, Chou En-lai, supported Dong's proposal. 146 In
the course of its bargaining, however, the DRVN proved willing
to modify its demands with respect to Laos and Cambodia in
return for concessions in Vietnam. 14? The decision not
to seat the Pathet Lao and Khmer Issarak at Geneva seem to
have originated from a realistic appraisal of their weak
claim to legitimacy as governments. 148
This decision had a curious consequence. After the agree-
ment to drop the demand for representation of the Khmer
Issarak and the Pathet Lao, the DRVN thereafter "represented"
these movements on the military commissions for Cambodia and
Laos and at the political conference.
Concerning the political aspects of the Geneva Agreement,
Robert Randle maintains that on the general principles of
respect for sovereignty, independence, and territorial integ-
rity of the three Indochinese states, and on interference in
each other's internal affairs, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia
while claiming such rights for themselves, did not address
themselves to the rights of the others. 1 ^ This is
despite their obligation under the agreement to do so.
Regarding the military aspects, the effect on the Cambod-
ian and Lao resistance movements was significant. In the
case of the Cambodian cease fire, it was agreed that the
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Khmer Issarak should be demobilized on the spot. The General-
ization that the Khmer Issarak was solely a creature of the
Vietminh is not entirely correct. Furthermore, there is
reason to believe that the Khmer Issarak freely consented to
Vietminh representation in June and to the terms regarding
demobi 1 i zation. 151
With the demobilization of the Khmer Issarak and the with-
drawal of Vietnamese military units, there was but one govern-
ment in Cambodia and no insurgent movement challenqed its
1 egi timacy .
As for the Pathet Lao leaders at Geneva, Langer and
Zasloff maintain that it is difficult to get an accurate sense
of their expectations. In view of the degree to which the
Pathet Lao were dependent on their North Vietnamese bene-
factors, the above scholars believe that the Pathet Lao must
have realized that their ultimate gains accrued from the gains
of their sponsor. 152
Ultimately, the Geneva Accords served the Pathet Lao well.
The Lao communists secured a base area in two strategic pro-
vinces from which they built up their political and military
strength. Based on interviews of communist defectors Zasloff
and Langer believe that while the bulk of Vietminh troops
departed Laos, political and military advisors remained in the
provinces of Sam Meua and Phong Saly to aive technical assist-
ance and advice. 153 Randal maintains that this de facto




An interesting aside to the main events of Geneva - and
one whose importance would only be fully recognized after
Vietnam's reunification more than twenty years later - was the
Cambodian delegate's presentation of a document that reserved
Cambodian "rights and legitimate interests " in certain
regions of the southern zone of Vietnam. Calling this terri-
tory "Cambodian lands in South Viet Nam," the delegate
stated:
Cambodia has no intention of interfering in
the internal affairs of the state of Viet Nam and
associates herself fully with the principle of respect
for its integrity, provided certain adjustments and
regularizations be arrived at with regard to the
borders between this state and Cambodia, borders which
so far have been fixed by a mere unilateral act of
France. * ^5
Following the conclusion of the Geneva Conference, Ho Chi
Minn in a report to the sixth plenum of the Viet Nam Workers'
Party Central Committee stated that the Vietnamese, Cambodian
and Laotian peoples were "united". Maintaining that their
resistance was growing ever more vigorous, he declared that it
was their task to "assist" the Pathet Lao and Khmer forces.
Gareth Porter maintains that the Indochinese federation
idea, which was supported by the Indochinese Communist Party
"since its beginning." was dropped by the Viet Nam Workers'
Party after 1954. ^7 Recent evidence which shall be
discussed in detail in conjunction with Vietnamese-Khmer re-




11 . Post-Geneva to Reunification
To have spent a great amount of effort analyzing
Vietnamese statements regarding their relations with Cambodia
and Laos during the time period of 1930-1954, and then to turn
around and briefly assess their statements during the 1955-1975
period is not without justification.
As was mentioned earlier, the idea of an Indochinese fed-
eration was dropped after 1954. The degree to which "secret"
party memos may have called for federation is a matter of spec-
ulation, but, nevertheless, appeals for solidarity between the
three Indochinese states decreased in intensity after 1954.
At the September, 1955 National Day Anniversary, Ho Chi
Minh in reiterating the terms of Geneva which had brought
peace to the region stated: "We particularly urge the main-
tenance of Deaceful relations with our neighbors, namely
Cambodia and Laos." 158
Five years later, at the Third National Congress of the
Viet nam Workers' Party, Ho Chi Minh's appeal was noticeably
subdued: "We sincerely hope that friendly relations between
our country and our neighbors, especially Cambodia and Laos,
ICQ
will be established and promoted in a satisfactory manner.
The downbeat tone of the above statement is striking. One
can speculate as to the many possible reasons for such a shift.
Perhaps Cambodia, and even Laos to a degree, were less vital
in the struggle for unification now that the ant i colonial
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resistance had succeeded. With the French forces gone, it is
probable that Vietnam felt less vulnerable from the west (i.e.
from hostile forces operating in Laos and Cambodia). Another
possible reason was the emergence of the Sino-Soviet split
which may have caused Vietnam to reconsider her relations with
her fraternal neighbors. And perhaps the tone in part re-
flects Hanoi's response to U.S. policy advocating independence
for Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.
Subsequent to the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, Pham Van
Oonq, in an interview in which both he and Ho were present,
stated that Hanoi would respect the Laos agreements "and at
all costs maintain qood relations with Cambodia.'
Adhering to the Laos agreement implied support of a neutral
Laos. Once again demonstrations of solidarity and fraternal
relations were lacking.
At a special Political Conference held during March, 1964,
Ho Chi Minh made a brief reference to the "brotherly"
countries of Laos and Cambodia. Concerning the Kingdom of Cam-
bodia, Ho stressed that Hanoi "consistently stood for the
establishment of good, neighborly relations." The Chairman
also disclosed that the DRVM supported and was willing to par-
ticipate in an international conference (proposed by Morodom
Sihanouk) which would guarantee the neutrality and territorial
integrity of Cambodia.
One year later, at the Second Session of the Third National
Assembly of the DRVN, Hanoi's supDort for her Indochinese
87

neighbors was once again on the apparent rise. Ho Chi Minh
stated that:
With regard to the Lao and Cambodian peoples who
are valiantly struggling against the U.S. imperialists
and their henchmen, our people constantly strengthen
our solidarity with them and wholeheartedly support
them. 162
On April 15, 1956 in a speech entitled "US Imperialists
Get Out of South Viet-Nam", Ho Chi Minh addressed the subject
of Indochinese relations stating:
With regard to the Laotian and Cambodian peoples...
our people constantly strengthen solidarity with them
and unreservedly support them. ^3
As was the case earlier, one can only speculate as to
the possible reasons for the apparent shift in verbal support.
Yet, the parallel occurance of this reversal with the build-up
of U.S. troops in South Vietnam, and increased hostile activ-
ity directed against the North from throughout Indochina,
cannot go without notice.
The above statement was quite likely one of Ho Chi Minh's
last public, official statements regarding Vietnamese support
for Laos and Cambodia. 165 While Ho Chi Minh's "Testa-
ment" makes reference to the world revolution, none is made
regarding Laos or Cambodia. 66
During the mid-1960s statements made by Pham Van Dong
generally echoed those of Ho Chi Minh. The Prime Minister's
statements also reflect the shift toward increased solidarity
between the three Indochinese states. However, statements
made between 1965 and Vietnam's unification some ten years
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later reveal a shallow oscillation about the norm of calls for
fraternal and militant solidarity. There was no apparent
step-like sequencing toward federation as was witnessed during
the early 1950s.
Figure 1 presents a summary of Pham Van Dong's statements
regarding Vietnam, Laotian; and Cambodian relations during
this 10-year period. The purpose of this matrix is to provide
a qualitative summary of the nature of Pham Van Dong's
statements. While representative, the summary does
not reflect an exhaustive analysis of all speeches and all
references regarding Indochinese relations. It does, however,
serve to illustrate the assessment stated above.
Two considerations not illustrated by Figure 1 merit
mention. As was previously illustrated for the Deriod during
the 1950s, Vietnamese calls for solidarity were not solely a
function of the external threat - in that case French colon-
ialism. That the close relationship between the three
countries during the 1960s and 1970s would continue beyond the
elimination of the U.S. imperialist threat was confirmed once
again in 1974 (i.e., after the Paris Peace Accords of 1973).
It also must be mentioned that recognition of mutual
respect for the other nation's sovereignty and territorial
integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in internal
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence,
i.e., the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, or Panch
Shi la, had been acknowledged in most, if not tacitly in all,
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statements since Geneva, 1954. This was generally consistent
with Ho Chi Minn's statements of the 1930s regarding the
equality of peoples, illustrated earlier.
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III. VIETNAM: THE TREND TOWARD FEDERATION -
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The purpose of this chapter is to focus on recent deve-
lopments in the trend toward federation in Indochina. Like
the previous section, it will proceed on two planes. It will
identify factors in the regional and extra-regional systems
which tend toward or away from federation. In addition, it
will specifically address the notion of Indochinese Federa-
tion as it reappeared after a twenty-five year absence. Al-
though the discussion of the Lao-Vietnamese relationship
extends back beyond "recent developments", it is included
here as a possible model for present-day Vietnamese actions
in Kampuchea.
A. INTEGRATION IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT
It would be a great mistake to assume that under the
umbrella of "special relationships," Vietnam's relationship
with Laos and its relationship with Kampuchea are similar.
Each has been the product of different circumstances; each
bilateral relationship has characteristic features.
The purpose of this section is to assess the nature of
Lao-Vietnamese relations. The reason is two-fold. First,
the Laos-Vietnamese relationship forms two sides of the
federation triangle. Any analysis of the prospects for
federation must address this relationship. In addition, the
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Laos-Vietnamese relationship has cultivated a much greater
degree of inter-dependence than Vietnam's association with
Kampuchea. An analysis of the former relationship - particu-
larly in the areas of organization and assistance; might not
directly translate into the Vi etnamese-Kampuchean context.
However, it might provide some insight into the nature of the
association that is presently developing between the latter.
Thus this study of the Lao-Vietnamese relationshiD, both
historical and current, has an enhanced significance.
This section on the bilateral relationship serves an
additional purpose. Throughout the analysis factors will be
identified which either detract from, or serve to enhance
this relationship. These are factors which ultimately in-
fluence the trend toward regional integration - and define
the nature of Indochinese federation.
1 . Lao-Vietnamese Relations: Background
The nature of the Lao-Vietnamese relations is complex
and diverse; it has extensive historical antecedents. The
following section seeks only to highlight some aspects of the
relationship which impact upon the general trend of regional
integration and are thus relevant to this discussion of Indo-
china federation.
Geography has significantly influenced the nature of
Laos' foreign policy. Laos is a small, land-locked, moun-
tainous country which shares its eastern border with Vietnam.
Lacking direct access to the sea, Laos has had to cultivate
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relations with her neighboring nations in order to market her
products. Vietnamese ports have figured prominently in this
process. Ties between the Lao and the Vietnamese extend down
to the tribal level. Laos' mountainous topography has exacer-
bated the ethnic diversity of the nation's mountain tribes.
Many of the tribes of Laos share a cultural affinity with the
peoples of Thailand and/or Vietnam. Ethnic groups straddle
the borders - borders created by the French with the para-
meter of administrative ease, not ethnic continuity, the
principal concern.
In an effort to enhance its relationship with Laos,
Vietnam has capitalized on this ethnic affinity. Towns in
Laos generally number more Vietnamese than Lao inhabitants
and commercial and administrative contacts with Vietnamese
1 CO
^re numerous. As a consequence of deep mixing at
all levels, Lao children develop a familiarity and attachment
1 fi Qfor Vietnamese culture, products and institutions.
Yet, perceptions of this association should not be carried
to an extreme. Lao resentment of their dominant partner is
far from uncommon. This pro-V i etnamese/anti -V
i
etnamese
sentiment has had a polarizing effect on Lao society. One
scholar of Laos has maintained that the political culture of
Laos "--extreme underdevelopment, a polyethnic society, the
Theravada Buddhist/animist value system--strongly militates
against the mass 'V
i
etnami zati on ' of Laos. ..170
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The more than thirty years of anti -col onial /anti -imperi al
resistance struggle has forged a close relationship between
the communist parties of Laos and Vietnam. Two consequences
of this close relationship have been the development of an
organizational framework to execute a Vietnamese aid and
assistance program for Laos. The following sections will
examine the relationship between the Communist Party of Laos
and that of Vietnam, its organizational framework, and
Vietnamese assistance to Laos.
2. The Communist Party of Laos: Associations with Vietnam
Apparently, there were no Lao or Cambodian communists at
the formation of the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930. 171
And it is believed that it was not until 1945, when the ICP
went underground, that the Vietnamese Communists recruited a
17?
small number of Lao members. c A small cadre of Lao
and Camabodian leaders were invited to attend the meeting
founding the Vietnamese Workers' Party in February, 1951. The
following month the formation of a Vietnamese-Laotian-Cambodian
alliance was made public--but no public announcements were
made regarding the formation of separate Lao and Cambodian
communi st parties.
Evidence supports the belief that former Lao members of
the ICP were instrumental in the formation of the People's
Party of Laos (PPL). 173 A captured training document
sheds light on the nature of this relationship, emphasizing




...the Laos who were members of the ( I ndochi nese)
Communist Party led the Lao people in their contin-
uing struggle.
Though it had been organized and expanded some-
time before, the PPL was proclaimed on 22 March 1955.
Based on these facts, it can be said that the PPL,
as the successor of the ICP, carries out the tasks
of that party. 174
The Lao revolutionary movement, commonly referred to as
the Pathet Lao, has been blessed by leadership of remarkable
longevity. This cadre has developed interlocking relation-
ships with both the Vietnamese people and Vietnamese Communist
1 eaders.
Many veteran Pathet Lao leaders have close personal and
family relationships with Vietnamese, most speak the languaae.
Head of State (President), prince Souphanouvong, and Deputy
Prime Minister and Finance Minister, Mouhak Phoumsavan, have
Vietnamese wives. Prime Minister Kaysone Phomvihane's father
is Vietnamese. Souphanouvonq and Kaysone were both educated
in Vietnam. ' 5
With such close personal ties, Vietnamese aid and assist-
ance is accepted with less suspicion and is perhaps perceived
as something less than "foreign".
3 . Organization: Parallel Structures in Laos and Vietnam
During its resistance war with the French, Hanoi
established extensive organizational structures to control
party activities and military operations in Laos.
The Vietnamese Advisory Group, known as Doan 959, was
responsible for coordinating political and administrative
affairs in Laos. It was situated approximately two and a
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half miles from Hanoi. This Group directed a forward command
post, also known as 959, located in Sam Neuan Province, Laos.
Doan 959 had a provincial headquarters for political affairs
(i.e., party affairs) and administrative affairs (i.e., com-
minications, economic affairs, MLHS work, irrigation, and
police). This structure had a parallel framework set up in
Laos to administer and advise the Pathet Lao at the province
level. Zasloff and Langer believe: "Very likely, this North
Vietnamese forward command post in Laos performs an advisory
mission with the Central Committee of the People's Party of
Laos." 176
The military advisory effort was handled through a sepa-
rate Morth Vietnamese hierarchy. This structure controlled
the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) Military advisors to the LPLA
(Lao Peoples Liberation Army), the NVA "volunteer forces,"
and the NVA mobile forces. It had a parallel structure
extending down to the company level in Laos. Normally, each




Hanoi's assistance, advice and support for the Pathet
Lao has been extensive and diverse. Vietnam's policies -
both foreign and domestic - shape the policies of their allies
in Laos. In the execution of its policies, Vietnamese assis-
tance has taken the forms of training, logistic support,




Vietnamese in Laos have served as administrative and
political advisors. Administrative advisors have given
assitance in such areas as policy formulation, decision-making
economic affairs, agriculture, irrigation, and education.
Vietnamese political advisors have helped the PPL organize
the masses, and have assisted in Party recruitment. In addi-
tion to specific services, the Lao communists have benefited
from Vietnamese experience, discipline and competence.
Hanoi has also provided the Pathet Lao an extensive mili-
tary advisory effort. Vietnamese communists have trained
personnel and suplied weapons. Vietnamese influence has ex-
tended to planning of individual operations, making intelli-
gence estimates, and assessing logistic needs.
5 . The Lao-Vietnamese Relationship: Recent Developments
While the preceding paragraphs provide food for spec-
ulation regarding possible Vietnamese organizational frame-
works and assistance employed during its present occupation
of Kampuchea, it is not directly relevant to present-day Lao-
Vietnamese relations. The purpose of the following paragraphs
is to examine the present relationship.
Hanoi's influence in Laos has grown under the tacit
approval of Prime Minister Kaysone. After 1975, over 2500
17 8
cadres with anti -V
i
etnamese views were purged. ° In
July, 1977, a 25 -year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
was signed between the two countries.
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There are perhaps as many as 50,000 Vietnamese troops
stationed in Laos - and it is believed that the underlying
reason why the Lao Liberation Army never exceeded 10,000 men
1 79
under arms was pressure from Hanoi. In addition, there
are approximately 6,000 Vietnamese officials serving in
country, and reports indicate that as many as 100,000 Viet-
namese civilians have resettled in Lao provinces. It is
suspected that 800 Vietnamese secret police arrived in Laos
in late 1978. 180
In a further effort to consolidate the views of the two
communist parties, the party history of the Lao Communist
Party is being rewritten to emphasize independence from China,
and to include the "historical necessity" of the solidarity
of the Vi etnamese-Lao-Kampuchean peoples against the French,
181
American, and Chinese threats.
In fulfillment of its obligations under the Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation, Laos, albeit belatedly, verbally
attacked the PRC during the Sino-Vietnamese border dispute of
February/March 1979.
Yet, can the LDPR be written off as a satellite of the
SRV? Geoffrey Gunn , in an attempt to answer such a question,
identified three interpretations of Lao foreign policy
rationale: patriotic-independent, federal, and doctrinaire
internationalist. Gunn concludes that such interpretations
are not mutually exclusive - and that advocates of the three
182
postures only serve to put a strain of LDPR unity.
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Despite the apparent tightness of the relationship,
factors are cl.early present which work against federation.
While the LDPR affirms the "special relationship" with Vietnam,
it has never abandoned its own sense of independent national-
ism. Laos' controlled trading with Thailand and its captial-
ist trading system serve to underscore its independence from
Hanoi. Visitors have noticed the difference between the
Vietnamese "model" and Lao practices, and the low degree of
mass mobilization in response to the party's appeal to solid-
arity with Hanoi. The political culture of Laos and the
continuance of Lao-Chinese relations also mitigate against
the belief that Laos is a satellite of the SRV.
It is also significant to note that Laos has not followed
Vietnam's lead in joining COMECON, nor is it specifically
bound to the USSR by any formal military agreement.
While it is fashionable to view Vietnam's prominent posi-
tion in Laos as a manifestation of Hanoi's desires for
regional domination, the role of Laos' desires in establishing
the existing partnership must, nevertheless, be acknowledged.
And in this dimension the present relationship is in no small
part a function of Lao acquiesence to, if not express desire
for, Vietnamese guidance and assistance.
While Vietnam and Laos share a common border, some 200
miles distanced Cambodia from North Vietnam's southern border
at the 17th parallel. Although perhaps not significant by
Western standards, this gulf is a factor which helps to ex-





developed so differently. The following section will examine
the Vietnamese-Kampuchean relationship and its relevance to
the notion of an Indochinese federation.
6. Khmer-Vietnamese Relations
After a respite of nearly 25 years, the concept of an
Indochina federation reemerged in December, 1977. It reemer-
ged in the context of a developing border conflict between
Kampuchea and Vietnam. The interim period had heralded
striking changes. French and American forces had been driven
from Indochina. Communist regimes had assumed control in
Laos and Kampuchea. South Vietnam had been liberated and was
being consolidated under Hanoi's control. Ho Chi Minn was
dead. And the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China
were the bitterest of enemies.
The dust of decades of resistance fighting had not settled
before internecine conflict erupted between the fraternal
brothers, Kampuchea and Vietnam. It was a time when the
surge of war-time solidarity was yielding to the forces of
1 o o
assertive nationalism. 00
It was amidst the confusion of an accelerating border
conflict that the current notion of an Indochina federation
gained prominence. In this context it became infamous, not
as a goal of solidarity toward which the three Indochinese
states should strive, but as a Democratic Kampuchea accusation
lodged against the perceived intent of Vietnam's regional
foreign policy. In a series of indictments released on
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December 31, 1977, Phnom Penh accused Vietnam of compelling
Kampuchea to submit to the formation of such a Federation. 184
The documents concluded with the temporary termination of
diplomatic relations between Democratic Kampuchea and the SRV.
The fact that the concept of an Indochina federation
re-surfaced at a time when Kampuchea and Vietnam were engaged
in an escalating border conflict - a conflict that would
ultimately be resolved by a massive invasion and occupation
of Kampuchea by Vietnamese forces - necessarily influenced
the way in which the concept of federation would be viewed.
The linkage of the notion of an Indohina federation to Viet-
nam's December 1978 invasion is a simplification which neg-
lects to address the complexities of the bilateral relations
as they had developed since the victory of communist forces
in April/May, 1975. Allegations that Vietnam invaded Kampu-
chea in 1978 to effect a federation are not wholly supported
by the cross-cutting and contradictory factors that ultimately
led to the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime. Mor are the
causal factors of the invasion simply limited to the sphere
of Vietnamese-Khmer bilateral relations. The events leadinq
to the invasion transcend the local environment and incor-
porate regional and international interests. The focus of
this section, however, is on the deterioration of Kampuchea n-
Vietnamese bilateral relations. Regional and international
interests, while alluded to in this section, will be addressed
i n some detai 1 1 ater.
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The origins of the border dispute itself tend to contra-
dict Phnom Penh's accusations of Hanoi's aggression and att-
empted subversion. Conflict along the land and sea borders
occurred simultaneously with the victory of the respective
communist revolutions in Kampuchea and Vietnam. Kampuchean
armed forces launched an attack against Phu Ouoc Island,
located south of the Brevie line and recognized as Vietnamese
territory on May 4, 1975. Kampuchean forces crossed the
border between Ha Tien and Tay Ninh in numerous places the
same week. On May 10, Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge occupied Tho Chu
Island and captured 515 inhabitants. Phnom Penh's
response to Vietnamese protests was "ignorance of local geo-
graphy." Nevertheless, Khmer Rouge forces continued to cross
into Vietnamese territory repeatedly during the ensuing two
year period.
Available evidence strongly suggests Vietnamese good faith
in attempting to resolve the dispute by negotiation. 8 °
Throughout the period between 1975 and 1977, the Vietnamese
proposed the resumption of talks on several occasions. These
proposals went unheeded by Phnom Penh. In addition, Vietnam
announced that the 600 Khmer prisoners captured in the early
period of the fighting would be released. The Kampucheans,
however, continued to hold the 515 Vietnamese captured on Tho
Chu I si and. 187
The border conflict intensified in 1977. In May, 500
ethnic Vietnamese families were rounded up and executed by
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Khmer Rouge forces. The dispute also produced a secondary
strain on Hanoi. Consequent to Phnom Penh's expulsion of Cam-
bodians of Vietnamese origins, the more than 60,000 refugees
from Cambodia were creating a serious burden for Hanoi. 188
This directly threatened Hanoi's reconstruction effort which
focused directly on the revi tal izati on of the economy. In
this context the conflict caused damage to Vietnam's pet eco-
nomic project - the establishment of New Economic Zones. 189
In addition, there was the concern that the border conflict
might set back the drive to open the nation's "wild west", 190
a population redeployment policy which was the linchpin of
Hanoi's battle against poverty.
If Vietnam initiated the border conflict, the effects of
the dispute were seriously jeopardizing Hanoi's primary objec-
tive of economic recovery. This is but an early indication
of the contradictory issues involved in asserting that Viet-
nam was attempting to establish a federtion by means of force.
The perceived causes of the conflict shed additional
light on this contradictory relationship. The destruction of
Vietnamese property, and the killing of Vietnamese citizens
was a causal factor. The challenge that refugees posed to
Vietnam's economic recovery was a second factor. The dis-
puted nature of the border itself, which rekindled ethnic
animosity, was a third. High on the list of causal factors
was the expectations of offshore oil wealth and other unex-
loited resources in the disputed territorial waters. (Hanoi
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had announced its position on the 200-mile territorial waters
and economic zone on May 20, 1977. Phnom Penh responded in a
pre-emptory fashion by listing 44 islands that were in their
terri tori al sea.
)
191
Events tend to point to Kampuchea as the aqgressor in this
early period. Such a picture is mollified only somewhat when
the nature of Kampuchea's allegations against Vietnam are
examined. The substance of these alleaations rests in the
resentment accrued by the Khmer Rouge against their dominant
partner, the Vietnamese communists. Perceptions more than
events form the substance of Khmer Rouge allegations. The
following examination of early Khmer-Vietnamese party rela-
tions supports the cumulative resentment held by the Khmer
Rouge against the Vietnamese.
Evidence of the split between the communist parties dates
back to the Geneva Conference of 1954. The Cambodian Commu-
nist movement was "shocked" when the Vietnamese Communists
failed to insist on their recognition at the Conference.
Resentment was manifested by the sackinq of the Vietnamese-
born Khmer communist party leader Son Mgoc Minh. c
Anti -Vietnamese feelinq was fanned when ?ol Pot asumed
the leadership of the communist party in the early 1960s.
Pursuant to his rise to power, the Cambodian Communists
adopted an ultra-nationalistic line and "completely denied
past connections with and the role of the ICP." 193 The
Pol Pot regime dates the founding of the Cambodian Communist
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Party not to 1951 - when the national communist parties
emerged, as was described earlier - but to 1960. The Khmer
Rouge maintain that at the formal dissolution of the ICP, the
Vietnamese created one party for each country - but in Kam-
puchea, the "Revolutionary People's Party" existed only by
name. 194
Phnom Penh published its allegations against Vietnam in
what has become known as The Black Book of Hatred . * 95
The Black Book maintains that revolutionary experience gained
by resistance from 1954 to 1969 lead to the founding of the
Communist Party of Kampuchea on September 30, 1960. The
Congress determined the tactical and strategical line, adopted
the Statute of the Party, and elected the Central Committee
of the Party.
When Hanoi learned of this development, the Vietnamese
Communists allegedly started to launch systematic attacks
against Kampuchea's revolution. The document also alleges
that Vietnamese secretly organized another party and another
organ of leadership.
Political differences between Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge
were apparent at the Paris Peace Accords in 1973. On that
occasion Hanoi advised the Khmer Rouge to negotiate with Lon
Nol's Khmer Republic. 196 The Khmer Rouge viewed such a
proposal as a sell-out of Khmer communist interests.
The theme of Khmer distrust of Vietnam was evident in
September, 1977 when Phnom Penh formally acknowledaed the
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existence of the Cambodian Communist Party (KCP). Reports
from Phnom Penh again reflected Cambodian sensitivity over
its historical links with the ICP, links by which the KCP
believed Hanoi might attempt to subvert the Khmer communists.
Kampuchea's suspicion did not solely rest with Vietnam.
Phnom Penh had clearly implicated the USSR in Vietnam's
alleged aggression by October 1977. 19 '' The verbal
assaults against the Soviet Union, however, were couched so
as not to totally alienate Moscow. Thus, bu the autumn of
1977, the first indications that the local conflict might
involve international indications had become apparent.
The Bl ack Book also details the centuries old antagonism
between the Khmer and Vietnamese peoples. This antagonism is
described in terms of Vietnamese "primeval hatred and pure
raci sm.
"
Included with the sections describing "The Annexationist
Nature of Vietnam ", and " The Vietnamese Maneuvers in Kampu-
chea Aiming at Taking Over the (Kampuchean) State Power
,
i s a
chapter entitled "The Strategy of 'Indochina Federation' of
the Indochinese Communist Party and its Political Program".
This chapter addresses the implementation of the Vietnamese
strategy of "Indochina Federation" in Kampuchea during the
period from 1930 to 1970. The following paragraphs serve to




Regarding the implications of "I ndochi nese" in the name
Indochinese Communist Party, Phnom Penh made no reference to
its Comintern origin. Instead, it has proposed to validate
the name's expansionist implications by stating that
"Lenin. ..has not given his party the name of 'European Commu-
nist Party' .
"
The document maintains that the slogan of the Indochinese
Communist Party was to "wage a struggle" for an independent
Indochina in order to found an 'Indochina Federation'. Con-
sequently the strategic political program of the Vietnamese
Party is the "Indochina Federation." The document also states
that this supposedly means only one country, one people and
1 QO
one army. i:70
Describing the period from 1930 to 1945, the document
states that the reason the Vietnamese were unsuccessful in
effecting the federation was because Vietnam was divided, and
that the Vietnamese cadres were "busy at home." Allegedly,
Hanoi did not have enough cadres to send to Kampuchea, and
"the Kampucheas 1 people as a whole had no idea about communism
and that they hated the Vietnamese.
During the period from 1945 to 1954, the Black Book
asserts that the Vietnamese "kidnapped" Khmers "in order to
serve their strategy of 'Indochina Federation' in Kampuchea".
It explains that in order to carry out activities in Kampuchea,
the Vietnamese organized Kampuchea into territorial zones.
In the northeastern section, the Vietnamese allegedly
installed their political and military base. The zones were
107

divided into provinces, which in turn were divided into
districts, and finally into communes. The armed forces in
these zones were composed almost exclusively of Vietnamese
soldiers. 200
From 1955 to 1970, the document alleges that the Viet-
namese used the term "solidarity" to cover the implementation
of their Indochinese federation strategy. And despite the
difficulties faced by Vietnam in the face of the growing U.S.
threat, "the Vietnamese did not give up this strategy." To
further support this claim, the document states that the Viet-
namese secretly organized and set up a parallel state power,
and "They attacked and ran down the Communist Party of Kampu-
chea by saying that its policy was wrong, leftist, adventurous,
etc. They sabotaged the Kampucheas' economy and state
food. ..201
The Black Book also refers to a document prepared by Le
Duan on the occasion of Pol Pot's visit to Hanoi in 1965 that
stated that after Vietnam had achieved victory, it would come
to liberate Kampuchea. u
Concerning Vietnamese recruiting methods the document
alleges: "The Vietnamese attracted their Kampuchean followers
by duping them, or by corruption, material baits, or through
7 D 1
the Indochinese Communist Party.
The Communist Party of Kampuchea (KCP) maintains that it
had "clearly discerned the true nature of the Vietnamese by
1966, and that by 1969 "friendship and solidarity" were
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"empty words." 204 The only reason that Democratic
Kampuchea waited until December 1977 to publicize their dis-
pute with the Vietnamese was supposedly because they wanted
to "safeguard" the friendship with Vietnam. The KCP main-
tained that based on this "wise and mature" position, they
have "always endeavored to peacefully solve the problem." 205
Democratic Kampuchea maintained that Vietnam sought to
destroy Kampucheas 1 revolution through a four-part
framework
:
1) by secretly organizing anti-party groups which
acted openly against the Communist Party of
Kampuchea;
2) by organizing secret networks within the ranks of
the Communist Party of Kampuchea for their future
activities;
3) by directly attacking by themselves the Communist
Party of Kampuchea;
4) by stirring up the people and the Revolutionary
Army of Kampuchea to oppose the Communist Party
of Kampuchea, aiming at creating difficulties to
it for the present and launching strateaical
7 n fi
attacks against it in the future. uo
In addition, the Black Book alleges that during the 1970
to 1975 period:
1) The Vietnamese wanted to set uo mixed commands
and mixed organs of power.
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2) The Vietnamese secretly organized a parallel state
power in Kampuchea.
3) The Vietnamese secretly organized a parallel army in
Kampuchea.
4) The Vietnamese secretly organized military training
and medical training schools in Kampuchea. 207
It also alleges that Hanoi wanted to annihilate the leader-
ship of the KCP through coups and assassination.
Responding to Vietnam's many offers to negotiate, Phnom
Penh attacked these offers as being "valueless". In order
for progress between the two countries to be made, Kampuchea
asserted that the root of the problem would have to be elimi-
nated: "That is to eliminate the Vietnamese ambitions of
swallowing Kampuchea and the Vietnamese strategy of Indochina
federation. " 208
While the above paragraphs illustrate the flavor of Kam-
puchea's polemics, and the zenophobic fervor with which the
concept of Indochinese Federation was resurrected, problems
of perspective, emphasis, exaggeration, and even contradic-
tion, destroy much of the credibility of the B1 ack Book .
Conseauently, Phnom Penh's allegations are largely groundless
The litany of complaints lodged against Hanoi, and the
severing of relations on December 31, 1977, marked the accel-
eration of a pedagogical war that would accelerate in para-
llel with the mounting border clashes. In response to Phnom
Penh's year end proclamation, Hanoi on January 6 released its
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most comprehensive statement to date of its position on the
conflict. The statement publicly defined Hanoi's
view of a "special relationship" (which had been developed at
the Fourth National Congress of the Vietnam Workers' Party in
December, 1976) and provided details on the border conflict.
Hanoi addressed the problem by holdinq a press conference at
which a Foreign Ministry Document was released and explained.
Forty journalists from twelve countries (including the U.S.)
were present at the press conference.
The Foreign Ministry Document of January 6, 1978 unequi-
vocally rooted the origins of the border conflict in the
historical context of Vietnamese-Khmer relations. The intro-
duction of the Document stated: "The Vietnam-Cambodia border
problem is an historical problem between the two fraternal
countries" and that the border question "involves complex
issues left over by history." 210 The press conference
concluded by stating that: "The correct path of settling the
Vietnam-Cambodian border problem is to hold negotiations on
the basis of solidarity and friendship for the sake of legit-
imate and lonastanding interests and in a reasonable, sensible
manner. " 211
As was mentioned above, the January 6 press conference
addressed the definition of "special relationship." Being
that Democratic Kampuchea viewed "special relationship" as a
codeword by which Vietnam hoped to disguise its Indochinese
federation strategy, 212 its definition as developed by
the Vietnamese merits scrutiny.
Ill

At the Fourth Congress of the Vietnam Workers Party held
in December, 1976, the notion of a "special relationship" was
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and the Vietnamese people have at all times respected the
independence, sovereignty, territorial inteqrity, and
freedom of other countries, considering this a correct
policy to defend our national independence. 2 * 4
The Vietnamese have maintained that:
"To preserve and develop this special relationship is
our unswerving policy, for with regard to the Vietnamese
people, the independence, sovereignty, and territorial
integrity of Cambodia consititutes a factor of very
important significance for the preservation of Vietnam's
independence".
Thus the concept of a "special relationship" has become
to be viewed as the "theoretical cornerstone" of Vietnamese
f orei gn pol i cy . *"
Noteworthy in the above statements on special relation-
ship is the distinct reference to the Party's, Government's
and People's ties to Kampuchea - a distinction found lacking
in earlier documents.
Despite Vietnam's clear assurances to Kampuchea, Hanoi
can be criticized for being insensitive to Kampuchea's
"national susceptibilities", i.e., its sense of national dig-
nity and pride. In the January 6 Document, Vietnam pro-
claimed: "Historical and geographic circumstances require
that our two countries unite and maintain friendly relations
with each other." 21 ' Such mention of uniting at this
critical stage of Vietnamese-Kampuchean relations could be
viewed as insensitive at least - and, perhaps, provocative.
The Foreign Ministry Document concluded with a list of
excerpts from messages and statements from leaders of the
Communist Party of Cambodia and the Government of Democratic
Cambodia concerning relations with Vietnam. These excerpts
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which express gratitude for Vietnamese support and assistance
contradict the Black Book's description of the development of
hostility between the two states.
To underscore the importance with which Vietnam viewed
the situation, the January 6 press conference was Hanoi's
first authorized Vietnamese News Agency statement in more
7 1 ftthan two years. °
Continuing to express its concern about the Vietnamese
"plot" to form an Indochinese federation, Kampuchean media on
January 6 stated that the "so-called" border incidents were
"just one" of Vietnam's many pretexts to force Cambodia into
a federation. 1 ^ In addition, to fan the flames of
conflict the Kampuchean media claimed "sooner or later Kam-
puchea will recover Saigon." 220
In a January 8 broadcast, Hanoi media addressed the issue
of federation for the first time in the Cambodian language.
The broadcast, which summarized remarks at the oress
conference on January 6, noted that the response to newsmen's
questions about federation was, in turn, a question in which
the reporters were asked when they had ever heard Vietnam
mention such a federation. Noting that the official's
question was met by silence, the broadcast went on to quote
him reiterating Hanoi's dedication to a "special relationship"
between the two countries.
As of January 8, 1978, the SRV renounced any specific
intention of forming an Indochinese federation. Nevertheless,
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Hanoi still maintained its interest in establishing a
"special relationship". 221 While technically satis-
fying Phnom Penh's demand that Hanoi renounce plans for an
Indochinese federation, Hanoi's action subsequent to January
8 did not assuage Pol Pot's fears that special relationship
was a codeword for the alleged federation scheme.
As the Vietnamese-Kampuchea border conflict increased in
intensity, it became inseparable from external influences.
While these influences shall be discussed in some detail
later, it is useful to briefly address the conflict in its
external settina at this point.
As of January, Peking media had not commented on the
conflict. The only Chinese viewpoint had been expressed by
the NCNA when it detailed Kampuchea's allegations against
Vietnam on December 31, 1977, and Vietnam's charges against
Kampuchea for the first time on January 8, 1978. 222
The PRC maintained an "even-handed" approach to the issue
and apparently encouraged a neutral stance among its allies
until mid-January. In what might be viewed as evidence of
its neutral stance, and a sign of good will toward Hanoi, the
PRC announced its agreement with Vietnam on a mutual supply
of goods and payments for 1978. The agreement was concluded
in 18 days - as opposed to negotiations of 5.5 weeks the
223previous year. tJ
Yet, for reasons as of yet undetermined, Peking made an
apparent gesture of support for Kampuchea by sendina
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Chou En-lai's widow to Phnom Penh on January 18, 1978. By
the third week of January, while publicly still avoiding
taking sides, the PRC blamed Moscow for instigating the
trouble between the Vietnamese and Kampucheans.
Soviet media had pledged support for the SRV throughout
the building conflict.
On January 8, 1978, National Security Advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski characterized the conflict as a "proxy war"
between the USSR and China.
Thus by mid-January, 1978, a conflict which had apparen-
tly originiated as a border conflict assumed the broader imp
lications of an international struggle for power. And in
this context, the seeds of suspicion were sown that would
erupt into the February, 1979 Si no-Vietnamese War.
In February Hanoi made an attempt to neutralize Phnom
Penh's charges that Vietnam desired to incorporate Kampuchea
into an Indochinese federation by proposing a three-point
plan to settle the conflict. An illuminatina concession was
the absence of the usual Vietnamese reference to special
relationship. At a press conference announcing the Plan,
then Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach repudiated Kampu-
chean alleaations reqarding the federation issue. He stated
that Vietnam had not raised the issue for more than twenty
years. Thach also reaffirmed Vietnam's commitment
to Cambodia's independence and territorial inteqrity. To
underscore the credibility of its desire to terminate the
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conflict, Hanoi proposed its readiness to accept some form of
international guarantee and supervision to seal the pledges
of both sides.
This plan, like its predecessors, was rejected by Phnom
Penh. Vietnamese impatience and irritation with the
continuing dispute was clearly apparent by March. Hanoi
dropped all references to Vietnamese-Kampuchean relations in
the state-to-state or party-to-party context. The SRV stated
that the Phnom Penh regime had lost its popular support and,
therefore, its legitimacy was suspect. 226 Vietnam also
accused Phnom Penh of using the border war to "side track the
Cambodian people" and to "repress the genuine Cambodian
revolutionaries." 22
By March, the major issues of the building vortex were:
a) The contention regarding Vietnamese desires to
establish an Indochinese federation
b) Hanoi's doubts about Phnom Penh's legitimacy.
c) Moscow and Peking involvement
Thus the dispute was no longer just a border war - but a
conflict "deeply rooted in the differing perceptions of the
shape post-war [Indochinese] relations should take." 228
In an article published a year after Thach's 5 February
1978 press conference, 229 Far Eastern Economic Review
correspondent, Nayan Chanda, proposed a "timetable" for the
decision-making process that resulted in Vietnam's invasion
of Kampuchea. His proposal was based on information provided
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by "communist sources close to Vietnam." Chanda maintains
that following Kampuchea's rejection of the February 5, 1978
peace proposal, a secret full session Vietnamese Communist
Party Central Committee meeting was convened at the end of
February. Vietnam's decision to back the rebel movement in
Kampuchea, which ultimately swept the Pol Pot regime from
power with the assistance of Vietnamese "military might", was
made at this time. Chanda basically proposes a five-step
framework to explain Vietnam's foreign policy initiatives
during 1978:
1) A diplomatic initiative to reassure Asean countries
(i.e., Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hi en's
and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong's Asean tour).
2) The forging of economic and military ties with the
Soviet Union (i.e., decision to, join Comecon, June
1978; and the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation,
November 3, 1978)
3) Gradual build-up along the Vi etnam-Kampuchcan border.
4) The creation of Kampuchea National United Front for
National Salvation (KNUFNS).
5) Lightning offensive at the end of December, 1978.
According to Chanda's "comunist sources", Pol Pot's
December 31, 1977 accusations and severing of official
relations "took Hanoi by surprise, and seemed to confirm the
view that the problem with Kampuchea was not just a bilateral






Unfortunately, Chanda's sources do not provide supporting
evidence in behalf of Vietnam's claim that Kampuchea was the
"bridgehead" of Chinese aggression. Nor does Chanda's time-
table address the events which transpired to change the
apparently cordial PRC-SRV relations at the time of the
signing of the January trade agreement noted earlier, to
Vietnam's perception of Chinese hostility a month later.
If Hanoi had decided to support the overthrow of the Pol
Pot regime in February, it nevertheless released a lengthy
document detailing the history of the Indochinese federation-
and rejecting its present day relevance - on April 7, 1978.
Also, in yet another attempt to settle the dispute between
Vietnam and Kampuchea, Hanoi offered a plan to demarcate the
border.
Hanoi's document on the Indochinese federation was later
Dublished as an Appendix to a two-volume work entitled
Kamouchea Dossier . This work provides a useful chronology of
SRV-OK relations from 1960-1978. For the most part, the
document restates the calls for unity and solidarity based on
the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence that had been
expressed throughout the 30+ year resistance period.
In a section entitled "Fromn 1931 to 1951: The Indochinese
Communist Party and the 'Indochinese Federation'", the docu-
ment refers to the March 1935 party meeting, discussed earlier,
in which the Indochinese federation was mentioned. In addi-
tion, the document states:
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Referring back to the French colonial policy of "divide
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The document also refers to the February, 1951 decision
to establish separate national parties, stating:
In February 1951 at the Proposal of the Vietnamese
Communists, the Indochinese Communist Party Disbanded
Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea Each Set Up Their Own
Parties, Governments, Armies and National United
Fronts, Completely Independent from One Another;
Meanwhile, They United in Struggle on the Basis of
Free Choice, Eauality, Mutual Assistance and Respect
for Each Other's Sovereignty. The Question of an
Indochinese Federation Was Never Raised Again...
The correct line of the Congress was followed up on
March 11, 1951 by the convening of a Conference of
representatives of the Viet-Khmer-Lao People's
Alliance, including representatives of the three
countries' respective National United Fronts, namely
the Lien Viet of Vietnam, the It sal a Front o^ Laos
and the Itsarac Front of Kampuchea; the Conference
adopted a resolution "to form the Viet-Khmer-Lao
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Peoples' Alliance based on the principles of free
choice, equality and mutual assistance" in order to
"carry on the long struggle..." 233
Regarding the pre-1975 period, and by way of conclusion
it states:
After the 1951 Congress of the Indochinese Communist
Party, and followina the 1954 Geneva Conference in
particular, the "indochinese Federation" auestion
passed into history, as did French Indochina. Like
Laos and Kampuchea, Vietnam has never referred to the
Indochinese Federation question again. 2 3 4
The third section of this document, which details the
SRV's rebuttal to Phnom Penh's allegations that Vietnam is
presently attempting to establish an Indochinese federation,
is reprinted in Appendix C. This section summarizes Pol
Pot's accusations as out of context, distorted, and
"completely groundless".
On 13 April 1978, Pol Pot held an interview on the Kampu-
chea-SRV conflict. In this press conference he explained
Kampuchea's perception of the relationship between Vietnam's
oolicies of Indochinese federation and special relatioship:
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our party, state power, military, economy, and
domestic and foreign policy, turning Cambodia into a
part of Vietnam and the Cambodian people into a
minority nationality of Vietnam. 2 ^5
Implicit in the suggestion that the "essence" of the
federation concept is the elimination of borders is the
question of territorial integrity. This was first alluded to
in Honey's assessment of the captured secret document cited
earlier. Despite Honey's assessment and Pol Pot's raving, no
evidence has been reviewed by this writer which would support
such a claim.
Pol Pot's response to Vietnam's call for negotiations was
that the negotiations have only been proposed to conceal
Vietnam's "aggressive face", and that "everyone knows this is
aimed at deceiving Vietnamese and world opinion in order to
O 'if.launch further aggression to sieze Cambodia.
Pol Pot's statements concerning the demarcation of
borders and border changes serves to clarify the source of
the dispute between the Khmer Rouge and the SRV:
Speaking of the right to demand the revision of
border documents and changes in the demarcation of
land and sea borders, only Democratic Cambodia has
the right and countless justified reasons to do so,
including the demand for the resettlement of the
Kampuchea Krom (Cochinchina) issue and the issue of
Cambodian islands which the French colonial regime
annexed to Cochinchina and Ngo Dinh Diem and past
Saigon administrations took away by force. With
regard to the sea border alone, if Democratic Cam-
bodia wants to revise (saeu reu) the documents, we
have all the legal rights as well as reasons of land
demarcation to bring the Cambodian border even
farther south of the Brevie line. 237
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The reference to Kampuchea's right to the territory of
Kampuchea Krom reflects an unchanging demand since the 1954
Geneva Accords, when the Cambodian delegate laid claims to
"Cambodian lands in South Vietnam". Phnom Penh's magnanimity
in refraining from reviving old border issues, i.e., Cochin-
china, must have struck the Vietnamese as ludicrous.
Concluding the interview, Pol Pot stated that settlement
of the border disputes was conditional upon Vietnam's recog-
nition of Kampuchea's sole right to decide the fate of the
disputed territories, and Vietnam's renunciation of its plan
of an Indochinese federation:
Democratic Cambodia holds that in-order to make friend-
ship between Cambodia and Vietnam possible, Vietnam
must have absolute respect for the aforesaid condi-
tions and must abandon forever all of its Indo-
Chinese federation and one party, one count ry, one
people and one army concepts and plans, as well as
its concepts and plans to annex and swallow Cambodian
territory and exterminate the Cambodian race. This
should not be done only in words; it should be put
into concrete deeds. Otherwise, the so-called
special friendship, special solidarity and negotia-
tions would merely be ploys to fool the Vietnamese
public and world opinion.
Although accusations and recriminations would continue
throughout the Kampuchean-V i etnamese conflict, Pol Pot's
interview spelled the beginning of the end of the pedagog-
ical war. The war of words was soon overshadowed by military
assaults. And as the military conflict escalated, the dis-
pute which had once had the appearance of a local border war
would escalate to the grander proportions of a regional
conflict that would polarize the international system.
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Having cited earlier instances of Vietnam's denial of the
Pol Pot regimes legitimacy, Hanoi extended this to its logical
conclusion in May, 1978, when it rejected Phnom Penh's right
to claim Marxist-Leninist credentials. 239 (This rite
would be repeated in July when the PRC would deny Vietnam's
communist credentials.)^ 40
Reports of "uprisings" in Cambodia appeared in the Viet-
namese media in June. Also during this period Hanoi
initiated broadcasts from Vietnam in the Khmer language to
i nci te rebel lion.
In September, Le Duan announced that the Vietnamese people
had to be ready for a third resistance war. 1 Later
that month, Cambodia launched a series of attacks into Tay
Ninh province which threatened the $US 110 million irrigation
project bankrolled by the World Bank. c
The following month Phnom Penh adopted the dual strategy
of calling for the overthrow of the "Le Duan - Pham Van Dong
Clique", while attempting to clean-up its international
image. 3 Also during October, Western military
intelligence sources reportedly found evidence supporting the
belief that Hanoi's main aim was not to physically occupy
territory - but to instead knock out the Khmer Army. 44
The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation entered into
between Vietnam and the USSR on November 3, 1978 provided
Hanoi the support it needed to pursue its military build-up.
(This treaty, along with Hanoi's June decision to join
Comecon will be discussed later.)
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On December 6, 1978 it was announced that a "United
Front" had been formed to topple the Pol Pot regime. Hanoi's
report about the formation of a Kampuchea National United Front
for National Salvation (KNUFNS) had been anticipated since
the previous summer. According to one analyst, the patterns
of propaganda campaign, armed struggle, the holding of a
congress and the setting up of a broad-based national front
with a democratic program, the establishment of a radio
station and the emergence of KNUFNS was a repitition of the
classic Vietnamese pattern seen in the early 1960s. "It was
like watching an old movie run at fast speed. "24 5
Vietnam's Christmas invasion of Kampuchea in support of
the Cambodian revolutionary armed forces, secured Phnom Penh
in 15 days - and the pro-Vietnamese Kampuchean reg-ime of Heng
Samrin was proclaimed.
The July 1977 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (TFC)
between Vietnam and Laos; the January 1979 TFC between Viet-
nam and Heng Samrin's Kampuchea; and the Laos-Kampuchea
Friendship Treaty, can not be viewed as cementing the
"federal" triangle.
The nature of the political relationship between the thre
Indochinese states is more complex than the above "friendshipe
associations would imply. There is evidence that the states "
themselves are not in accord on the specifics of their relat-
ionships. Whereas Vietnamese officials were willing to speak
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of an alliance between the three states at the Indochinese
foreign ministers meeting, this sentiment was echoed by
neither Laos or Kampuchea.
In practice, such squabbling has little real value.
Vietnam, with the overwhelming mass of its military and demo-
graphic attributes, bends her neighbor's external relations
to conform to her will by sheer force of gravity. In essence
Vietnam's Indochina policy is Indochina's Indochina policy.
Regardless of the name attributed to Vietnam's relations
with her western neighbors - be it federation, confederation,
or something else - certain key Hanoi concerns must be
recognized in her external relations. First in importance is,
the critical value Hanoi assigns to Laos and Kampuchea in
terms of Vietnam's security. Over thirty years of resistance
fighting (following centuries of back and forth conflict over
the territories of these two states with the Thai's) has
solidly defined Laos' and Kampuchea's position in Vietnam's
security system. If Laos and Kampuchea are to be "neutrals",
they will be neutral according to Hanoi's definition. The
parallel between Vietnam's "bloc" and the Soviet Union's
Warsaw Pact is not without substance.
Secondly, Hanoi has a great concern in Laos and Kampuchea
because of the value of their economic compatibility. Of the
two, Kampuchea is the larger prize. In terms of agriculture,
and in particular rice, Kampuchea's potential is viewed as a
horn of plenty. Mindful of Vietnam's (particularly the
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north's) historic inability to consistently feed its growing
population, the potential cornucopia of Kampuchea is seen as
an economic necessity.
There is a second major dimension to Laos and Kampuchea's
economic value for Vietnam. The three Indochinese states
dominate the Mekong River. With the river's hydroelectric
power potential, it could easily supply Vietnam's energy
needs as the SRV proceeds toward industrialization.
Finally, it is likely that Hanoi views her neighbor
states as something akin to a frontier - a sparsely populated
region that could help to relieve Vietnam's building demo-
graphic pressure.
As a consequence of these key factors, a broad statement
of Vietnam's Indochina policy is relatively easy to derive.
Vietnam's national interest in Indochina stems from economic,
(military) security, and political (even though not addressed)
concerns. Hanoi's Indochina policy is designed to ensure
Vietnam's ultimate security by protecting her interests in
these three dimensions. However, neither these interests ncr
the factors thus far examined necessarily spell federation.
The preceding discussion has clearly illustrated how the
notion of an Indochinese federation reappeared in a context
entirely different from earlier plans of federation. Distor-
tion in perception based on this change of context suggests
that the belief that Vietnam has a master plan to establish
an Indochinese federation be viewed with skepticism.
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While little is yet known about Vietnamese administration
and direction in Kampuchea, it is useful to compare the cases
of Lao-Vietnamese and Kampuchean-Vietnamese relations.
Whereas Jacob's and Teune's factors of geography and cultural
affinity were elements promoting a greater degree of
association with Laos, these factors do not hold the same
import for Kampuchean-Vietnamese relations. Kampuchea,
unlike Laos, is ot dependent on Vietnam for access to the
sea. And in contrast to the Lao-Vietnamese case, ethnic
enmity can be viewed as the single largest factor militating
against a greater degree of association between Kampuchea and
Vietnam. Vietnamese-Kampuchean interdependence is unlikely
to reach the stage of present Vietnamese-Laos relations.
Finally, the Lao-Vietnamese relationship suggests that in
Kampuchea Vietnam will be assisting the Khmers in such areas
of party organization, education and training, and medical
care. The PAVN will not only serve to combat rebel activity,
but also function to maintain internal security and enforce
party directives. The establishment of "sister provinces"
might be viewed as the first step in Vietnamese efforts to
estblish a parallel administrative structure in Kampuchea.
B. INTEGRATION AND THE EXTRA-REGIONAL SYSTEM
Vietnamese intentions regarding Indochina - be they
federation or otherwise - cannot be executed in an isolated
arena. Interests of the other international powers run deep
into the region. These interests impact on Vietnam's foreign
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policy options. The Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet
Union are two international actors which figure prominently
in Hanoi's decision-making process. This section will
examine the role these powers play in the trend toward
regional integration.
1 . The Role and Interests of China in Indochina
The previous section described how an initial clash
of bilateral interests escalated into a contest between Viet-
nam and China for influence throughout Indochina.
In reality, the conflict between Kampuchea and Vietnam
was n ester solely a bilateral dispute or later solely a
regional dispute between Vietnam and China - crosscutting
issues invalidate any such generalization. What changed was
the focus; bilateral issues were the focus of interest early-
on, followed by an increasing emphasis on regional concerns.
The purpose of this section is to briefly survey some aspects
of the regional dispute between Vietnam and China.
A step-wise documented resolution of the chicKen or egg
nature of who initiated the emerging hostilities between
Vietnam and China is beyond the scope of this analysis. What
is relevant to this paper's concern, however, is the linkage
between the escalating Si no-V i etnamese conflict and the
notion of an Indochina federation. This linkage will be
examined by focusing on three areas: Chinese interests in
Southeast Asia, causes of the Si no-V ietnamese conflict, and,
finally, the common denominator between interests, conflict,
and the notion of an Indochina federation.
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Chinese interests in Southeast Asia, and Beijing's deter-
mination to protect them is the single largest external con-
straint on Vietnam's perceived desire to establish a feder-
ated Indochina. A recent analysis of China's strategic
interests in Southeast Asia has summarized Beijing's concerns
as f ol 1 ows:
--to minimize and, if possible, to prevent the
penetration of the Soviet Union into the region;
--To encourage regional states to side with China
against Vietnam and the Soviet Union;
--To develop economic relations with the region in
order to channel trade and investment into the
Four Modernizations;
--To maintain reasonably close contact with the
Overseas Chinese in order to keep them politically
sympathetic and economically active on China's
behal f
.
--To play down China's support for revolutionary
parties;
--To maintain and even improve relations with the
United States and Japan in order to cope with the
Soviet threat and support domestic economic modern-
ization . 2 4 6
While the question of under what circumstances the PRC
would once again resort to military force to pursue these
strategic interests is of speculative interest, it unfortun-




In support of these strategic interests China has adopted
what might be viewed as a three-pronged approach toward Indo-
china:
1) Throttling of any Indochinese state which acts
contrary to China's perceived security aspirations
and regional interests.
2) Freeing the region from Soviet influence
3) Advancement of policies which ensure the PRC a
dominant role in the region.*'
The competition for influence in Indochina was the
central issue leading to the Si no-Vietnamese conflict of
February, 1979. The following list (in the form of a chrono-
logy) serves to present but a few of the disputed issues.
1. August 1975:
2. January 10, 1977
Differing views on hegemonism and
the dispute over claims to Paracels
and Spratley Islands precludes
issuance of a joint communique fol-
low in a Le Duan's visit to China.
Memorandum on Vice-Premier Li Xian
Nian's talks with Premier Pham Van
Dong (a Chinese document) states
that there are seven major disputed
concerns between the two countries:




4. January 10, 1978
5. January 11, 1978
6. February, 1978
7. May, 1978:
2) The land boundary
3) Railway maintenance
4) The Paracel and Spratley Islands
5) Tong King Bay
6) Overseas Chinese in Vietnam
7) Economic Aid 248
Thai observers note that Hanoi is
eager not to be left in the wake of
Peking's initiative to consolidate
a diplomatic base line running thru
Phnom Penh, Bangkok, and Rangoon,
which is designed to contain the
spread of Soviet influence in South-
east Asia 249
Agreement reached on mutual exchange
of goods between China and Vietnam.
Through this date, Chinese media had
been pursuing an "even-handed" app-
roach on the Vi etnamese-Kampuchean
Confl ict.
Secret meeting of Vietnamese Commu-
nist Party Central Committee during
which decision to invade Kampuchea
in December, 1978 was allegedly made
PRC expresses concern over status








PRC rebukes Hanoi, cuts aid.
PRC sees sinister Kremlin plot
behind Hanoi's actions.
PRC closes three Vietnamese consul-
ates.
PRC no longer considers Vietnam to
be a communist state.
Nhan Dan article traces Peki ng-Phnom
Penh axis back to Pol Pot's visit
to China in 1960.
PRC offers talks with Vietnam, raise
question of Sprately Islands.
PRC effectively signals end of party
ties with Vietnam.
PRC breaks off talks.
Dong's and Deng's ASEAN tours
NCNA says root cause of conflict is
Vietnam's attempt to establish an
Indochinese federation
Si no-Vietnam Border War
13. November 19, 1980: Beijing deflates ASEAM-I ndochi na
pen
rapprochement. c JW
This review of Chinese interests in Indochina plus some
of the events leading to the Si no-Vietnamese War of February/
March 1979 identifies the linkage between interests, conflict
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and the notion of an Indochinese federation. Just prior to
Vietnam's December invasion of Kampuchea, China started to
echo Pol Pot's allegations that Vietnam was attempting to
establish its age-old dream of an Indochina federation.
Beijing has continued this line to the present time. To this
writers knowledge, the PRC has offered no new evidence which
might suppport or confirm that it was Ho Chi Minh's or
Hanoi's desire to establish a federal arrangement in Indo-
china. Nor has the PRC advanced any evidence which conclu-
sively shows that Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea was an
attempt to establish such a federation by force.
This review has identified two noteworthy events:
1) The aparent existence of a Chinese scheme to estab-
lish a Phnom Penh - Bangkok - Rangoon axis.
2) PRC actions to extinguish efforts to effect a recon-
ciliation between ASEAN and the Indochinese states.
China's Phnom Penh - Bangkok - Rangoon axis scheme
certainly must have triggered Vietnam's historic fear of
Chinese encirclement and domination. In fact, there is a
remarkable similarity between China's fear of Vietnam consol i
dating a federation in China's backyard, and Vietnam's
argument that "by pushing Kampuchea into publicly attacking
Vietnam, China had taken the first step towards its long-
standing goal of curbing Vietnam.'"11 The similarity
rests in the apparent mutual paranoia felt by China and Viet-
nam regarding perceived "spheres of interest".
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Although by no means conclusive, these facts tend to
identify China as the initiator of this snowballing contest
of mutual paranoia. It also tends to identify the PRC as an
agent acting against regional stability.
In summary, Beijing's accusations that Hanoi is attemp-
ting to establish an Indochina federation is merely a parrot-
ing of Pol Pot's allegations. No evidence in the course of
the Si no-Vietnamese conflict and its cold war follow-on has
been unveiled which confirms Kampuchea's charges. China
employs the phrase in order to discredit the Vietnamese and
gain support for her own interests in Southeast Asia.
2 . The Role and Interests of the US'SR in Indochina
Observers were quick to identify Vietnam's December
1978 invasion of K.ampauchea as a finaer in the expanding
reach of the Kremlin throughout Asia. Such an identification
raises the issue of Moscow's influence in Vietnsm's external
relations.
This analysis will proceed in three steps: First, the
role and interest of the Soviet Union in Indochina will be
addressed. Second, the mul ti -dimensi onal relationship between
the Soviet Union and Vietnam will be examined. And third,
mitigating factors in the relationship will be assessed, i.e.,
internal and external constraints which tend to inhibit co-
ordinated USSP-SRV efforts in Southeast Asia.
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a. The Soviet Factor
Whereas the PRC is an external factor which tends
to work against Vietnamese desires for greater regional asso-
ciation, the Soviet Union plays the opposite role. Soviet
assistance has contributed to Vietnam's capability to pursue
her regional objectives. Consequently, the Soviet-Vietnamese
relationship will be examined in some detail. Although it is
impossible to establish precise coefficients, it is believed
that the Soviet variable plays a greater role in influencing
Vietnam's foreign policy than does Chinese threats - which
might act as a deterrent to Vietnamese foreign policy
initiatives.
The following paragraphs will examine USSR assistance to
Vietnam and address the issue of influence alluaed to above.
The purpose of this section is to examine the nature of
Moscow's influence in Vietnam's Indochina policy, i.e., how
the USSR figures into the trend toward integration - be it
toward federation or something else.
This discussion will explore the nature of the
Soviet-Vietnamese relationship to a greaater degree than the
preceding paragraphs on the PRC-SRV relationship. It is the
author's belief that in the final analysis of the trend toward
federation, the influence and support of the USSR plays a
larger role than the Chinese deterrent.
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b. The Role and Interest of the Soviet Union in
Indochina
Soviet interests in Vietnam can be defined along
three principal dimensions: global, regional, and bilateral.
It is reasonable to assume that each dimension has a hierarchy
of Soviet foreign policy objectives. Yet, that there is
little agreement on the specific hierarchy of policy objec-
tives is not surprising - for each structure incorporates
the biases of its architect.
The common denominator of all external relations of the
Soviet Union is to ensure the USSR's security and integrity.
Beyond this fundamental objective, the Soviet state seeks to
expand its influence throughout the world. This policy of
expanding its influence is conducted under the guise of
"proletarian internationalism" and support of "national
1 i beration" .
The following sections will review the three principal
dimensions of Soviet interest in Vietnam and propose some
possible foreign policy objectives at each level.
( 1 ) Indochina as a Function of Moscow's Global
Strategy . Of the many regional theaters into which Soviet
global foreign policy is divided, the Eastern Europe theater
is the primary concern.
Historically, the primary threat to Russia has generated
from Europe - the Mongol invasion excepted. Thus, few would
deny the primacy of Moscow's Eurocentric foreign policy
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objectives. In the context of Moscow's global strategy,
Indochina rates a relatively low priority. Yet, Dieter
Heinzig, in a most lucid examination of the role and interest
of the USSR in Indochina, concludes that in this primary
region of the USSR's foreign policy calculation the countries
of Indochina serve as "help mates". 52 Heinzig sees the
expansion of the Kremlin's military base system as serving a
supporting function in Moscow's "politico-military shielding
of the European Soviet Bloc". Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay,
Oanang, and Haiphong serve as important links in this primary
Soviet objective.
Concerning the expansion of Soviet influence throughout
the world, Donald Zagoria views Moscow's interest in Vietnam
to be a function of its new system of alliances in the Third
World. 53 The danger of these new alliances is "not so
much that Moscow will achieve hegemony in the Third World...
[but] rather that the spread of communism and Soviet power
will upset tenuous regional balances of power, lead to inten-
sified regional instabilities, and make even more difficult
the settlement of a variety of regional clashes that could
lead to war."
In summary, Moscow's global strategy is designed to
ensure its security and increase its influence. With perhaps
the possible exception of Heinzig' s "helpmate" hypothesis,
the role of Indochina in the global context of ensuring the
Soviet Union's security is virtually nonexistent. Regarding
138

the expansion of Moscow's influence throughout the world,
Indochina, and Vietnam in particular, has a function in the
emerging system of Soviet alliances in the Third World.
( 2 ) Indochina As A Function of Moscow's Asia Strategy
Russian fears of the "yellow peril" are incomprehensible
to most Westerners. An yet, the perceived threat of the PRC
is at the hub of the Kremlin's Asia strategy. Moscow's foreign
policy concerning China is not unlike Washington's 1950's
containment strategy.
The USSR's goals revolve around the desire to influence,
if not dominate, both ideologically and geopol i tical ly the
countries bordering China. What the USSR wants in the reqion
is ideological dominance: This is to be achieved without
Soviet participation in war. This theme, dominance without
war, explains virtually everything the USSR has done in Asia
OCA
during recent times (Afghanistan excepted). 3
Douglas Pike has summarized Moscow's perceived Asia stra-
teqy in the policy objectives hierarchy below:
1) fill the vacuum left by the United States
2) decrease United States' influence in Asia -- eliminate
United States' military presence if possible
3) woo Asean nations
4) increase bilateral relations with Asian nations
5) develop a base system in Indochina
6) increase Soviet military presence in the region --
ships at sea and bases in Vietnam with a view toward
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gaining parity with, or even ascendancy over the United
States in the Indian Ocean. 55
With the possible exception of number three above, each
of the aforementioned objectives can be translated rather
straightforwardly in terms of the Soviet-Vietnamese
relationship
Finally, any discussion of Moscow's Asian strategy must
address the USSR's 1969 proposal of an "Asian collective
security" arrangement. In light of subsequent Communist
adventures in Asia (i.e., Afghanistan and Kampuchea), the
wording of Moscow's Asian policy seems rather ludicrous:
"The right of each people to dispose of its own
fate, the impermissibility of annexation of terri-
tory through aggression, the inalienable right of
every people to sovereign rights over its own natu-
ral resources and the realisation of socio-economic
transformations, the solution of all international
disputes by peaceful means."
In 1977 Moscow praised Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as
examples of the "spirit" of collective security - blind to the
fact that it was precisely these kinds of events transpiring
in Indochina that were generating the greatest alarm among
o c 7
the nations of Southeast Asia.
The preceding paragraphs have served to introduce Soviet
interests in Indochina as a function of Moscow's Asia Strategy.
This dimension of the Kremlin's interest in Indochina will be
referred to and expanded upon throughout the remainder of this
analysis - for it is this context in which
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Vietnam's 1978 invasion of Kampuchea is viewed as an extension
of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia.
(3) Soviet Bilateral Interests in Indochina . Strictly
speaking, on a bilateral level, i.e., when the Soviet- Viet-
namese relationship is decoupled from third party considera-
tions, Soviet interest in the one-on-one relationship is
virtually non-existent. Vietnam produces few qoods desired
by Russian markets, it offers the Soviet Union no prospects
of advancement through technology transfer, and it is not a
source of hard currency which the USSR desperately needs.
Culturally, in the field of education, and even politically,
Vietnam offers minimal returns. Thus, aside from the
prestige gained by the advancement of another socialist
country following the Soviet model (and even this was
tarnished when Vietnam invaded Kampuchea), the Kremlin gains
little from its bilateral relationship with Vietnam.
In light of this negative bilateral balance for the USSR,
it is third party considerations which will ultimately influ-
ence the Soviet- Vietnamese relationship. Cases in the past
of Moscow sacrificing Vietnamese interests in order to
advance Kremlin designs elsewhere are well known to Hanoi's
leaders. Such a relationship is hound to breed contempt and
insecurity on the part of the Vietnamese.
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(4 ) Summary Of Objectives Of Soviet Foreign Policy
And The Role Played By Indochin a. The division of Soviet
interests in Vietnam along three principal dimensions -
global, regional, and bilateral - and the recognition of
Soviet objectives/interests as being either directed toward
maintenance of security, or expansion of influence, lends













The major thrust of the remainder of this analysis will
be to examine the nature of the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship
as it relates to Moscow's regional objective of expanding its
influence in Asia.
When discussing the USSR-SRV relationship in the context
of recent developments, it is important to recall that in the
Asian subsystem, there is a polarizing tendency for communist
nations to follow the lead of either Moscow or Peking. Few
nations have successfully "straddled the fence" for any
appreciable length of time, and the states of Indochina have
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been no exception. The emergence of Vietnam's pro-Soviet
tilt in late 1977/ early 1978 released shock waves throughout
the region. This tilt was quickly followed by the proclama-
tion of China's support for the Pol Pot regime of Democratic
Kampuchea.
The escalating border conflict between Kampuchea and
Vietnam set the stage for the Soviet Union, by means of its
relationship with Vietnam, to pursue its interest of expanding
its influence in Asia - and thus dominate ideologically and
geopolitically another nation bordering China. The following
section of this analysis will examine the nature of the
USSR-SRV relationship with an eye toward assessing the nature
of Moscow's influence in Vietnam's Indochina policy.
c. The USSR-SRV Relationship
This section will examine the mul ti -dimensi onal
nature of the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship. Its three
parts will provide a descriptive chronology of the military
dimension of the USSR-SRV relationship, a descriptive chrono-
logy of the economic relationship between Moscow and Hanoi,
and, finally, additional dimensions of Soviet-Vietnamese
relations not covered under these two headings.
Such an examination will help to further define the
nature of Moscow's influence in Vietnam's Indochina policy.
( 1 ) The Military Dimension . At the time of Hanoi's
liberation of the South in May, 1975, the USSR was supplying
75% of North Vietnam's military hardware. China was supplying
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15%, and Eastern Europe, ten percent. Whereas military aid
then tapered off during 1976, assistance from the Soviet
pro
Union began to increase once again in 1977. 3 ° As of
mid-year 1977, diplomatic sources in Hanoi reported that the
number of Soviet experts in country was 2,700 -- of which
supposedly only about 40 were military advisors.*^
The period from 1977 to 1978 witnessed a 100% increase
in arms transfers between the two countries, and for the
first time since 1975, Vietnam began to receive large quanti-
? fi n
ties of arms and military equipment from the Soviet Union. ou
The emergency deliveries of military hardware, which had been
increasing since early summer in coordination with the
escalating Vietnamese-Kapuchean border conflict, were trans-
7 fi 1ported to Vietnam by both sea and air routes. 0i
Beginning in autumn, the emergency supplies escalated into a
? fi ?
massive arms transfer operation. c
During 1978, the USSR increased Vietnam's military
capacity by 50%; the latter's tank inventory climbed from 900
to 1,450 vehicles and self-propelled artillery increased from
90 to 290. 263 Vietnam reportedly possessed 8,000 anti-
aircraft guns, 500 SAMs, 2,000 anti-tank missiles and even
thirty MiG-23/27s by years end. 264 (The transfer of
MiG-23s to Vietnam was also corroborated by the New China
7 fi RNews Agency.)
Vietnam's navy was also built up during this period.
7 fi fi
The Soviets sent two gun boats in December, 19 78. °°
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This transfer came on the heels of a naval battle between the
SRV and PRC on December 10 in which the Vietnamese used
9 fi 7Soviet- supplied vessels.
The year's arms transfer relationship was not limited to
just military hardware. The number of Soviet military
advisors increased dramatically in mid-1978. A Vietnamese
Army corporal taken prisoner by Khmer forces in November
reported that Soviet advisors were "all over Vietnam -
particularly in the Army." 263 According to intelli-
gence sources, in late 1978 the Kremlin had ordered nearly
1,000 more advisors and technicians to Vietnam, bringing
their number to almost 4,000. 69 As a result of the
massive military assistance supplied Vietnam by the Soviet
Union, by years end the 615,000 armed forces of the SRV were
equal in number to, but better equipped than, the combined
forces of the ASEAN states. ° In addition, Vietnam
was the Far East Region's second largest arms importing
country - with a total of SUS2 62 million (estimated in 1975
dollars), second only behind North Korea, and ahead of Taiwan.
Vietnam received 11% of the region*"s total arms imports.
The military assistance link between the USSR and SRV
continued to expand rapidly in 1979. Western analysts esti-
mated that in the first six months of 1979, the Vietnamese
received 90,000 tons of war material from the USSR, more than
the amount Hanoi received from the Soviet Union during the
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whole of 19 78. 272 A visitor, returning to Vietnam
after more than a year out of country, reported being struck
by the profusion of brand-new Soviet materials - from command
cars, heavy duty trucks and tanks, to MiG-21s. By
1979, the USSR was supplying 97% of Vietnam's military
equipment, while 2% came from East Germany, and 1% from
1 A
Czechosolvakia and Poland.* Soviet assistance also
provided Hanoi a string of radar stations built near the
Chinese border. 75
The SRV's air power capability was significantly augmented
by the Kremlin during 1979. Fifty new Soviet made Badger
(bombers) were reported on Vietnamese airfields, and these
were protected by 125 to 150 MiG fighters and a new air defense
7 7 fi
system using SA-3s. Long range Soviet reconnaissance
aircraft arrived at Danang in mid-April; missions were flown
over Kampuchea, the Gulf of Thailand, and the South China
7 7 7
Sea. Repeated sightings of these TU-95 Bear Ds
flying out of Danang in support of the Vietnamese defense
o 7 o
effort peppered the reporting period.
Commencing in March, a dozen AN-12 transports began
7 1 Qferrying troops and military supplies throughout Indochina.
In support of the Vietnamese war effort, Soviet AN-12 trans-
port planes were making as many as 30 flights a day. FBIS
reported that the Soviet Union was flying the military
p on
supplies to Vietnam via Calcutta. By late 1979, ten
ships per month were arriving at Vietnamese ports with
7 P. 1
military cargo - averaging 1,300 tons each.- 01
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With respect to military and technical assistance, West-
ern observers estimated that as many as 8,000 Soviet military
and civilian personnel were in Vietnam - up from 2,700 two
pop
years earlier. oc Apart from the Ambassador, two very
senior Soviet officials enjoy similar ambassadorial status,
and are stationed in Hanoi to supervise the disbursement of
economic and technical aid, military assistance and training.
Unconfirmed diplomatic reports indicated that, as of 1979,
General Petrov Nikolai Al exandrovi tch was the Soviet military
poo
assistance coordinator in Vietnam. OJ
It was originally believed that Soviet military assist-
ance groups in Vietnam served chiefly in the field of commu-
nications and as cargo handlers. But in March 1979 the first
group of Soviet "volunteers" arrived at Haiphong and Ho Chi
Minh City to help unload the massive flows of military
supplies. ° ^ Soviet sailors also helped unload cargo
at Ho Chi Minh City's port. 285
It soon became apparent that the extent of Soviet mili-
tary and technical assistance was even greater than originally
believed. Soviet marine experts were enlarging port
p o c
facilities and dredging the Saigon River. 00 Soviet
technicians in Danang assisted in refueling and maintaining
p o 7
the TU-95 Bear Ds. A substantial number of advisors
turned out to be instructors at air force training schools.




use of new equipment, and the maintenance and operation of
op q
aircraft and ships. °^
Such Soviet support as technical assistance, training,
and the use of technicians is not surprisinq. What was
shocking, however, were reports of Soviet pilots allegedly
flying combat aircraft in the Cambodian War, and Soviet
personnel engaging in actual fighting. 90 The Thai
military supreme command "confirmed" the presence of thirty
Soviet Military advisors in Kampuchea. x Corrobo-
rating the numerous reports that Russians were being captured
in the fighting, was the display of the bodies of Soviet
pop
advisors killed during the invasion.
Soviet naval assistance increased the nost rapidly
during 1979. Moscow presented to the SRV at least five naval
pqo
combatant vessels. During the period of open hosti-
lities between Vietnam and China, the Soviets dispatched a
fifteen-ship contingent to Vietnam's coast for the purpose of
intercepting Chinese battlefield communications and relaying
the intelligence to the Vietnamese.-' Several of the
ships anchored at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay. In May, U.S satel-
lite intelligence indicated that a Soviet Foxtrot submarine
had visited Cam Ranh Bay. Additional intelligence releases
indicated that the Soviets were setting up electronic listen-
ing posts at the harbor. Such outposts would give the Soviets
(and presumably the Vietnamese) the ability to keep track of
U.S. and Chinese fleet movements in the South China Sea, and
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provided the ability to pinpoint Chinese command
headquarters.
Pursuant to Vietnam's invasion and subjugation of Kampu-
chea, the PAVNI (People's Army of Viet Nam) received an
additional hardware transfusion - access to Khmer stockpiles.
The Vietnamese captured twenty Mi G-21 s , two 11-28 bombers
plus additional aircraft, tanks, and heavy guns. °
The Vietnamese also gained the use of Kompong Som, formerly
known as Si hanoukvi 1 1 e - a port of underestimated arms trans-
port importance during the Vietnam War. Soviet freighters
began unloading transportation equipment there by years end,
7 9 7
19 79. " Finally, as if to underscore an otherwise
very profitable year for the SRV, Admiral Gorshkov made a
December visit to Vietnam, and pledged increased Soviet
o q o
military assistance to Hanoi.
Vietnam entered the decade of the 1980s with the fourth
largest standing army in the world. It is is estimated that
47% of Vietnam's total state expenditures were attributed to
defense; this equated to about SUS3.8 billion - or about 28%
? 9 9
of the national income. As Vietnam remained deeply
dependent on the USSR for all weaponry required in Kampuchea,
it is estimated that Soviet aid for 1980 was nearly SUS2
billion - of which 5
5
°l» was military aid.
Soviet arms transfers to Vietnam began to ebb in 1980.
In one of the few statements on Soviet military assistance to
SRV during 1980, French sources reported the assignment of




As a result of the amount (and to an extent, sophisti-
cation) of Soviet naval assistance to Vietnam - particularly
the transfer of coastal patrol craft which continued in 1980
- the Soviet Union had increased the potential intensity of
naval warfare in Southeast Asia. 02
The regional implications of Soviet arms transfers
became more apparent as Vietnamese troops clashed with Khmer
rebels and their troops on the Thai -Kampuchean border in June
1980. Reports in 1980 indicated that Soviet advisors (esti-
mated at 1,600), in conjunction with Vietnamese troops, were
running Laos "in all but name". 3
While reports of Soviet military assistance declined in
1980, they all but stopped in 1981. SIPRI maintained that
while there are no good numbers for Vietnam, Laos or Kampu-
chea, the military spending in the region must be very high.
It was estimated that total SRV dependence had risen to
o r\ c
between SUS3-6 million per day. Allegedly, the
Soviets provided weapons for the 150,000 Vietnamese troops
who remained on full alert at the Chinese border to guard
against a repeat of the PRCs 1979 "lesson". 306
In the regional context, the Kremlin's attempts to
bolster its presence in Laos and Kampuchea included a gift of
five fixed-wing aircraft and two helicopters.
In summary, certain key satistics become apparent.




leading Third World importer of major weapons. (It is inter-
esting to note that the first four and following three were
all from the mid-East - Iran, Libya, Israel, Syria; then
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan.) For the 1977-1980 period,
Vietnam was the tenth largest Third World major weapon
importing country, with 3.1% of the world total . ®°
Between 1975 and 1979 the Soviet Union shifted from supplying
75% of the SRVs military hardware to 97% - while China's 15%
was terminated altogether. The report of 2,700 advisors in
1977 expanded into an upper estimate of 8,000 by 1979. In
1978 alone, Soviet arms trade to Vietnam doubled - which
increased Hanoi's military capacity by 50%.
(2) The Economic Dimension . One of the most
significant actions in establishing Hanoi's tilt toward
Moscow was the Kremlin's approval and support for North
Vietnam's final offensive to liberate the South in the Spring
of 1975. 09 China's orestiae suffered greatly due to
her original advocation of moderation, restraint, and
patience in further North Vietnamese liberation efforts (as
opposed to unification by military force). Moscow
thus emerged as Hanoi's prime benefactor in the post-Paris
Accords liberation and unifcation scheme.
As regional tensions seemingly subsided, the relative
importance of Soviet-Vietnamese relations diminished somewhat
during the 1975-1978 period. Yet, alarmed by the prospect
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of increased Chinese incluence in Southease Asia coming on
the heels of U.S. withdrawal from Indochina, Moscow extended
promises of economic aid to Vietnam. It was generally
believed that during this period Hanoi's attention was
directed toward the domestic dilemmas of unification, modern-
ization, and socialization. Pressing the advantage it had
gained, Moscow urged the Soviet model for economic develop-
ment (as opposed to the Maoist), and supplied an estimated
$US1.2 b i 1 ion in economic aid during the first year after
unification. At least 20% of the rice eaten in Vietnam - and
possibly as much as 30% (2-3 million metric tons)- was being
supplied annually by the USSR. 11 (Moscow also attempts
to meet Vietnam's chronic food shortage by supplying wheat
bought from countries such as Australia and India.) 31
Hanoi depended on Moscow for other eaually vital commodity
aid such as petroleum, chemical fertilizers, and spare parts
for transportation vehicles.
In a major postwar aid agreement negotiated in Moscow in
October 1975, the USSR agreed to fund 60% of Vietnam's
1976-1980 Five Year Plan - at a cost of about S3. 2 billion.
The agreement involved some 40 major industrial projects,
chiefly in the fields of electrtical power, oil and mineral
exploration and exploitation, transportation, communu i cati on
and industrial s'ipport for agriculture. In addition, the
USSR agreed to sponsor 30,000 Vietnamese students and tech-
nicians in the USSR. Commercial air service between Hanoi
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and Moscow commenced in late 1975. And during this period an
average of 75 Soviet ships. per week began calling at Viet-
namese ports.
Even as Si no-Vi etnamese relations improved somewhat in
1977 as compared to previous years, Hanoi's ties with the
USSR remained close. By midyear, Moscow was supplying $15
billion a year in economic aid to Vietnam, which amounted to
approximately one half of the total assistance Vietnam was
receiving from all sources.
A series of events destined 1978 to be a decisive year
in terms of Soviet-Vietnamese relations. Having previously
equivocated about joining COMECON, Vietnam reversed its
position and, on June 29th, became the organizations tenth
member. (That same month China terminated its twenty year-
old assistance program to Vietnam.)
The major fore i an policy development of 1978 between the
Soviet Union and Vietnam was the signing of a twenty five
year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in November. As a
result of this agreement, Vietnam was firmly committed to the
Soviet camp. (This Treaty will be addressed again later.)
In addition to the Treaty, five other agreements dealing with
defense, economic aid, technology, and cultural exchanges
were siqned. At the time, there were rumors in Moscow that
the Treaty contained an unpublished protocol adding the
"immediate military aid" phrase that appears in both the
North Korean and Mongolian Treaties. It is known that some
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sort of military protocol annex to the treaty was signed in
November, but the nature of the protocol has not been made
public. 315
By 1979, about 65% of Vietnam's total trade was with the
USSR. In 1980, approximately 50% of Vietnam's exports were
sent to the USSR as partial compensation for fuel, technical
equipment, food, consumer goods, and military assistance.
Vietnamese imports for 1980 approximated Rbl 800 million, two-
thirds of which came from the USSR and about one-third from
other socialist countries. 31 Sovi et-I ndochi nese trade
for the 1975-1981 period is listed on page 159.
After an apparent downturn in 1980, relations with
Moscow seemed to improve somewhat in 1981. Through the period
until 1981 it is estimated that approximately two hundred
projects had been built with Soviet aid, and 60,000 Vietnamese
had been trained in the USSR. In July significant economic
cooperation and trade agreements were signed to cover the
period 1981-1985. 17 During the five year period, the
USSR would help Vietnam with more than one hundred projects.
The announcement proclaimed that the Soviet Union would con-
tinue to assist Vietnam in ongoing projects such as: The Da
River project, the Than Long bridge over the Red River, and
the Xuan Mai concrete slab factory for prefabricated houses.
Additional Soviet assistance would be extended in such pro-
jects as coal production, power generation and transmission,
cement factory equipment and superphosphate fertilizer
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production. Technical and vocational schools in such fields
as communications and transportation, construction, and
chemicals would be constructed with Soviet aid - and 2,000
Vietnamese students would receive training at Soviet
vocational schools.
Under the economic and technical accord, the Soviets
would help Vietnam build forty new projects in such critical
areas as hydroelectric power and coal production, and harbor
and railway improvements. Also under the new agreement,
Moscow would "almost quadruple" its supply of equipment and
machinery to Vietnam as compared to the previous similar
peri od
.
Concerning trade, the agreement stated that bilateral
trade between the USSR and SRV would expand by 90 percent!
Under its provisions, the USSR would increase shipments of
oil products, fertilizers, motor vehicles, and road construc-
tion machines and equipment. Vietnam, in turn, would boost
its exports of coffee, tea, vegetables, fruit, spices,
010
rubber, timber and handicrafts. And as in previous
years, the agreement stated that the Soviet Union would pro-
vide cotton, wool and medicinal plants to be processed in
Vietnam and returned to the USSR as finished products.
Although no firm totals for the pledge have been forthcoming,
Moscow had been requested to fund $6 billion of the 1981-1985
Vietnamese Five Year Plan. 319
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Information on financial assistance from COMECON to
Vietnam is "rare". Nevertheless, it is known that Hungary
has been assisting Vietnam with the construction of two
cotton-spinning mills. East Germany has pledged assistance
for a cotton mill and shoe factory (both for export), and aid
in modernizing dockyards. The East Germans have pledged
approximately Rb 1 155 mi 11 ion /year for such projects as a
plant to produce prefabricated houses, a flat-glass mill, and
general reconstruction. 20 In the past, Hungary has
supplied equipment for telegraph lines; East Germany,
compressors and cranes; and Bulgaria, cement mixers.
When considering Soviet trade to the SRV it is prudent
to remember that figures, and dollar equivalents, are
difficult to verify and corroborate. This problem exists not
only in the field of economic assistance; it was witnessed in
the section dealing with arms transfer as well.
The shroud of secrecy in which most of these trans-
actions are cloaked inhibits - to a degree - specific
correlations between foreign policy determinations and aid
and assistance.
The following data is provided as a benchmark for
comparison, i.e. increasing or decreasing trade trends over a
period; rather than as an authoritative representation of






As % of GNP 30
Defense as % of GNP n/a
Defense as % of public expenditure 47










Total foreign trade as % of GNP 9
% of enerqy consumption imported (net) 90
% of food consumption imported (net) 12
% of trade with Pacific region 1
(except US and Japan)
























GNP in USS (billions) 16.0
Per capita income (USS) 290
Percentage average GNP growth, 1970-80 3






Agriculture as % of GNP 45
Indistry as % of GNP 35
Gross capital formation as % of GNP 10
Capital -output ratio n/a
Inflation (CPI) in 1980 30
1981 estimates 50
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( 3 ) Additional Dimensions of Assistance . Although
foreign military and economic assistance has become the most
visible and important policy tool in expanding Moscow's
interest in the SRV, the Soviets have also supported their
client by other means. The joint Soviet-Vietnamese space
flight of July, 1981 is one such example. This had
significant propaganda value and served to raise the prestige
of both the Soviets and Vietnamese in the eyes of the Third
World nations. But the focus of this study is on Soviet
assistance and implications for Vietnam's Indochina policy.
Throughout the building border conflicts (initially
between Vietnam and Kampuchea, and later Vietnam and the PRO,
Soviet media consistently gave Hanoi unequivocal support.
This support served two functions: First, it served to
strengthen the credibility of the USSR not only in Vietnam's
eyes, but also in those of the Third World. Second, Soviet
media support served to publicize the heretofore discrete
"3 ? T
Chinese assistance to the Khmer Rouge. Under the
guise of supporting Vietnam, Soviet media -thus advanced its
regional objective of combating Chinese influence throughout
the region. In this second function served by the Soviet
media, the USSR apparently became the first major power to
spin the local conflict into the web of the Sino-Soviet
dispute.
Moscow's initial comment on the V
i
etnamese-Kampuchean




The article endorsed Vietnam's line on the conflict and
Hanoi's proposals for negotiations. Moscow media carried
reports of Peking's support of Kampuchean aggression against
Vietnam.
Eager to exploit Si no-Vietnamese differences, Moscow
publicized the ethnic Chinese resistance to Hanoi's new
economic policies - resistance which was developing throughout
Vietnam in May, 1978. Soviet media stressed that the resist-
ance was particularly strong in the Colon district of Ho Chi
Minh City.
The following month Leonid Brezhnev linked the reign of
terror and mass executions perpetrated under Pol Pot to the
o o c
period of the Cultural Revolution in China.
In the context of the Si no-Vietnamese War of 1979, Pravda
articles, in clear support of Vietnam, linked the PRC's
military build-up to its expansionist aim throuahout South-
east Asia. 26 China's alleged appetite for the region
was a persistent subject of Soviet commentary.
One I. Aleksandrov article, published in February 1979,
noted China's opening of a "second front" against Vietnam,
ridiculed the PRC because of its failure to "break through to
? ? 7
the Gulf of Si am or to encircle Vietnam". - (Hidden
in this statement is an apparent projection of the Kremlin's
own failure to reach the (Persian Gulf.)
The border war between China and Vietnam was the first
real test of the USSR-SRV Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation,
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Unclassified reports describe Moscow's support of Vietnam
during its Chinese War as cautious. The USSR took no action
that could have been interpreted as being brazenly hostile
toward China. The Kremlin did, however, initiate a crash
military assistance program. It supplied Vietnam with intell-
igence information, staged a quasi-naval show of force in
suoport of Vietnam, and jockeyed troops along the Si no-Soviet
border. The USSR also provided Vietnam a good deal of diplo-
matic and political support.
Critics of the Soviet Union, perhaps in attempts to sour
its relationship with Vietnam, have painted the Soviet Union
as unwilling to fulfill her treaty commitments during times
of crisis. While the SRV was desirous of obtaining the most
possible assistance from its patron, it apparently felt that
the Soviet "check" of Chinese power was sufficient. Hanoi
admitted that the Treaty acted as a strategic deterent
against China. 28 It is also possible that Vietnam
signed the Treaty to ensure a Soviet veto of the almost
inevitable Security Council resolution that would (and in
fact later did) demand the removal of Vietnamese troops from
Kampuchea.
It is helpful to recall that the Treaty demands only con-
sultation during times of crisis. The Treaty signed between
Moscow and Hanoi lacks the "mutual assistance" dimension
which characterizes Soviet treaties with its other communist
allies - and in this reaar6 it falls into the category of
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treaties that Moscow has heretofore reserved for non-communist
nations. In fact, parallels have been drawn between the
Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty and the treaties signed between the
USSR and India. There is a striking similarity in the timing
of the treaties; that with Vietnam was concluded just prior
to its Kampuchea invasion, and India was pressured into
signing its treaty prior to launching its military operations
against Pakistan. In addition, it has been speculated
that Moscow's desire to conclude such a treaty with Vietnam
was, in part, a response to the Si no-Japanese treaty of the
331previous summer. 0i
Considerations underlying Moscow's cautious approach
throughout the Si no-Vi etnamese fighting were intimated by
Pravda in March, 1979. Commentaries inferred that maintaining
"good" relations with Washington was a prime Soviet consider-
ation in responding to China's attack. The Soviet desire to
sign the Salt II Treaty is seen as a critical factor in this
regard. 32 The Kremlin's cautious apprach should be
viewed, in part, as an effort to minimize the impact of the
conflict on U.S. -Soviet relations.
In yet a third border conflict involving Vietnam - the
conflict with Thai forces along the Thai -Kampuchean border in
June /July 1980 - the Soviet Union once again backed Hanoi.
In this case, the USSR criticized the press, and recognition
these skirmishes were receiving, as a U.S.-PRC attempt to




Finally, for purposes of this discussion, Soviet support
for its ally was manifested at the United Nations. Moscow's
official position on the refugee situation was doctrinaire
and callous, maintaining that the problem had been invented
in Washington and Peking (to promote their own political
designs) and that Vietnam was not responsible for the
affair. Additionally, in January the Soviet Union, in a U.N.
Security Council meeting, voted aqainst hearinq Sihanouk plea
Kampuchea's case. In January and March, the Kremlin
exercised its 111th and 112th vetoes in defeating resolutions
on Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea and the convention
asking the termination of hostilities between Vietnam and the
PRC.
In summary, the Soviet Union has actively and broadly
supported the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Such support
has been clearly demonstrated in the areas of military aid,
economic assistance, propaganda support and solidarity at the
United Nations.
d. Mitigating Factors in the Soviet-Vietnamese
Rel ationshi p
Despite the bonds forged by their symbiotic
military and economic relations, the USSR-SRV relationship
has been punctuated by periods of strain.
The purpose of this section is to identify and describe
the mitigating factors in the relationship which have
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contributed to the friction between the two countries. This
will be accomplished by first presenting a brief overview of
the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship and later focusing on
internal and external constraints which tend to retard
coordinated USSR/SRV efforts in Southeastern Asia.
The Vietnamese are keenly aware of the Kremlin's dupli-
city as an ally. Moscow has sacrificed solidarity with its
Vietnamese comrades to its own European interests on at least
-3-34,
three major occasions during the post-World War II period. °
Such actions have contributed to Hanoi's skepticism and con-
tempt of Soviet assurances. The SRV is also sensitive to its
role as "The Vietnam Card" in Moscow's anti-China Asian policy.
Periods of tension in the USSR/SRV relationship have been
apparent in the post-Vietnam War period - the temporal focus
of this study. Such tension was apparent in 1976/1977, 1980
and late 1981. During the months of 1976/1977 the estrange-
ment was largely rooted in ideological disagreement. The
latter periods of 1980 and late 1981, however, were the con-
sequence of economic factors and conflicting foreign policy
interests in Indochina. Before addressing these mitigating
factors and by way of introduction to the scrimmaging between
the Soviets and the Vietnamese, an overview of what might be
called the Soviet-Vietnamese "personality conflict" is
presented.
( 1 ) The USSR-SRV Personality Conflict . Douglas Pike
has developed a most insightful assessment of the psychological
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dimension of the USSR-SRV relationship. Although intangible,
it is a mitigating factor which influences all dimensions of
Soviet-Vietnamese relations. Pike maintains:
A great paradox operates at the subliminal level of
Soviet-Vietnamese relations. If ever there were two
alien cultures, they are Vietnamese and Russian. Yet
the personalities thrown up by each culture have simi-
lar dark sides. Both are marked by devious mentality,
the result in both cases of a conspiratorial and brut-
alizing history. Both have paranoid tendencies, mani-
fested by unremitting suspicion of strangers and a
general inability to trust. Both exhibit the phenom-
enon of the tortured soul, abundantly illustrated by a
literature of despair. Both also have the ability to
throw up an exclusive sort of flaming creative genius,
in art and music. But these qualities of similarity,
by their very nature, make the two cultures alien-
hence the paradox. 33 5
Thus what exists is a relationship between two alien
cultures held toaether by bonds of necessity.
(2 ) Domestic Constraints On The USSR-SRV Relationship .
The following section will examine some domestic
determinants of foreign policy decision making. It will
focus on the mitigating dimension of ideology, economics,
geography, and resources - factors which one might reasonably
assume would serve to strengthen the Soviet-Vietnamese
relationship.
Ideoloay! Early indications that the USSR-SRV rela-
tionship was experiencing trouble became evident in 1976. Much
to Moscow's consternation, Le Duan came forward in support of
the Eurocommuni s t movements. At the 25th Congress of the CPSU,
the Vietnamese Secretary General praised "the diversified form
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and method of struggle suitable for the conditions of each
country to take the revolution forward to its final noble
goal." 336
The following year, Mikail Suslov, the late Soviet party
theoretician, attended the Vietnamese party congress. He
left before it ended, presumably because of disagreements
over ideological issues - Hanoi's support for Eurocommunism
cited above, and its initial refusal to become a full member
of COMECON.
Ideology has never been a steel band when it comes to
packaging relationships, and it is highly questionable
whether it is a band at all in the Soviet-Vietnamese case.
The degree to which ideological fraternity was a motive in
the development of relations between Moscow and Hanoi is
debtable. 337
Indeed, it is clear that Soviet theoreticians tend to
hold Vietnamese communism in low esteem, presumably because
it departs so radically from the Soviet brand. Marxism for
5
-J O
the Vietnamese true believer is not a guide but an icon.
Pike asserts that this longstanding disparity in Marxist
thought has always conferred on the Vietnamese communist-
Soviet communist relationship the overtone of tenuousness, of
being delimited and hedaed on both sides, and above all,
being transitory. Never has Vietnamese communism had an aura
of true proletarian kinship with the USSR. Hence, there
never has been any particular allegiance. 339
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Economics! It has been disputed that economics was a
motive factor in the decision to develop Si no-Vietnamese
relations. Vietnam has proved to be an economic risk for the
USSR and the Kremlin has gained essentially no economic
advantage from its relation with Vietnam. It is most ironic
that the USSR, which is dependent on wheat imports itself, is
exporting grain to Vietnam.
Indeed, whereas economics certainly was not a domestic
factor favoring the estblishment of relations it may well be
a motive factor in their deterioration. The Soviet Union is
already being throttled by the effects of over-centralized
planning and lagging industrial and agricultural production,
burdened by the Polish debt, and constrained by financing the
war in Afghanistan.
In November 1981 Brezhnev reported that food output and
distribution was the USSRs biggest problem. How
then could they afford to export grain to Vietnam? The Soviet
Union's financial burden has been further exacerbated by the
fact that Moscow has had to allocate hard currency to pur-
chase both grain and petroleum for Vietnam. * The USSR
has been discretely selling large amounts of gold to make up
for a currency shortage aggravated by 1981s grain shortage.
Consequently, Moscow has been forced to reduce its aid to
Southeast Asia. The price Vietnam pays for Soviet Detroleum
rose from $4.00 to $16.00 per barrel in 1981 and grain ship-
ments have been decreased.
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During an Indochinese leaders summit meeting in Moscow in
1981, Brezhnev underscored Moscow's economic difficulties and
apparently urged the Southeast Asian trio to engaqe in
diplomacy with ASEAN in attempts to solve the Kampuchea
probl em.
The greatest single domestic constraint on Vietnam's
foreign policy has been its economic stagnation and near bank
ruptcy. Vietnam's dismal economic condition has been the
result of a compounding effect between a series of factors.
Natural disasters such as floods and droughts have crippled
Vietnam's predominantly agricultural economy. This situation
has been exacerbated by government mismanagement, poor plan-
ning, and corruption. Shortaqes of necessary logistical
supplies such as seeds, fertilizers, and even electricity to
run irrigation pumps have compicated the situation. In
addition, problems with transportation and storage have
resulted in spoilage, and thus robbed the Vietnamese popula-
tion of products that have been produced. Such an array of
problems have combined to create the economic dependence of
Vietnam on the Soviet Union that was detailed earlier. A
conseouence of Vietnam's domestic nightmare which has served
to exacerbate the tension between Vietnam and the USSR has
been the stream of severe criticism from the Kremlin and the
increase of Soviet advisors and technicians (which Vietnam
has not desired). 42
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Economic and foreign problems in the USSR have decreased
the availability of Soviet foreign aid. The effects of Pol-
and and Afghanistan, while mentioned briefly earlier, cut
even deeper in this regard. Poland has been a drain on Soviet
resources - and perhaps has caused the Kremlin to shy away
from increased commitments to the SRV. In addition to
consuming Soviet wealth, the invasion of Afganistan has
called attention to the Soviet Union's expansionistic nature.
The military facilities that increased ties with Vietnam
could potentially provide must have been an enticing jewel to
the military elites. Indeed, present use of Cam Ranh Bay and
Danang have greatly augmented the Soviet naval, prsence in
both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The Soviets have also
established intelligence collection centers, communications
facilities, and air station facilities in Vietnam. Mot only
do such facilities contribute to the regional objective of
containing China, they directly threaten the U.S. naval
presence in Subic Bay, Philippines. The military appears to
have gained a trump card in the Soviet-Vietnamese relation-
ship. Or have they?
Geography: Geographically, Vietnam is unable to sat-
isfy the "traditional" Russian desire for a warm water port.
Under the most ideal circumstances, Vietnam could but provide
the USSR with only a warm water base. Whereas bases are some-
what more valuable than the support offered by a facility, they
170

fall short of the advantages provided by an established port.
In order to satisfy commercial requirements of a pert, the
USSR must be able to ensure secure communications between the
port and the Soviet Union's means of industrial and
agricultural production. Rail lines connecting the Soviet
Union and Vietnam run through China; the Sino-Soviet split
has added greater distance to the physical separation between
the USSR and Vietnam. To satisfy commercial requirements, a
port must almost necessarily be contiguous to Soviet
continental control.
Resources! The prospects of plentiful Southeast Asian
offshore oil reserves have dimmed. Whereas the West Germans,
Italians and Canadians have been unable to tap oil in the
continental shelf and have consequently given up their ex-
ploration, the Soviets have only just recently (late 1 981 -
1982) commenced their search.
Although it has been said that Vietnam maintained the
most likely plots for Soviet exploration, their efforts will
"1 AT.
most likely also end in frustration. J Mot only is
the projected output of minimal value, the drilling sites
themselves are contested areas between Vietnam and China.
In summary, domestic factors such as ideology, economics,
geography and resources cut two ways. Although they have
qualities which serve to strengthen the Soviet-Vietnamese
relationship, they nevertheless exhibit a mitigating effect
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by either contributing directly to the estrangement of
relations or significantly reducing the anticipated gains.
( 3 ) USSR-SRV: Friction in Foreign Policies
Soviet and Vietnamese attitudes towards their respec-
tive foreign relations with other international actors have
not always been in harmony. Vietnamese external relations
have piqued Moscow on several occasions since 1975. Hanoi
clearly initiated the Kremlin with its membership in the World
Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank.
Particularly relevant to this study was the divergence of
views regarding the perceived role of ASEAN in Southeast Asia.
Vietnam does not fully accept the Soviet view of ASEAN as an
imperialistic creation. In addition, Hanoi's low-key stand
on the building Polish crisis irked their Soviet ally. -
Yet, these are relatively minor irritations in the
broader context of Soviet-Vietnamese relations. The defini-
tive factors affecting the relationship will emerge from
Soviet foreign policy initiatives. Such initiatives are
likely to fall under the rubrics of:
1) Increased Soviet bilateral relations with the Indo-
Chinese states of Laos and Kampuchea.
2) Efforts to improve Soviet-ASEAN relations.
3) Initiatives to improve Soviet-PRC relations.
4) Future USSR-US relations
A preview of the potential consequences of the first
initiative emerged in 1981. When the Kremlin established
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direct links with Laos and Cambodia - thus circumventing
Hanoi. The Vietnamese leaders felt squeezed out of what they
considered their natural sphere of influence in Indochina.
Vietnamese aid could not compete with that of its Soviet ally.
According to G.I. Chufin, a Soviet academic:
The Soviet Union supports humanitarian international
aid to the Kampuchean people. Along with Vietnam and
other socialistic countries, it is giving the People's
Republic of Kampuchea considerable assistance on a bi-
lateral basis in rehabilitating its economy and normal-
izing life as rapidly as possible. In 1979, the Soviet
Union granted Kampuchea free aid amounting to 85 million
dollars worth of commodities. Under the 1980 programme,
free deliveries of goods will total nearly 134 million
dollars, including 164,000 tons of food (of which more
than 100,000 tons have already been delivered), 130,000
tons of oil products, 8 million metres of fabric, 420
automobiles, and various consumer goods. In addition,
the Soviet Union is helping the PRK to restore a number
of factories, medical institutions, and educational
establishments. Funds earmarked for these purposes
add up to more than 68 million dollars.
Despite Soviet acknowledgement of Vietnamese aid, this
imbalance spelled a loss of face for the Vietnamese in Kam-
puchea. The December, 1981 expulsion of Pen Sovan, number
two man in the Kampuchean political hierarchy and Moscow's
man in Phnom Penh, apparently for reasons of his pro-Soviet
allegiances, provides an indication of the degree to which
Hanoi will move to protect its interests. It is also
indicative of the limitations in the Kremlin's control over
Vi etnam.
Improvement in Soviet-ASEAN relations and Moscow's support
for Hanoi's occupation of Kampuchea are mutually exclusive.
As long as the Kremlin supports Vietnam in such a manner, it
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can not expect an improvement in relations with ASEAN. As
ASEAM is clearly the larger prize (in terms of geostrategic
value, productivity, and population), any Soviet initiative
to improve relations with ASEAN collectively or bilaterally
would mitigate against Soviet relations with Vietnam.
Recent Soviet initiatives toward China have made Hanoi
very uncomfortable. Such initiatives serve to validate
Vietnamese suspicions of their unreliable ally. Perhaps as
an effort to register their concern with Moscow, Hanoi sent
not Le Duan, but second-in-command, Truong Chinh, to
Brezhnev's funeral. Le Duan did, however, send a message to
Andropov expressing congratulations and confidence that the
USSR would remain the "mainstay and reliable supporter of all
forces of revolution" 3 (thereby underscoring his
concern in this regard). While the Kremlin has stated that
improved relations with China would not occur at the expense
of other countries, it is intriguing to note that Moscow has
not firmly rejected China's demand that the USSR terminate
its support of the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea.
The U.S. signal is an important factor in the Soviet
Union's decision -making process, and Indochina is a region
where Soviet, American, and Vietnamese interests converge.
Should the U.S. maintain its hardline approach toward Vietnam
it is reasonable that any improvement in U.S. -USSR relations
would have a mitigating effect on Soviet-Vietnamese relations
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However, the death of Brezhnev and Reagan's commitment to
resolving the questions of remaining MIAs in Indochina may be
the potential seeds for change.
In summary, any relationship based on necessity, and not
mutual respect and trust, is bound to splinter when forces
conspire to change the nature of the need. Suspicion
resulting from the legacy of Moscow's past sell-outs has
caused Hanoi to view with concern changes in Soviet external
rel ations.
Indications exist, particularly in political relations,
that might suggest that Soviet influence in Vietnam is indeed
restricted. The debate still rages as to whether Vietnam has
in fact yielded port (vice facility) privileqes in Cam Ranh
Bay to the Soviets. Vietnam's expressed desire to limit the
number of Soviet advisors in Vietnam also suggests less than
total Soviet influence. Strains as a result of Soviet
cut-backs in economic support to Vietnam would also tend to
degrade Moscow's influence. Finally, the December 1981
expulsion of Pen Sovan provides indications of significant
limitations in the Kremlin's control over Vietnam. The
subject of influence, like the "proxy" theory, remains a
question of degree.
e. Soviet Influence
Having examined the role and interest of the USSR
in Indochina, the USSR-SRV relationship - and its mitigating
factors - it is necessary to draw some qualitative conclusions
about Soviet influence in Vietnam's Indochina policy.
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The question of influence is directly related to specu-
lation on the role of Vietnam may play as a Soviet "proxy" in
regional affairs. While the extensive Soviet military and
economic assistance provides strong evidence in support of
the "proxy theory", this study has illustrated the difficul-
ties in translating assistance into influence. Vietnam's
fierce sense of nationalism and independence has a neutral-
izing effect on Moscow's heavy handed imperialism. To over-
emphasize the role of Vietnam as a Soviet surrogate is to
misrepresent the historical process behind the i ndi geni zati on
of communism in Indochina."
Where Soviet and Vietnamese interests run parallel, there
is a tendency to see Vietnam acting as Moscow's "proxy".
While this may not necessarily be false, this writer question
the value of such an identification - save for propaganda
purposes. A danger of this view, however, rests in the trans
position of such a notion to issues where Soviet and Viet-
namese interests do not coincide, and thus perhaps obscuring
a potential opportunity to exploit the differences between
Soviet and Vietnamese interests to U.S. advantage.
Vietnam has survived Chinese expansionism, French colon-
ialism, and American imperialism. It will certainly survive
its "friendship" with the Soviet Union.
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f. Assistance, Influence and the Trend Toward
Federal i sm
There is no doubt that Soviet military assistance
has provided Hanoi the tools with which to pursue its goal of
greater regional solidarity. Soviet military assistance must
thus be viewed as a substantial positive factor in the
capability of Vietnam to carry out its regional policies.
Economic assistance has played a similar role. But military
and economic assistance is not directly transl ateabl e into
influence - much less into the definition of regional
policies. There is no basis to support the view that Soviet
military and economic assistance is supporting the establish-
ment of a Vietnamese-dominated Indochinese federation.
Nor do factors which mitiqate against a closer USSR-SRV
relationship necessarily imply a decrease in Vietnam's desire
- or perhaps even ability - to pursue its goal of greater
regional coordination. Indeed, Soviet efforts to increase
their bilateral relations with Laos and Kampuchea would
suggest that Moscow is not necessarily firmly committed to
the concept of a Vietnamese dominated Indochinese
federation. It must also be remembered that in the hierarchy
of Moscow's Asian policy objectives, Moscow's China policy is
preeminent. Any substantial improvement in Soviet-PRC rela-
tions is likely to witness a distancinq in the USSR-SRV
association. Thus, while the USSR-SRV relationship provides
Hanoi the tools with which to pursue its policies in Indochina
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most effectively, the USSR-SRV relationship does not define
the policy. Nor does it necessarily suggest that the trend
is toward federation - or even that the Soviets would




In many respects the assumption that Ho Chi Minh, or
the Communist regime in Hanoi, was determined to dominate all
of Southeast Asia - or at a minimum federate all of French
Indochina - has assumed the standard of a "given". It has
been established as a law of Asian politics against which all
events are then verified and validated. Events in Southeast
Asia are seen to somehow logically follow from this assump-
tion. This analysis of the concept of an Indochinese feder-
ation and the long-term trend toward regional integration has
illustrated the faults of such deductive reasoning.
The challenge of this study has been to follow this pro-
cess in reverse. This study has attempted to proceed induc-
tively, to gather and examine the broad base of facts
surrounding the origins of the notion of an Indochinese feder
at ion, to follow their development, and to see where they
lead -- toward federation or toward something else.
The thesis of this study has argued that removed from its
historical setting, the concept of "Indochinese federation"
has assumed an unintended connotation. Ambiguity and incom-
plete documentation surrounding the origins of the concept
compounds this dilemma. Consequently, usage of "Indochinese
federation" to explain recent developments in Southeast Asia
infers biases which merit careful consideration. When these
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deficiencies of context and ambiguity are ignored, the
consequence emerges that Vietnamese actions in Indochina are
potentially being interpreted within a limited spectrum of
possible Vietnamese intentions.
This analysis has proceeded along two planes; it has
examined the historical trend toward regional integration,
and it has examined the specific concept of an Indochinese
federation. The introductory chapter of this analysis
identified a series of factors which facilitate or inhibit
the trend toward federation. Jacob and Teune identified such
elements as: Geographical proximity, social homogeneity of
the peoples involved, shared functional interests, communal
character of the people, governmental effectiveness, previous
integrative experience, etc. as factors to be considered in
the discussion of federation. Franck complimented the above
list with factors such as: ideology, elite charisma, common
language, similar culture, complementary economies, common
challenge, etc. Many of these characteristics have been
either directly described or alluded to throughout this
study
.
The intent of this analysis has not been to either eval-
uate or weigh each of these factors in any precise way.
Instead, it has sought to develop a qualitative appreciation




By way of a general summary, the many factors relevant













g) consciousness of common heritage











f elite chari sma
g) geopolitics
Regarding the qualitative equation for federation in Indochina
it can be concluded that social factors, particularly primor-
deal variables such as race, language, religion, culture, etc.
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have a long-term mitigating effect on the trend toward
greater regional cohesion. While economic interests of the
three Indochinese states could be developed more effectively
and efficiently through greater regional cooperation, it can
not be assumed that economic interests will transcend the
opposing forces of the social dimension. Political factors
present a somewhat less clear-cut breakdown. While govern-
mental effectiveness is generally lacking in all three states,
Hanoi nevertheless is the leading political actor. The SRV
will continue to promote administrative cadres in both Laos
and Kampuchea who are sympathetic to her desires. Ideoloqy
is a somewhat capricious factor. But for the near and medium
term Hanoi should be able to maintain and develop intra-
party bonds.
What Hanoi must promote to enhance her position in both
Laos and Kampuchea is the mutual belief in a common enemy, a
common (anti) colonial heritage, and common future challenges.
The PRC remains the largest sinqle extra-regional actor
working to inhibit Hanoi's plans for regional cooDeration.
The USSR, on the the other hand, is the largest sinqle extra-
regional actor working to support Hanoi's desires.
Regarding the specific notion of an Indochinese federation
several conclusions can be formulated:
1) The initial founding of the Indochinese Communist
Party, including the selection of the D arty name,




2) Ho Chi Minn did envision some form of regional
solidarity, perhaps even an alliance -- but such
considerations appear in the context of the anti-
colonial resistance struggle -- and are usually
coupled to affirmations of the Five Principles of
Peaceful Co-existence. This writer has uncovered
no document which confirms that it was Ho Chi Minh's
"aqe-old dream", "will", 348 or "vision" 349 to
establish a Vietnamese-dominated Indochinese feder-
ation.
3) The step-like trend toward "federation" in the late
1940s/early 1950s and the call for enhanced solid-
arity in the 1960s appear at a time when Hanoi is
responding to an external threat; in such a context,
the calls for greater solidarity between the three
Indochinese states appears reactive.
4) No document has surfaced specifically describing
the structural mechanics of the much speculated
about Indochinese federation.
Ouestionina the fundamental need for a federation in
Indochina, speculating on alternatives, and looking into the
future, Philippe Oevillers presents a reasonable Western
assessment of the question of Indochinese federation in the
present-day context:
There was -- and there is still today -- no
need for an official political "federal" structure,
which would certainly create troubles and also he
wasteful, Droducinq only dubious results. Even a
coordinating body, like a 'political secretariat'
created by the states on the ASEAN model, would be
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different, but they will undoubt-
Hanoi media describes the present network of LPDR-PRK-SRV
"friendship" treaties, "cooperation agreements" and troop
deployments as an "Indochinese unity bloc". Perhaps
this is the most appropriate way for Westerners to view the
present regional system.
Why did Vietnam invade Kampuchea in December, 1978?
There is no one reason -- there rarely is. A recent confer-
ence held at the Institute of Asian Studies, Chul al ongkorn
University was unable to conclude a satisfactory response.
This study has referred to a number of contributing factors,





What relevance does a study such as this hold for those
individuals concerned with the U.S. national interest, or
even U.S. policy formulation? The relevance hinges on
Washington's heretofore lethargic Southeast Asian initiatives
in the post-Vietnam War era. U.S. policy in Southeast Asia
has apparently paralleled Beijing's of late. Some have
specul ated that:
The reason for this seemingly ambivalent U.S.
position lay in the Reagan administrations
assessment of its Asian priorities. With the
troublesome question of the future of the Republic
of China (Taiwan) still beclouding Washington-Beijing
relations, U.S. support for the PRC in the Kampu-
chean question seemed a particularly desireable and
pacifying gesture to make... 33
Of course, this has not been a study of U.S. Asian priorities,
but nevertheless, the potential consequences of tacit
approval for China's Southeast Asia policies must be acknow-
ledged and assessed.
Despite its public united strategy, ASEAN is not of one
mind regarding the principal threat to Southeast Asia. Thai-
land and Singapore see the primary threat as originating from
a Moscow-supported SRV. Malaysia and Indonesia, on the other
hand, see the PRC as the primary long-term threat to South-
east Asia. Justus M. van der Kroef maintains:
If Vietnam and its Indochinese allies were stronq and
viable but nimimally dependent on the USSR, Malaysia
and Indonesia would both view this as a desireable
regional balance.
Maintenance of the present U.S. -PRC parallel policy runs
the risks of recrimination from Malaysia and Indonesia (for
disregard of perceived threats to their security interests),
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polarizing ASEAN, and sanctioning of a Chinese ant i -Vietnamese
policy that is likely to be increasingly confrontational and




At the conference held at the Institute of Asian Studies
referred to earlier, Y. Sakamoto, Secretary-General of Inter-
national Peace Research, University of Tokyo, raised a unique
perspective on the Kampuchean situation. Mindful of the sit-
uation that Kampuchea faces (the prospect of either continued
Vietnamese occupation or prolonged civil war if Vietnam were
to withdraw), Sakamoto suggested that in this context peace
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can stand higher in importance than self-determination.
While this proposal poses real problems if generally extended
to the international system, might not it be the foundation
for prudent dialogue between the ASEAN and Indochinese states
in the future?
The introduction to this analysis noted the common
perceptual feature between the Domino Theory and 'Indochinese
federation'. This linkage heralds a final note of caution
for those individuals concerned with U.S. interests in
Southeast Asia. The sensitivity generates from the self-ful-
filling possibilities arising from continued reference to the
Domino Theory. 356 The relevance of the below hypothesis
to present considerations of Indochinese federation, and by




During the next few years at least, international
relations within Southeast Asia will be characterized
by both real and imagined stress, but the predictions
of the domino theory are most likely to occur if the
non-Indochina states of Southeast Asia, in reaction
to domestic political cleavages and superficially under-
stood external evidence, behave as if the assumptions
of the theory are correct; hence the need for new
assumptions and language which provide alternatives
to those of the domino theory and, thus, facilitate
the avoidance of a self-fulfilling prophecy. '
The alternative which this study suggests is the
decoupling of U.S. and PRC policies regarding Southeast Asia
and the tcit support of ASEAN-generated options which call
for the resumption of talks between ASEAN and the Indochinese
states on the basis of mutual respect, and recognition of
each other's security concerns. The first objective of such




Prehistory: skulls and fragments indicate northern Vietnam to be a region of
racial diversity (Australoid, Melanesia-Paupuans, Melanesia, Indo-
nesians)
300 B.C. : emergence of first permanent settlements in northern Vietnam
221 B.C. : kingdom of Ch'in brings to an end the period of Warring States;
China develops as a centralized empire
218 B.C. : Emperor Ch'in Shih-huang-ti stages an expedition into country of
Yueh (pronounced Viet); indigenous tribes forced to flee
207 B.C. : taking advantage of anarchy in China brought on by Ch'in Shih-
huang-ti 's death, Governor Chao T'o of Yueh territories proclaims
himself King of Nan-Yueh (Nam Viet)
202 B.C. : founding of Han dynasty
196 B.C. : Han recognizes Nan-Yueh in exchange for Han's suzerainty over the
region
111 B.C. : Wu-ti occupies and incorporates Nan-Yueh into Han empire; province
stretches from present-day Danang (approximate) north to Kwangsi
Province called Chiao, or Chiao-chih
1st Century A.D.: beginnings of Funan - centered at lower course and delta of
Mekong
40 A.D. : Trung sisters spearhead rebellion against Chinese
43 A.D. : Ma Yuan, Chinese general, pacifies rebellion. Nan-yueh once again
administered as a province. Large numbers of Chinese migrate to
this region.
192 A.D. : Vietnam founded
192 A.D. : beginnings of Champa (Lin-Yi), centered in province where present
day Hue i s located
200 A.D. : Vietnam welcomes Buddhist missionaries, welcome extended to
followers of Tao and Confucianism
220 A.D. : Fall of Later Han dynasty
446 A.D. : T'an Ho-chih, governor of Tongking (i.e., Chiao), in response to
raids from Champa, captures their capital at Hue and extracts
100,000 pounds of gold. Cham capital later relocated at Danang.
550 A.D. (approx): dismemberment of Funan/ beginnings of Chenla or Cambodia;
first instance of "push to the south".
188

541-603 A.D.: period of revolt and unrest for Ly of Tanq King. Provincial
capital moved to site of present-day Hanoi. Territory once again
pacified under Sui dynasty. Continuing raids by Champa on Ton
King
622 A.D. : Tang dynasty reorganizes administration boundaries and government
of Ton King
679 A.D. : Ton King exercises general protectorate over An-nam to the south
706 A.D. : Cambodia divides into Land Chenla (northern half) and Water Chenla
(southern half)
722 A.D. : Vietnamese revolt against China, revolt aided by Chows and Khmers
(from Land Chenla)
750 A.D. (approx): political center of Chamnpa moves further south to
Nha-trang
802-850 A.D.: beginnings of the kingdom of Ankor
907 A.D. : Tang dynasty falls, end of effective control over southern
provinces
938 A.D. : Mgo Ouyen, espousing "nationalist" course defeats Chinese and re-
adopts former name Nam Viet
950- A.D. : Khmer armies raid Champa
954-968 A.D.: Vietnam rulerless during Twelve Su-quan period
968 A.D. : Dinh Bo Linh gains control over Nam Viet and renames it Dai Co
Viet. Accepts vassal status in exchange for China's recognition
of his newly independent state
988 A.D. : from this period on, Champa is subject to increasing pressure and
attacks from the north
1054 A.D. : Cao Doi Viet changes name to Dai Viet
1076 A.D. : despite allied efforts of China, Cambodia, and Champa, Vietnam
forces China to deal with Vietnam on an "equals" basis. Dai Viet
forces Champa to abandon her northern provinces
1113-1149 A.D.: during reign of Suryavarman II (for whom Angkor Wat was built
as a funerary temple), Khmer armies advance to their farthest
point east, occupying northern Champa
1177 A.D. : Champa launches naval assault up Mekong and pillages Angkor
1203-1220 A.D.: Champa becomes a Khmer province
1218 A.D. : Khmers and Chams, acting in concert, threaten Dai Viet
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beginnings of Mongol invasions
Dai Viet complains to Kublai Khan of Khmer and Cham attacks
Khmers defeat Mongol incursion
D.: Mongols invade Champa via the sea (Vietnamese refuse to permit
Mongols to pass over their territory)
Mongol army enters Cambodia
Marco Polo visits Champa
Thai of Sukothai ravage Cambodia
Cham king marries Vietnamese. princess in exchange for two provinces
north of Col des Muages
: Dai Viet, acting as sovereign protector, defends Champa against
Siamese raid
: Dai Viet placea a Vietnamese military commander on throne of
Champa; he in turn liberates himself
1350-1430 A.D.: Angkor and Ayutthaya in near permanent state of war
1353 A.D. : beginnings of Laotian kingdom of Lan Chong. Angkor seized by
Ayutthaya and ruled by Siamese prince
1357 A.D. : Angkor regains independence
1361-1390 A.D.: Champa launches a series of successful raids against Dia Viet
1393 A.D. : Angkor falls once again to Siam
1407 A.D. : China under Mings annexes Dai Viet outright; supports Chams
1418 A.D. : Le Loi, head of peasant family, leads 10-year resistance against
Chinese
1428 A.D. : Le Loi acceeds to throne, accepts China's suzerainty
1431 A.D. : Angkor abandoned, Khmer capital re-established at Dhnom Penh
1441 A.D. : Champa falls into rapid decline
1471 A.D. : Vietnamese king Le thanh-tong forces Laotian kingdom to recognize
his suzerainty
1515-1526 : Trinh, Nguyen, and Moc strugqle for power in Vietnam, Vietnam
partitioned into two political districts
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1620 A.D. : Cambodian king, Chei Chetha, marries Vietnamese princess, duaghter
of King Sai Vong of the Nguyen dynasty
1620-1673 A.D.: intermittent fighting between Trinh and Nguyen
1623 A.D. : consequent to efforts of Vietnamese princess' efforts, Vietnamese
custom house established at Prei Kor (Saigon). This factor acce-
lerates Vietnamese settlement of Mekong delta
1660 A.D. : Trinh rule area of Red river delta, Nguyen control the south; both
sides regard Le as legitimate emperor
1672-1691 A.D.: fratricidal struggle for succession to throne weakens Cambodia,
both Siam and Vietnam aiding opposing brothers intervene in
Cambodia's internal affairs in exchange for their aid. Ensuing
struggle dominates most of 18th century. Vietnam occupies most of
Mekong delta through slow but steady infiltration
1674-1774 A.D. : century of relative peace in Vietnam in which Trinh administers
in the name of Le in the north, Nguyen expands into Cambodian pro-
vinces of Mekong in the south
1679 A.D. : Ang Non, Khmer ruler of Saigon, attempts to seize Cambodian throne.
Rulers in Phnom Penh enlist Siamese aid and Ang Non
1685 A.D. : Cambodia requests Vietnamese aid to supress Chinese refuqee leaders
and freebooters. Vietnam forces Cambodia to recognize Nguyen over-
lordship in exchange for assistance
1700 A.D. : Laos kingdom divided between Luang Pra-bang and Vienchang.
Vietnam and Siam vie for the control of Laos
1719 A.D. : Cambodian kings acknowledge their vassalaqe to Siam by payment of
annual tribute
1758 A.D. : Vietnam has acauired from Cambodia all territory later known as
Cochin China (Portugese name for Nguyen territory).
1765 A.D. : Territory of Nguyen vassals extended beyond present Viet-Cambodian
boundary
1773 A.D. : Tay Son rebellion. This period of Vietnamese weakness enables
Siam to increase her influence in Cambodia
1777 A.D. : Tuy Son rebels capture Saigon, kill all Nguyen (unrelated to
Nquyen ruling family) except Nguyen Anh.
1784 A.D. : Nguyen Anh receives aid from Siam
1787 A.D. : Nquyen Anh effects an alliance between France and Cochin China
1802 A.D. : Nguyen Anh crowned sovereign of a united Vietnam as Emoeror Gialong
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1806 A.D. : Cambodian kings, while receiving their crown from Si am, pay
tribute to Vietnam
1811 A.D. : King Ang Chan of Cambodia seeks aid from Vietnam to thwart his
brother's ambitions on the crown - who is being aided by Si am
1813-1833 A.D.: Ang Chan flees to Saigon under pressure of Siamese attacks,
enlists aid of south Vietnamese general Truong Minh Giang. Ang
Chan reassumes throne. General remains and Vietnamese garrison
installed at Phnom Penh
1831 A.D. : Siamese troops occupy Phnom Penh. Minh-Mang (Gia-longs successor)
sends 15,000 troops to Cambodia and drives out Siamese
1834 A.D. : upon death of Cambodian king Ang Chan, the Vietnamese president
Ong Khma-Mang, by order of Minh-Mang, places prince Anq May on
throne. It "became obvious" that Minh-Mang intended to absorb
Cambodia into 33 provinces with new names attached to Cochin China.
Cambodia falls under suzerainty of Vietnam.
1845 A.D. : Siamese forces place Ang Duong on Cambodian throne.
1846 A.D. : peace treaty between Si am and Vietnam brings Siamese influence to
Cambodian court.
1854 A.D. : in attempts to ward off further Siamese encroachments, Ang Duong
seeks French aid. Nothing materializes.
1859 A.D. : King Norodom assumes throne of Cambodia
1862 A.D. : Treaty between France and court at Hue permits French presence in
eastern Cochinchinese provinces.
1862 A.D. : French admiral Bovard visits King Norodom. He is tasked with
establishing Vietnam's ancient rights of suzerainty over Cambodia
in order to counteract Siamese claims.
August 1963: French establish protectorate over Cambodia (1863 Treaty)
December 1863: Norodom secretly signs treaty with Si am undermining provisions
of French 1863 Treaty.
1867 A.D. : Franco-Siamese Treaty cedes provinces of Battambang, Siem Reap and
Si si phone to Si am.
1877 A.D. : Le Myre de Vilers, Governor of Cochinchina, notes that it is in
France's interest to give qreater encouragement to the immigration
of Vietnamese into Cambodia. He believes that within 50 years
Vietnamese would constitute the most important element of Cambodia's
population. When that situation had been achieved, Cambodia, and
the Cambodians, would no longer present a problem. "We will lose
our time in tryinq to aalvanize this race that a fatal law seems
to have condemned to disappear."
192

1908 A.D. : French census reveals 60,000 Vietnamese in Cambodia - out of a




A. French Pol icies
2. Declaration of the Provisional
French Government Concerning Indochina
March 24, 1945
The Government of the Republic has always considered that Indochina was
destined to have a special place in the organization of the French community
and to enjoy freedom in keeping with its stage of evolution and its capacities.
The promise of this was made in the Declaration of December 8, 1943. Shortly
afterwards, the principles of general application set forth at Brazzaville
clarified the intention of the government.
Today Indochina is fighting: the troops composed of a mixture of Indo-
Chinese and French, the elite and the populace, whom the maneuvers of the enemy
cannot deceive are lavishing their courage and employing their resistance for
the triumph of the cause which is that of the entire Fr&nch community. Thus,
Indochina is acquiring new rights to the place to which she is called.
Its former intentions having been confirmed by events, the Government
considers it its duty, beginning now, to define what shall be the status of
Indochina when it has been freed from the invader.
The Indochinese Federation shall form with France and the other parts of
the community a "French Union", the interests of which abroad shall be
represented by France. Indochina shall enjoy within that union, liberty of its
own.
The nationals of the Indochinese Federation shall be Indochinese citizens
and citizens of the French Union. On that basis, they shall have access,
without discrimination of race, religion or origin, and with equality based on
merit, to all the federal posts and positions in Indochina and in the Union.
The conditions under which the Indochinese Federation shall participate in
the Federal agencies of the French Union, as well as the status of citizen of
the French Union, shall be fixed by the Constituent Assembly.
Indochina shall have its own Federal Government, presided over by the
Governor General and composed of ministers responsible to him, who shall be
elected from among Indochinese as well as from among the French residing in
Indochina. Under the Governor General, a Council of State, composed of the
highest personalities of the Federation, shall be charged with tne preparation
of Federal laws and regulations. An Assembly, which shall be elected according
to the manner of voting most suited to each of the countries of the Federation
and in which French interests shall be represented, shall vote taxes of all
kinds, as well as the Federal budget, and shall deliberate on bills. Commer-
cial and good-neighbor treaties which concern the Indochinese Federation shall
be submitted to it for examination.
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Freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom
of thought and belief and the democratic liberties in general shall form the
basis of the Indochinese laws.
The five countries which form the Indochinese Federation and which differ
among themselves in civilization, race and traditions, shall keep their own
character within the Federation.
The Governor General shall, in the interest of each, be the arbiter of all.
The local Governments shall be improved or reformed; the posts and positions in
each of these countries shall, in that country, be especially open to its
nationals.
With the aid of the mother country and within the systems of general
defense of the French Union, the Indochinese Federation shall organize land,
sea and air forces, in which the Indochinese shall have access to all ranks on
an equal footing with the personnel coming from the mother country or other
parts of the French Union.
Social and cultural progress shall be developed and accelerated in the same
direction as political and administrative progress.
The French Union shall take the necessary measurements to make primary
education obligatory and effective and to develop secondary and higher educa-
tion. The study of local language and thought shall be closely associated
with French culture.
By the setting up of independent and efficient [system of] work inspection
and by the development of trade unions, the well-being, social education and
emancipation of Indochinese shall be constantly sought.
The Indochinese Federation shall enjoy, within the framework of the French
Union, an economic autonomy which will enable it to attain its full agricul-
tural, industrial and commercial development and to carry out, particularly,
the industrialization which will permit Indochina to cope with its demographic
situation. Thanks to this autonomy, and without any discriminatory regulations,
Indochina will develop its commercial relations with all the other countries
and especially with China, with which Indochina, the entire French Union,
intends to have close friendly relations.
The statute of Indochina, as it has just been presented, will be put into
final form after consultation with the qualified aaencies of liberated
Indochina.
Thus the Indochinese Federation, within the system of peace of the French
Union, will enjoy the liberty and organization necessary for the development
of all its resources. It will be in a position to play in the Pacific the role
to which it is entitled and to make effective in the whole of the French Union
the auality of its best elements.
Source: Journal Officiel de la Republigue Francaise





Concern! nq Sino-Indochinese Relations
February 28, 1946
The French Government and the Chinese Government, equally desirous of
strengthening their traditional bonds of friendship and, in conformity with the
terms of the Franco-Chinese exchange of notes of March 13, 1945, resuming and
developing the economic relations of Indochina with China, have resolved to
conclude an agreement for that purpose and have designated as their respective
Plenipotentiaries:
The Provisional Government of the French Republic:
His Excellency M. Jacques Meyrier, Ambassador of the French Republic in
China
The National Government of China:
His Excellency Dr. Wang Shi h Chieh, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of China
Who, after having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in
good and due form, agreed upon the following provisions:
Title I. Conditions of Establishment
Art. 1. Chinese nationals shall continue to enjoy the rights, privileges
and exemptions which they traditionally possess in Indochina, particularly as
regards entry and exit, the tax system, the acquisition and possession of rural
and urban real property, the keeping of commercial accounts, the establishment
of primary and secondary schools, the practice of agricultural occupations,
fishing, inland and coastwise navigation and other free occupations.
Art. 2. The treatment which Chinese nationals shall enjoy in Indochina as
regards the right to travel, to reside and to engage in commercial, industrial
and mining enterprises, to acquire and possess real property, shall not be less




III The Kampuchean Authoritories; Allegation about a So-called
"Vietnam-dominated Indochinese Federation with Only One Party, One State, and
One People" is Completely Groundless
The history of 100 years of foreign domination experienced by the
Indochinese peoples has proved that the imperialists, whether they were the
French colonialists, or the Japanese fascists or the U.S. imperialists, all
used Indochina as a theatre of war, applied their traditional "divide-and-rule"
policy, used one country as a springboard for aggression against another, and
used one people to fight another, with the aim of conquering all three
countries. The solidarity of the peoples of the three countries against their
common enemy was an objective requirement of the revolutionary cause of each
people, a factor of decisive importance in winning victory in the national
liberation struggle as well as in the long-term cause of national defense and
construction carried out by each people. To be lasting, this solidarity must
be based on equality and mutual respect, it must serve the national interests
of each country, and conform to the interests of the world people. The Indo-
Chinese Communists in the past, as well as the leaders of the three Parties and
three countries later on, did all they could to build and foster the militant
solidarity and fraternal friendship between the three nations, while
scrupulously respecting the fundamental national rights of each people and the
independence of each Party.
The consistent policy followed by the Vietnamese Party and Government with
regard to the two fraternal countries and Parties is to foster "militant
solidarity and to promote long-term and friendly cooperation with them on the
basis of respect for the fundamental national rights of each country". With
regard to Kampuchea, now as in the past, in hard times as well as in the days
of victory, Vietnam's policy is consistent and its feelings are unchanged:
solidarity with and wholehearted support to Kampuchea, respect for its
independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, political system,
independent and sovereign line, and non-interference in its internal affairs.
With its correct line and actions as well by its concerted fight against
the common enemy, Vietnam has done its utmost to contribute to the lofty
solidarity between the three nations and to fulfill its international duties
towards the common cause of revolution.
All true revolutionaries, and patriots are dutybound to defend and promote
this lofty solidarity. Only the imperialists and world reactionaries are
striving to undermine it.
Why then have the Kampuchean authorities distorted history and called white
black in slandering the Socialist Republic of Vietnam? "The Indochinese
Federation" is history, and for the past twenty years and more has never been
referred to. If the "Indochinese Federation" question really stands in the way
of the friendly relations between the two countries, why then do they not agree
to sign with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam "a treaty in which they
undertake to respect each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial
integrity, to refrain from agression, from the use of force or the threat to
use force in their relations with each other, from interference in each other's
internal affairs, and from subversive activities against each other, to treat
each other on an equal footing, and to live in peace and friendship in a good
neighbourly relationship," and "a treaty on the border question on the basis of
respect for each other's territorial inteqrity within the existing borders,"
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as proposed by the Vietnamese side on February 5, 1978? The fact that they
resurrect this historical matter just as they have done with the historical
question of territory between the two countries, is but a stratagem to arouse
national hatred and enmity. The policy of fanning national hatred and enmity
between Kampuchea and Vietnam and sabotaging the friendship between the two
peoples is part of their policy of creating border conflicts with neighbouring
countries, applying a closed-door foreign policy, enhancing narrow nationalism
and rejecting international and regional cooperation (such as cooperation on
the Mekong River). The Kampuchean authorities' foreign policy is aimed at
serving their intensified repression of the people in their country and their
purging of revolutionaries and patriots opposed to their erroneous line; it is
also aimed at consolidating their power and diverting public opinion at home,
which has become indignant at their criminal domestic policies.
In undermining the traditional solidarity between the three countries, the
Kampuchean authorities are not only betraying their people's close comrades-in-
arms but also cutting across their people's sacred feelings and national
interests. Although the imperialists have been forced to withdraw from
Indochina, they have not given up their vicious intention to sabotage the inde-
pendence and peace of the three Indochinese countries. By undermining the
militant solidarity between the three peoples, the Kampuchean authorities are
committing a crime which is encouraged by the imperialists and world
reactionaries, and for which they must be held fully responsible to their own
people and to history.
The Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam affirms the following:
1. "The Indochinese Federation" is a question which has passed forever
into history. As of 1934 after Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea regained their
national sovereignty and territorial integrity and were recognized by many
countries in the world, it has no longer been mentioned by the Laotians, the
Kampucheans or the Vietnamese. Holding high the banner of national indepen-
dence and socialism, the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam once
again affirms that there is no such question as the Indochinese Federation.
2. The Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam unswervingly
honours its commitments in the Geneva Agreements on Indochina (1954) and the
Geneva Agreement on Laos (1962), the Paris Agreement and the Act of Inter-
national Conference on Vietnam (1973) as well as other international documents
it has signed concerning its relations with Laos and Kampuchea: strict respect
for the independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, political
system and the independent and sovereign line of the two fraternal countries -
Laos and Kampuchea -, respect for the independence of the People's Revolutionary
Party of Laos and the Communist Party of Kampuchea, and non-interference in the
internal affairs of Laos and Kampuchea. It is prepared to sign a treaty on
mutual respect with Kampuchea and a treaty concerning the border between the
two countries as proposed in its February 5, 1978 statement.
3. The Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam will continue to
make every effort to preserve and strengthen the militant solidarity and
fraternal friendship between the Vietnamese and the Kampuchean peoples, and
between the peoples of the three countries on the Indochinese peninsula.
The Vietnamese people are confident that in the end justice will prevail,
and the solidarity and friendship between the Vietnamese and Kampuchean peoples
will prevail.
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